Hunting for "brunettes"
How Caucasians and migrants became convenient targets for public denunciations
A monument to veterans of the Ministry of Emergency Situations near the Slavyansky Bulvar metro station in Moscow, early winter. Dagestani Zaur Ismailov throws a sports harness over a boy's statue in the memorial and does some exercises. Then he slaps the statue's cap several times, miming the blows.
Zaur films his morning workout and then posts it on Instagram. That same day, Z-blogger and neo-Nazi Vladislav Pozdnyakov writes on his Telegram channel that Ibrahim is mocking the memory of veterans. "The devil will soon apologize, just wait," he says. comments Pozdnyakov. The young man was indeed quickly apprehended. Now he faces a real prison sentence of up to five years.
Ismailov's story is yet another example of how public denunciation works in today's Russian reality. While many use it, the far right has made denunciation practically their primary tool. In this situation, migrants and people from the North Caucasus have been particularly targeted.
"NeMoscow" in collaboration with the publication Fortanga I studied this phenomenon and talked about it with the head of the Memorial anti-discrimination center.
- The Story of Zaur Ismagilov
- How denunciations work
- Particularly vulnerable group
- Digital and street surveillance
- Effective because it's convenient
"Am I pissing on him, spitting on him?"
Zaur Ismailov, confident that he had done nothing wrong, tried to explain"There's a monument [standing]. He [the boy] is giving a military salute to a veteran. It's just convenient. He's got a tourniquet on it. Am I peeing or spitting on it? It's a beautiful monument. I'm not hiding from anyone and never will be. I respect it. I've been running here every morning for six years now, throwing my arm and tourniquets on it. What a pit... You've got it all wrong." He even posted his phone number for those "who want to see him."
However, it didn't help. The guy was arrested that same day. frames, which were posted by Russian security forces, it is clear that they are twisting his arm. In early December 2025, the court concluded Ismailov was taken into custody. A criminal case has been opened against him for desecrating military monuments. The maximum penalty is five years in prison.
Ismailov suffers from a serious illness—multiple sclerosis. He also has a young son. The defendant also donated 50 rubles to a charitable foundation to help mobilized soldiers. His brother participated in counterterrorism operations and has received awards. His lawyer cited all of these arguments in court when requested Ismailov was not taken into custody. However, he was still sent to pretrial detention until February 5.
"I left the house at eight in the morning for a workout, all neat and tidy. There's a monument, I gave a military salute, tied a clean rubber band around my hand—I didn't want to tie it to a tree so as not to break it—I did the exercise, and ran on. I've lived in this neighborhood for several years. Here, on the benches by this monument, people drink, smoke, spit, and litter almost every day, and I'm a criminal... I didn't know, I'd done something stupid, the doctor told me to train, to buy a bandage," говорил athlete in court.
Friends and acquaintances of the Dagestani claim he didn't expect such an outcome and wasn't even worried at first. He thought the worst he could face was harassment from Telegram channels, a friend of the athlete told NeMoskva.
"Zaur was never a conflict-prone person. He raised his own child and played sports. He never had a criminal record, and he never caused any problems for himself or us. What did he do that deserves to be locked up? A young man who never harmed anyone," Ismailov's relative complained to us.

Lawyer friends told her there was a chance Zaur wouldn't be released on February 5th. And indeed, he extended A preventive measure has been issued, but the length of the detention is still unclear. Lawyer Kamandar Karaev announced that he is no longer handling the Dagestani's case and hung up.
Lawyers consulted by NeMoskva note that desecration charges most often do not result in arrest. For example, in July 2025, three men committed an act of vandalism In relation to the "Blockade Tram" monument in St. Petersburg, the case is ongoing. Unlike Zaur Ismailov, 32-year-old Mikhail Dmitriev, 33-year-old Ivan Trunov, and 30-year-old Anatoly Semenov actually vandalized the monument: they broke a memorial plaque and then urinated from the roof of a tram. However, the men were only placed under house arrest, which was later commuted to a "prohibition of certain activities." A verdict has not yet been issued in this case; the next trial is scheduled for March 3.
How denunciations work
Ismailov's story is yet another example of how public denunciation works in contemporary Russian reality. This genre has changed significantly in our time. In the classic sense, a denunciation is a report to the authorities about a "violation," made by an individual or organization and triggering a repressive or disciplinary response. In Russia in the 2020s, a significant portion of denunciations have become public and media-distributed. A complaint often exists in two realms: the official—in the form of a complaint to the police, the Investigative Committee, the prosecutor's office, or Roskomnadzor—and the public—in the form of a post on social media.

In recent years, denunciations have become not a side effect of civic activism, but an independent tool of pressure. And some far-right groups have turned them into their primary mode of operation, building strong ties with law enforcement, the Anti-Discrimination Center Memorial explained to NeMoskva.
"Certainly, part of the nationalist sector is primarily engaged in snitching, especially the 'Russian Community,' they have direct contact with the Investigative Committee: some inform, others put people in jail. Sometimes they think it's inciting hatred against Russians, sometimes slandering the 'SVO,' and so on," comments Stefania Kulaeva, head of the anti-discrimination center.
The key mechanism of modern denunciations is this: informants file complaints, and the state apparatus itself chooses who exactly to punish as an example. Moreover, representatives of ethnic diasporas are increasingly becoming victims of informants, the human rights activist shares her observations.
Particularly vulnerable group
People from the North Caucasus are one of the most vulnerable groups in this regard: Caucasian identity has been embedded in the language of hostility for decades. Caucasians and Asians have always been targets of nationalists, according to the Memorial anti-discrimination center.
The expert reminds history Usman Baratov, president of the interregional Uzbek community "Vatandosh," posted a photo of a chicken on his social media page in January 2024, captioned, "No butter, no eggs! Bring back the roosters from the front!" Russian neo-Nazis and "war correspondents" reported the incident to the Investigative Committee, and Bastrykin immediately ordered a criminal investigation. Russian politicians were also outraged at the time, including Pyotr Tolstoy, a State Duma deputy from United Russia. saidthat national diasporas, regional associations and communities are “legalized mafia structures,” and called for an end to “interethnic liberalism.”
"How are these 'compatriots' any better than similar ones in Corsica or Sicily? They still bribe local authorities, cover for legitimate militants, protect semi-legal businesses, and intimidate everyone else. There should be no room in Russia for parallel structures with their own laws, customs, and authorities," говорил Tolstoy. The deputy's statement, of course, did not apply to the "Russian Community," known for illegal raids on migrants and "substituting" for law enforcement.

Xenophobia against people from the North Caucasus has been entrenched for years against the backdrop of the Chechen wars, rhetoric about the "terrorist threat," and media images of "dangerous outsiders." This layer has been documented by both sociologists and human rights activists. For example, Levada Center reports back in 2013 right The persistent nature of social distancing towards Caucasians and its historical causes were discussed. The UN Special Rapporteurs on contemporary forms of racism in the same year celebrated, that in Russia, people from the North Caucasus are associated with terrorism and extremism, and this is reflected in law enforcement practices. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, in its report on Russia pointed out, that police are more often stopping and checking Chechens and other residents of the Caucasus, suspecting them of involvement in extremist activities.
"The police and prosecutors are prone to ethnic profiling, that is, a willingness to approach charges from a biased, racist perspective. Back in the 1990s, Sergei Adamovich Kovalev, then the Human Rights Commissioner, said, 'The police don't catch bandits, but brunettes.'" Back then, prejudice against Chechens was particularly prevalent, during the First Chechen War. Unfortunately, the hunt for "brunettes" has only intensified in recent years. — states Stefania Kulaeva.
Modern denunciations of Caucasians fall into an established pattern. A blogger or organization describes an incident involving them in a way that makes it seem not an isolated incident, but a threat to the "titular nation." This mechanism is clearly visible in the story of athlete Zaur Ismailov: Vladislav Pozdnyakov repackages an everyday act as a symbolic crime.
Digital and street surveillance
Pozdnyakov is one of Russia's most notorious "serial informers." In 2016, he founded "Male State," an online community built on misogynistic and nationalist discourse. Formally dedicated to "defending traditional values," the movement's practical mission was the systematic persecution of women, activists, journalists, LGBTQ people, and migrants.

In 2021, the "Male State" was declared an extremist organization and banned in Russia. This had no effect on its leader: Vladislav Pozdnyakov quickly abandoned the formal movement and focused on personal blogging on Telegram. This allowed him to maintain his audience while simultaneously distancing himself from the legally toxic organization.
The platform change coincided with a shift in the neo-Nazi's focus. Previously, the "Male State"'s main targets were women and feminists, but Telegram increasingly featured posts about people from the Caucasus and migrants.
The target of these posts is not so much the channel's audience as law enforcement agencies. This is evident in Pozdnyakov's rhetoric, which largely aligns with the official state message: "desecration," "disrespect," "spitting in the memory," "mockery of symbols." The blogger accompanies almost every such publication with predictions of punishment: detention, public apologies, criminal prosecution. Sometimes these predictions come true.
Digital surveillance is complemented by street surveillance. The most notable example is the aforementioned "Russian Community." Far-right activists conduct raids, inspections, and arrests, forcing their victims to record public apologies—in short, "acting as direct fighters against ethnic crime, replacing law enforcement agencies." notes Center "Sova".

The "Russian Community" often portrays Caucasian cultural otherness as "disrespect for the titular nation." For example, in June 2025, the "community members" have entered A conflict arose with a brother and sister from Tatarstan who were dancing the lezginka in the courtyard of a residential complex in Moscow's Lyublino. They began threatening the dancers, filming the incident, and demanding an apology. When asked what exactly they needed to apologize for, one of them saidthat the guy, dancing the lezginka, “is trying to show his superiority.”
The noise of the altercation drew children and teenagers aged 11 to 14 from the courtyard, residents of the complex, including some from Chechnya. According to the girl dancing the lezginka, the nationalists perceived this as a threat and called for "reinforcements." A short time later, about 30 more people from the "Russian Community" arrived. They surrounded the brother and sister and the teenagers, preventing them from leaving the courtyard. One of the children called their parents and reported that adult men were threatening them. When the relatives arrived, they saw a crowd in the courtyard holding their children back. A video from the scene shows one of the parents speaking. screaming"Why did you detain our kids? This kid is in first grade!" After the adults began to gather, the "community members" dispersed. The police did not intervene.
In August 2024, in St. Petersburg, a 38-year-old taxi driver from Dagestan complained to the police in response to threats from the "Russian Community." They detained nine "community members," and then the Investigative Committee aroused A criminal case. Not against the nationalists, but against the police officers who detained them. This led to a public conflict between the agencies. For right-wing activists stood up the entire Investigative Committee of Russia, together with its head, Alexander Bastrykin.
"Police officers detained activists [of the Russian Community] without cause, who had come to find out why a group of immigrants was preventing local taxi drivers from working," the Investigative Committee said in a statement. Criminal proceedings against the officers were initiated and dismissed several times. The Prosecutor's Office found the officers' actions to be lawful, but the Investigative Committee insisted on prosecuting them.
Effective because it's profitable
Denunciations work because they're convenient: the state can delegate some control to society while simultaneously retaining the ability to selectively respond. Denunciants provide security forces with incidents, and they decide which ones to use to demonstrate force and "protect values."
From February 2022 to May 2024 alone, serial informers filed at least 3,5 complaints. says In the "Important Stories" study, the authors emphasize that this is a minimum estimate, based solely on public appeals and announcements.

At the same time, the director of the Anti-Corruption Center "Memorial" notes that state institutions—the Duma, the Investigative Committee, and the authorities—"not only play along, but also impose xenophobic directives at the legislative level," demonstrating distrust of foreigners, immigrants, and other "others." The most striking example, according to Stefania Kulaeva, is the persecution of defenders of the rights of indigenous peoples and minorities in the Russian Federation.
— A year ago, their activities were suddenly announced "terrorist" i (On July 26, 2024, the Russian Ministry of Justice designated 55 Russian indigenous rights organizations as part of the "Anti-Russian Separatist Movement" and added them to the list of "extremists"; the organizations included the Sakha Pacifist Association, the Karelian National Movement, the Movement for the Independence of the Sakha Republic, the Committee of the Independent Confederation of Siberia, the Free Karelia movement, and the Free Yakutia Foundation.) "This is about people defending the climate, environmental, and linguistic rights of small peoples!" Kulaeva exclaims indignantly.
In the report of the Sova Center says The ongoing convergence of far-right ideology with official political rhetoric is underway. Initiatives promoted by nationalists are increasingly reflected in legislative practice, primarily in the areas of migration and the fight against "ethnic crime." The public sphere, meanwhile, fails to distinguish between migrants and Russian citizens from the North Caucasus; all are lumped together as "foreigners."
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