A soldier has returned from the front: does the government have a plan for his adaptation?
Tatiana Rybakova
Sooner or later, the fighting will end, and hundreds of thousands of people whose job it was to kill will return. Will they find a new career, or will Russia face a new wave of crime? And if so, which regions will it hit?
About 250 thousand people who returned from the North-Eastern Military District are not employed, сообщил Sergei Novikov, head of the Presidential Directorate for Public Projects, said, "We have a fairly large gray area—tens of thousands of people who... haven't found employment. They've returned, aren't working, are either spending the money they received, or are making ends meet in other ways... Overall, 250 people... haven't found employment anywhere... We must, of course, address this," RIA Novosti quoted him as saying. However, his words, like the headline, were soon fixed — apparently, the figure seemed too frightening. And this alone speaks to the seriousness of the problem. Meanwhile, the issue of adapting these people to civilian life could become a test of the system's readiness for the return home of at least a million people whose profession in recent years has been the ability to kill.
Specific contingent
First, it's worth understanding who these quarter-million returnees are today. Currently, those mobilized in 2022 can return either if hostilities end or if they are wounded. Contract soldiers can only return if they are wounded; their contracts are essentially indefinite. Moreover, given the abundant evidence that even those sent into combat are on crutches, it's easy to assume that demobilization is only possible with injuries that render a person completely useless at the front. A separate group of demobilized individuals were former prisoners who fought with Wagner; they were demobilized with their criminal records expunged after six months. Now, after campaign Following the attack on Moscow by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of Wagner, and his death, Wagner was disbanded, and prisoners who had not yet been demobilized are fighting as contract soldiers, on the same basis.
So, the 250 returnees Novikov mentioned are a very specific group. On the one hand, they are people with serious injuries, possibly with psychological consequences, who are unlikely to compete equally in the labor market with healthy candidates. On the other, they are former prisoners, a significant proportion of whom had not just criminal convictions before being sent to the front, but convictions for murder and serious injury: Prigozhin made no secret of the fact that he gave preference to such people when recruiting. Again, it's hard to imagine employers' delight at such applicants. And they themselves, especially those with several tours of duty, are often not particularly eager to work. They typically had a good amount of money upon demobilization, at least by their standards, and if they've run out of it in the past two years, old habits are more likely to suggest a different path than searching for suitable openings.
It's worth noting that "going out" after demobilization is a traditional behavior for mobilized soldiers of all times and nations. After a life of adrenaline, potential injuries, and the absence of familiar peacetime joys, people's attempts to "recapture" what they were deprived of are understandable. Another issue is that some eventually reintegrate into civilian life, while others try to "continue the party" by any means necessary. This is where pressure from both society and the state becomes crucial: on the one hand, society should push individuals to adopt socially acceptable behavior as quickly as possible, while the state should facilitate their transition to civilian life. In the case of today's demobilized soldiers, this is especially important, as their unique circumstances often make some unable, and others unwilling, to adapt independently.
Difficulties of adaptation
The first to take up the adaptation of the demobilized United States after the end of World War II - and it must be admitted that even today This remains a serious problem. Both foreign and Russian psychologists recognize Even if a person returning from war doesn't have PTSD (it occurs in an average of 30% of those who fought), this doesn't mean they don't suffer from moral trauma. And this trauma remains with them forever. In the case of today's Russia, this is complicated by the fact that psychologists, even if they work with returnees, are unlikely to deviate from the state doctrine of the justness of the war and the rightness of what the person did in Ukraine. And if a person's moral principles contradict this, the consequences can be quite severe.
However, will every returnee even get such a psychologist? On the one hand, Vladimir Putin will be back in 2024. ordered Provide psychological support to every demobilized person. He entrusted this task to the state-run "Defenders of the Fatherland" foundation, headed by his niece, Anna Tsivileva, Deputy Minister of Defense, as well as to those foundations that received presidential grants for this purpose. On the other hand, judging by an accidental leak from one such foundation, their work cannot boast of being effective. In particular, according to According to leaks, in 2024 alone in the Stavropol Territory, every tenth former prisoner ended up behind bars again after returning from the war.
The problem of delinquency among demobilized soldiers—and not just ex-convicts—is only getting worse. A common story: a returning "SVO participant" begins to display aggression toward family members, neighbors, and even complete strangers. And often these acts of aggression end in tragically: Last year alone, those returning from the front killed at least 11 women. In total, over the course of the war, they killed or maimed more than 1000 people, about 8 thousand convicted for various crimes. Considering that "SVO veterans" are only taken on in serious cases, it's no surprise that people greet them with fear and mistrust. This includes potential employers.
If we believe Putin, there are currently more than 700 thousands man. Based on his previous data in terms of the size of the invading army, approximately this size was maintained throughout the fighting throughout the war. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington recently appreciated Russia's losses during the war in killed, wounded, and missing amounted to 1,2 million people. The number of those killed during these years, according to various sources, ranges from 165 to 325. A simple calculation shows that, according to the most conservative estimates, after the end of hostilities, Russia will be home to at least a million people whose occupation in recent years was murder and violence. The question arises: does Russia have a system for adapting such a large number of people to civilian life?
Much noise, little sense
One of the most publicized programs for former war veterans is "Time of Heroes." On the program's website says, that its goals are: “To prepare highly qualified, competent managers from among the participants of the SVO for subsequent work in state and municipal government bodies, as well as state-owned companies,” and that “the program involves training in modern management methods and technologies, teamwork, and personal development.”
But to get into the program, you need to have experience in managing people and a higher education. Considering that most of all mobilized were from the poorest regions, and contract Signed by residents of the same depressed regions, who are typically unencumbered by a good education and a sought-after profession, it's clear that this program is far from for everyone. And even with the promised leadership positions not everything is okay: there are no vacancies in government, and the “veterans of the SVO” themselves often do not have the necessary competencies, despite completing the “Time of Heroes” program. And the adoption billThe plan, according to which "veterans of the SVO" will be virtually impossible to fire, makes the employment prospects for many of them dubious. The only option left is to invite them to schools to teach children about patriotism—but there's no money for this, and judging by demographic indicators, there may not be enough children for all the "veterans of the SVO."
In principle, there's nothing new in the Russian authorities' reaction: they're accustomed to responding to any challenge by creating programs, mega-organizations, fighting for funding, and loud PR campaigns—followed by the quiet disappearance of these projects from the news agenda, often returning in the form of scandals and criminal cases of embezzlement. However, this time, it's not about "mastering" funds to create some import-substituting miracle or an ambitious route through the Arctic ice floes: the question is, will Russia face a new wave of violence from maladjusted "veterans of the Central Military District," as happened in the 90s with the returning "Afghans"? If serious measures aren't taken now, this wave could be much more severe: over the years of the war in Afghanistan, it has seen... 620 thousands People, and the number of those who experienced the war in Ukraine is already twice that. And these aren't conscripts sent to Afghanistan—people from all sorts of backgrounds—but, as already mentioned, a rather specific contingent: former prisoners, marginalized individuals, people who weren't particularly well-adapted to real life even before the war, or simply weak enough to resist their superiors and informal authorities.
A local problem
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that most of those sent to war are from poor regions that lack their own resources for rehabilitation programs for those returning, lack the necessary specialists, and, what's more, lack sufficient suitable vacancies for veterans. Will the demobilized return home? Some will—if they have family, housing, and employment prospects there. Many will go to more prosperous regions—Moscow and the Moscow region, St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region, and the southern regions. And this will exacerbate the adaptation problems.
Those from the North Caucasus will likely face the fewest problems: they typically have a place to return to, a large and close-knit family circle at home, and a society that is tolerant of organized violence while also strictly controlling domestic violence. The most likely challenge there will be the status of women: while traditional society tolerates violence against them, those returning from war will be able to vent their aggression primarily on the women of their families.
The cult of war and the military largely exists in regions such as Buryatia and Tuva. Here, some softening of the morals of those returning from war will be ensured by social respect and assistance with employment and adaptation. However, employment in these regions, which are, frankly speaking, poor, will likely be informal and low-wage. For people accustomed to large wartime payouts, this could be a problem. On the other hand, if the authorities in these regions encourage veterans to open their own businesses, this problem could be mitigated.
Things will be more difficult in regions without such traditions. In a region like Kuzbass, for example, where mining customs are very reminiscent of military hazing, the problem for "veterans of the Soviet military" will likely be employment and a decent income. While society there lacks a tradition of honoring veterans, it does react harshly to aggression that is "unjustified." And if the global situation changes and coal and ferrous metal prices begin to rise, things could improve. However, the situation in prosperous regions will likely be the most challenging. On the one hand, many demobilized soldiers will flock there. On the other hand, it is precisely these regions that have the least combat experience and are the most wary and dismissive of "veterans of the Soviet military." This situation is a ripe breeding ground for conflict and violence.
Trial version
It's not that the authorities don't understand this problem. But so far, proposals for solving it have been put forward by dubious characters and seem quite exotic. For example, economist Sergei Karaganov from the Higher School of Economics offers Send "Northern Military District veterans" to develop Siberia. Let them, they say, build the infrastructure for the proclaimed "pivot to the East." Let's not even mention the enormous funding needed to build such infrastructure in Russia's deficit-ridden budget. But the problem is that only Russia has made the infamous "pivot to the East," and even then, it was forced to do so—while the main target of Russia's interest, China, is in no hurry to turn toward Russia. And no other projects in Siberia with potential and scale sufficient to accommodate a million people are currently or are in the offing: sanctions and a lack of necessary technology are hampering exploration and development of new deposits.
But let's even assume that such large-scale projects do emerge—in Siberia or elsewhere. For example, Russia will indeed begin developing rare earth metal deposits or something similar together with the United States. Where, excuse me, will the people involved live? Currently, Arctic projects are most often developed on a rotational basis. But those returning from war, especially former prisoners, often don't have housing—where will they return to after their shifts? This means new settlements, perhaps even cities, will need to be built. Let's not even speculate about the crime situation there—after all, many new construction projects, including the development of Siberia, began with precisely this, attracting a significant contingent of criminals and declassed elements. And no matter, over time everything leveled out. However, building not even a city, but a settlement, also requires considerable funding. Where will the money come from?
Perhaps it would be more appropriate to create a program similar to construction Levittowns — suburban communities with good social infrastructure and affordable standard homes for veterans in the United States after World War II. They were awarded through lotteries or offered with very low-cost mortgages with minimal down payments. While these communities eventually attracted criticism, they served their purpose: veterans received housing close to cities with a significant need for labor, and the mortgage, though affordable, prevented idleness. Furthermore, the project's architect, William Levitt, head of Levitt & Sons, established rather strict regulations in the communities: loud noise was prohibited, the house and lawn had to be kept clean and tidy, etc. In other words, while veterans received housing and employment opportunities, they also benefited from socialization. However, private developers in Russia are still reluctant to build individual homes: land is expensive, and the hassle of obtaining permits and connecting utilities is just as difficult as building more affordable apartment buildings. However, it's unlikely that anyone would undertake to build apartment buildings for veterans, let alone teach them how to mow lawns.
All that remains is to hope that the authorities' concerns will ultimately translate into something more constructive than PR projects and wild proposals. And it's possible that the current 250 unemployed veterans will serve as the litmus test that will determine whether the authorities are ready for the return of those who shed Ukrainian blood for them.
