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Propaganda for Normies

How regional media dissolve war into everyday life and make it "normal" 

Propaganda in Russia is usually associated with television and newscasters whose words have long been parodied into quotations that incite shame in Spain—like "Turn the US into radioactive ash" or "Freedom is not having to choose." This type of propaganda is typically aggressive, head-on, and targets millions. But alongside it, there's another, less visible form, aimed at a narrower audience: the propaganda of regional and local media. It uses less radical techniques; readers often don't recognize it as propaganda, and journalists and researchers often don't notice it. However, it continues to speak to local audiences daily and, in its own way, convey the necessary ideas.

NeMoskva examined at least 200 publications in 50 city, municipal, and district media outlets across various regions and asked experts about the most common local propaganda techniques and whether their narratives influence public perceptions. 

От редакции: This article does not generalize its findings to all regional and local media outlets. The ability of such media to fully cover military topics is indeed severely limited. However, even under censorship restrictions within the country, editorial staff continue to operate that discuss the war in one way or another (in Aesopian language, focusing on the social and humanitarian consequences) or, at a minimum, avoid propaganda. 

Methods and narratives of regional propaganda

Throughout the four years of the war, the propaganda discourse in regional media has been quite homogeneous: the media write the same stories, using the same cliches and formats, comments a media researcher and Telegram channel author. cogito ergo cum Nikolay ChikishevSuch publications ignore regional characteristics and identity markers. If the name of the federal subject is omitted, it becomes impossible to understand which region is being discussed. 

Next are the methods and narratives that are widely used by media in different regions.

1. The image of the region as “contributing”

examples: 

• Transbaikalia ranked 9th in the Russian Federation for the number of Heroes of Russia in the North-Eastern Military District. (Chita.ru, Transbaikal Territory).
• Tyumen residents raised over 143 million rubles to support SVO participants. (GTRK "Region - Tyumen").

One of the goals of regional propaganda is to "integrate" the war with Ukraine into the regional agenda, says a journalist and media researcher. Vasily Gatov. This is achieved through the logic of participation and comparison: a region begins to exist in the media space as a unit of contribution—how many people left, how much aid was collected, how many awards were received. This is reminiscent of peaceful forms of interregional rivalry—economic, sporting, demographic—but transferred to a military context. 

A striking example is the "competition" over how many Heroes of Russia a region has in the "SVO" and what place it occupies in the ranking of federal subjects based on their number. Remarkable and the desire to rise to a higher level that sometimes appears “even funny,” he notes Ilya Shepelin, A journalist and host of the "Zomboyaschik" program on the YouTube channel "Popular Politics" wrote: "Chita.ru" writes that the Zabaikalsky Krai took ninth place, but immediately explains in the subtitle: if you evaluate it differently, it would be fourth." 

"Participation in the war becomes a way to confirm one's own significance," comments Vasily Gatov. "At the same time, the region as a political entity (and especially its media) has no right to interpret what's happening. It can participate, help, be proud, and mourn, but not explain—the interpretation remains federal. In such circumstances, locality is forced to become quantitative (what is our contribution?) and commemorative." (i) (relating to the perpetuation of memory) (our heroes are the most heroic and ours). 

2. The main character is a local soldier, “one of us”

examples: 

• The Sacred Path of a Hero: The Feat of Yugra Resident Asker Ilyazov (PokachiInform, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug).
• Tractor driver, entrepreneur, fireman. A Transbaikal resident died in the North Military District. (Chita.ru, Transbaikal Territory).
• "I know what the dirt of war is, but I cannot stand aside." (Proofs, Republic of Bashkortostan).
• A member of the SVO from Samosdelka spoke about his military career. (Delta Lighthouse, Kamyzyak, Astrakhan region).

In regional media, the main hero of the war is a locally recognizable figure, integrated into the familiar structures of civilian life. This person is a graduate of a local school, an employee of a local company, someone's son or brother—"one of us," explains Gatov. Such a hero differs fundamentally from the classic image of a warrior: he is not so much the subject of action as the bearer of the right qualities and a symbol of community belonging.

"This glorification removes the need to explain the goals and causes of the war," the expert comments. "The hero's biography replaces the political context, and familiar journalistic genres—feature stories, obituaries, stories about 'ordinary people'—allow us to discuss the war without overstepping the bounds of what's acceptable. The hero, however, is deprived of his own voice. He's not a subject, but an image, needed for memory and ritual, not for conversation." 

In some publications, the combatants are given the floor. Then, the soldiers simply repeat "what the political officer told them," notes Ilya Shepelin. These are the same phrases: "We had no other choice," "If we don't bring war there, they'll bring war to us," "We're defending our country, our home, not some distant frontiers and borders." Such words are the only thing a person who has resigned themselves to the fact that they will have to kill others and may die themselves can cling to, the expert believes. 

"Examples and personal stories are essential for propaganda. Regional press stories feature individual soldiers so that readers perceive the fighting not as a single mass, but as individuals. This is part of a larger advertising campaign for contract service," Shepelin believes. "Such stories should convince people: look, he's not a soldier, but the Nazis' insolence forced him to stop being a 'tractor driver, entrepreneur, stoker' and sign a contract. You can do the same—and inspire them: if you go to war, you'll be a hero like him, and they'll interview you too." 

3. Another hero is a regional volunteer.

examples:

• Kamyzyak volunteers help SVO fighters (Delta Lighthouse, Kamyzyak, Astrakhan region).
• A grandmother from Aleksandrovka helps SVO soldiers in memory of her fallen grandson. (Stavropol-on-Volga, Tolyatti, Samara region).
• Adam Delimkhanov fulfilled the New Year's wish of a SVO participant's son from Stavropol Krai for a Lego set. (News of the Chechen Republic).

A local volunteer who helps the military by weaving camouflage nets, collecting rations, and sewing and knitting clothing for soldiers is another hero. Such "unarmed" citizen activism remains one of the few ways for the media to demonstrate that at least part of society cares about the progress and outcome of the war, explains Vasily Gatov. 

Publications about volunteers seem to say: people who live near us and don't hold weapons wake up wondering how the "SVO fighters" are doing, and they too participate in supporting the war, says Ilya Shepelin. 

"This is a kind of 'gasket' for public opinion, an attempt to reconcile it with the ongoing nightmare: look, there's something good about this, people have come together and are helping," the expert explains. "Furthermore, such publications create a positive image of the war. The public is likely to have a largely negative attitude toward those who go to fight for big money or to be released from prison. In such circumstances, we need to create a different symbol of war. If people associate it not with a soldier, but with a grandmother weaving camouflage nets, then they will be calmer and more indifferent to what's happening." 

In such texts, a family narrative is clearly evident, notes Nikolai Chikishev: 

— The emphasis is on presenting "us" as a kind of "family," where everyone comes to each other's aid: helping wounded soldiers, widows of soldiers... This narrative is quite holistic and closed: for the local community, the war doesn't seem to exist (its victims, war crimes, and other horrors are not described), but only this mutual aid. How can one not join in, when "in difficult times, we are all one big family"?

4. Ritualization of death and glorification of the dead

examples:

• A young SVO participant was buried in Karelia today. (Petrozavodsk says Republic of Karelia).
• Mikhail Pelyatagin, a resident of the village of Krasneno, died in the North Military District. (IA "Chukotka").
• Touched a Thousand Hearts. Confession of the Mother of a Deceased SVO Participant (Irkutsk.Media).

For propaganda to be effective, it must be grounded in reality, notes Nikolai Chikishev. Regional media outlets can't completely ignore the deaths of their fellow countrymen in the war and regularly publish news about them. Most of the articles are based on Defense Ministry reports, which are very dry. Authors use the same clichés that don't evoke emotion: "died a hero's death," "showed an example of immeasurable courage." This is done deliberately, the expert believes: this way, the publications don't attract much attention and aren't remembered by people, meaning they won't associate the "SVO" with death.

Although rare, there are still emotional stories that recount the life and journey of the deceased, and allow their loved ones to speak. Such materials also don't aim to show the many casualties of war; death is mentioned in passing. Their purpose is to glorify the fallen, explains Nikolai Chikishev: for example, in text Irkutsk.media The connection between the deceased and his ancestors who fought in the same places is emphasized, and the narrator, like any mother, idealizes her child, unknowingly helping the journalists achieve their goal.

"We're once again seeing family and memorial narratives. 'At that moment, I realized my son was a hero, and I had to send him off on his final journey with honor,'" Chikishev quotes the publication. "This way, the reader is invited not only to empathize with the mother's grief but also to learn that in the Russian army, ordinary people become heroes."

Moreover, in both the dry and more emotional materials, death is almost immediately translated into the language of memory, bypassing the stage of comprehension—those who have just died in the war are “immortalized”: 

"As a result, memory is created before there's a chance to understand what exactly happened. And, frankly, contrary to this understanding. After all, society more or less imagines that the 'heroes of the SVO' aren't heroes at all, and this regularly manifests itself in the attitudes of the lower classes toward them," says Vasily Gatov.

5. Memorial discourse and cliched language

examples:

• War is different, goals are unchanged (Kogalym News, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug). 
• A native of Bashkortostan received the Gold Star: why was General Garifullin named a Hero of Russia? (Proofs, Republic of Bashkortostan).

Local authorities, followed by the media, are picking up on signals from Putin and his entourage about the "mega-memorialization of Victory 1945" and are trying to fit into this trend as best they can, mechanically transferring narratives of the Great Patriotic War to the current war, comments Vasily Gatov. As a result, Nikolai Chikishev believes, a "memorial discourse" is emerging in regional media: historical parallels with the 1941-1945 war are constantly being drawn: "The soldier served as his grandfather, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, bequeathed," "The army's ranks continue to be filled with patriots of the Fatherland, worthy of the glory of their ancestors."

Experts believe that the media are forced to use the language of those times. There are limitations on the detail of descriptions of the war in general and specific events (location, circumstances, and especially the reasons for these circumstances), which often leads to the use of phrases borrowed from the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War instead of living, contemporary vocabulary.

— The language of specific memorialization textually goes back to invectives i (an offensive, accusatory statement directed against a specific person or group) [one of the founders of the Red Army] Leon Trotsky. Essentially, it was necessary to "separate" their own dead from the "Whites," and Trotsky, who had a keen sense of language, literally "developed" instructions for writing about the victims. Over time, his ideological formulas permeated everyday speech and became the "norm." Since many Russian journalists don't know any other language, they use it.

 “He died a hero’s death,” “He gave his life for his homeland,” “One more step towards victory has been taken,” “The enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours,” “He defended the land of his ancestors” – all these expressions, says Chikishev, are reminiscent of “reports from the Stalingrad front.” 

"It's a simple and easily understood narrative, familiar clichés," the interviewee comments. "This language is well suited to the main goal of propaganda: manipulating public consciousness. Using these clichés, the media presents today's war as a nationwide and victorious one." 

6. Idealization/whitewashing of the image of those returning from war

examples:

• A veteran of the Air Defense Forces held a Courage Lesson at the Scarlet Sails Center in Tyumen. (GTRK "Region - Tyumen"). 
• Public administration courses begin for the Heroes of Chukotka group. (IA "Chukotka").
• "People could rip your head off for this." Gurulev stated that society isn't afraid of soldiers returning from the Northern Military District. (Chita.ru).
• "All three deserve shame and contempt." An E1.RU journalist on the rape of a 15-year-old schoolgirl in Yekaterinburg. (E1).

A common narrative in city and municipal media is that the situation in the region is calm, and residents who returned from the war are not afraid. Many publications report that these people are being adapted to civilian life, trained, provided with social support, found employment, and are engaged in productive activities. However, there are reports of crimes committed by those who returned (since February 2022, about nine hundred war veterans have returned). convicted for violent actions), or they don’t write, or they write in a way that doesn’t catch the eye. 

During the first two years of the war, relatively independent regional media made no attempt to conceal the veteran status of murderers and rapists; mention of it might appear in the headline or subheading. Now, it might appear in the third or fourth paragraph of a publication, and so on. 

See also: Cooing, affection and village community - How Yakut propaganda sells war to the people

Is regional propaganda effective?

This kind of propaganda allows for reaching a wider audience. Vladimir Solovyov-style campaigning is aimed at a small "core electorate"—people demanding an escalation of the conflict and general mobilization, explains Ilya Shepelin. Most Russians don't respond to this: they simply want to live their lives; for them, the war truly exists somewhere in the background. It is these people who are targeted by regional "propaganda for the masses." normis" i (a colloquial word from internet slang; a person perceived as "ordinary", belonging to popular culture, not belonging to a narrow subculture or a specific community, and also a representative of the "mainstream"; a bearer of common tastes and views) as something less burdensome for the psyche and emotional background.

“This is quite moderate propaganda, but it works for its audience, regularly reminding: there is a war going on somewhere - this is normal, the people around you support it - this is normal, - explains the expert. "For example, [the media] often write about volunteers who weave nets: maybe there are only a thousand of them in a city of a million, but it seems like they're the majority. This achieves the main goal: those who don't support the war feel like they're in the minority." 

And people ultimately choose to remain silent. Spiral silence i (a theory of social behavior by German political scientist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, according to which people tend to hide their opinions if they consider them unpopular or socially disapproved) It's getting twisted, and political persecution is helping her with this. 

It's also important to understand, says Nikolai Chikishev, that the goals of propaganda have changed over the four years of war. In 2022, the media was dominated by propaganda Propaganda calling for action (e.g., "kill the enemy"). Over time, society grew tired of this narrative, and the government's goals shifted. Now, Vasily Gatov explains, they need an influx of contract soldiers and volunteers, while also preventing growing problems from erupting into mass protest. The latter requires isolating society from the war, relegating it to the background ("Ostasia has always been at war with Oceania," as in the novel "1984"). 

As a result, the propaganda of many media outlets, including regional ones, became integrationShe doesn't call for urgent action, but rather gently and gradually shapes public opinion. Now her goal is to make people accept the war as a given.

Gatov believes integration propaganda is more effective than agitational propaganda: it doesn't require consent, but rather creates a habit. Regional media don't "sell" the war directly, but rather "dissolve" it in the information flow—news about school, culture, charity, and the economy. This kind of propaganda may be more readily consumed by audiences, as it has a therapeutic effect, according to Chikishev: it convinces residents of the regions that they are not subjects of the war, but merely observers. 

Potential discontent is then channeled into safer forms of activism (inviting veterans to schools to tell children about the war, expressing grief—and preferably without explaining why people died), responsibility is diffused, and a sense of the historical inevitability of what is happening is formed, notes Vasily Gatov. 

Regional media don't write about the war itself; they simply mention it as a circumstance. Something happens somewhere—and you can donate clothes, help weave camouflage nets, sympathize with the widows. This way, everything becomes trivial: so what, it's war? — adds Nikolai Chikishev.  

Regional propaganda integrates into normalcy and creates a context that becomes acceptable to the audience. All of this, taken together, "holds together the social fabric" in the face of prolonged conflict and helps people feel at least some sense of support. The fighting becomes a backdrop, which helps the authorities achieve both goals: ensuring an influx of people and resources and preventing the perception of all-out war.