Iran Syndrome: Is Russia Lucky?
Which regions can benefit?
Author: Tatyana Rybakova
The US-Israeli "special military operation" in Iran has clearly gone awry. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, drone strikes on tourist hotspots in neighboring countries, and burning oil depots are all devastating the global economy. For now, the damage appears repairable. But what if the war drags on?
It seems the Trump administration hoped that the death of Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would create chaos within Iran's leadership, allowing protests to overthrow the current regime. Or perhaps Donald Trump was completely sincere. говорилThat the US had more negotiable candidates in mind for the leadership, in order to establish more productive relations without changing the regime itself, as was done in Venezuela, but they perished along with Khamenei. One way or another, "Tehran in three days" didn't happen. Not in a week, not in two. And even the "three to four weeks" that Trump spoke of seem unrealistic. Now the American president saysthat the operation will end "when I feel it." And while some experts worry that Trump won't "feel it" when Iran truly ceases to pose a threat to the region, others are confident that the conflict will be protracted. The actual timeframe is still unclear. unclearMeanwhile, it is the timing of the operation—at least its "hot" phase with military action—that determines what will happen to essential goods and services, and therefore, the entire global economy.
Oil and Gas

The biggest focus right now is on oil. Through the Strait of Hormuz exported 20-25% of the world's oil volume. The main suppliers are Saudi Arabia (37% of all shipments through the strait), Iraq (23%), the UAE, primarily the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (13%), Kuwait, and Iran itself (10% each). Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz—the chokepoint connecting the Persian and Oman Gulfs with the Arabian Sea—has always been the greatest fear during any escalation of the conflict between Iran and Israel or other countries. And now it has come true: although Iran's attempt to mine the gulf was unsuccessful (the US managed to destroy the mine-laying ships), Iranian missiles and drones pose no less a threat to ships. Last week, Iran attacked Three vessels—two tankers and a bulk carrier—were equipped with anti-ship missiles and drones in the Strait of Hormuz. This quickly cooled the ardor of risky captains who attempted to transit Hormuz with their transponders turned off, and it discouraged insurers from issuing insurance at any price and under any conditions. Although the US claims to have destroyed all of Iran's launchers, the counter-drone campaign has so far been unsuccessful.
Meanwhile, with the Strait of Hormuz at its narrowest point between Iran and Oman being 33-40 km wide, even the smallest and slowest drones pose a danger to oil tankers, and Iran clearly has a lot of them. Apparently, it is precisely because of the danger posed by drones that the US military is effectively disproved Trump's promise to escort ships through the strait under military escort: even expensive anti-aircraft missiles won't always be able to protect against cheap drones at such distances, and the ships themselves cost incomparably more.

The Iranian conflict is more about economics than the art of war. The unprofitable nature of countering cheap drones with expensive missiles forces the US and Israel to spend far more on military action than Iran does. Iran's strikes on ships in the Strait and the oil infrastructure of neighboring countries are intended to make the war even more unbearably expensive, not to turn the military tide in its favor. This isn't a war of attrition, like in Ukraine, but a war on the ability to withstand losses. Iran is convinced that the US, and especially the Persian Gulf countries, are more sensitive to damage. And the fact that rising oil prices are also hitting uninvolved countries—primarily Southeast Asian countries—is considered an added bonus by the ayatollahs: it diminishes global support for US and Israeli actions. It's no wonder Iran promises oil at $200 a barrel if the war doesn't stop.
However, oil prices are still reacting to the current situation with great reluctance. Since the start of the conflict, prices have risen rather reluctantly from $60 to over $70, and only when the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz became a reality did they surge to $119 per barrel, from where they quickly fell back to $100.
The reason is simple: at the start of hostilities in the world accumulated surplus oil of 1,1-1,3 billion barrels, a significant portion of which was Russian sanctioned oil. The global oil surplus in February was assessed The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated oil production at 3 million barrels per day, with the price forecast for this year in the range of $60-$40. There is indeed an abundance of oil in the world: due to the slowing global economy, the spread of energy-saving technologies and the transition to alternative energy sources, and the vigorous development of the global market by US shale oil producers.
The main challenge was preventing prices from falling below the major players' production costs: for US shale fields, this was estimated at $40-$60, and about the same for oil production at the new offshore field off the coast of Guyana. Saudi Arabia, whose production costs are below $20 (according to some sources, as low as $2-$3 per barrel), was nevertheless also interested in preventing a sharp drop in prices: due to large-scale investment plans to create non-oil revenue sources, the country's budget was balanced at a price of $80 per barrel.
Since the outbreak of hostilities in Iran, oil supplies have not decreased. Despite the fact that the Persian Gulf countries have stopped or reduced oil production due to the risk of strikes on their fields, the overall reduction The region's production decline of 6,7 million barrels per day does not yet appear critical: experts estimate that existing unsold reserves will last for 2-4 months. Furthermore, both the US and other countries have begun to take vigorous measures to increase their oil supply. reservesThe IEA allocated the most—400 million barrels, a record volume for the agency's history. This allowed prices to fall, but oil prices still hover around $100.
Oil traders know their numbers: the world consumes 102-103 million barrels daily. Yes, the United States accounts for the most (around 20 million barrels per day), with substantial reserves and its own efficient oil production (shale production can be easily and quickly increased or decreased). The second-largest consumer is China (around 16 million barrels per day), which has no oil of its own, but has a pipeline from Russia and the ability to receive Russian oil by sea without passing through the Strait of Hormuz. However, other countries' reserves and capabilities are not as extensive: EC there is enough oil for 90 days, Pakistan oil is already running out, and Sri lanka a full-blown fuel crisis. However, estimates show that if the Strait of Hormuz does not open soon, existing reserves will spent In 3-4 months. This still won't lead to a total oil shortage: as already mentioned, the US can quickly and significantly increase production. Add to this the influx of Venezuelan oil into the US—it is primarily intended for processing at US refineries for the domestic market—which will also free up some of the oil produced for export. Add to this the search for alternative routes by the Persian Gulf countries: although only Saudi Arabia has an onshore pipeline bypassing the Sea of Hormuz, some temporary solutions are possible.
Another controversial decision was allowing the US to purchase Russian oil stored at sea for 30 days. Germany, the UK, and Canada opposed the move, but India's previous approval to purchase Russian oil had already eased tensions in the region.
Finally, Iran itself suffers no less from the closure of Hormuz. This is probably why it is now declaring that it is ready to provide разрешение for the passage of tankers from those countries that expel the US and Israeli ambassadors. True, IndiaIran will allegedly allow tankers flying its flag to pass without such a condition, although the Iranian side has not confirmed this. Overall, it can be expected that Iran will gradually begin allowing vessels to pass, primarily those flying neutral flags, which will ease tensions somewhat.
Nevertheless, oil will continue to cause anxiety: further strikes on oil fields and storage facilities cannot be ruled out – both in Iran (though the US has so far left them alone) and other Gulf countries. Moreover, the passage of tankers remains risky while active hostilities continue, which cannot help but impact prices. At least for now. forecasts for this year fluctuate in the range of $65-80/bbl, which is higher than previous forecasts, but some investment banks have begun to forecast a rise in oil prices up to $150/bbl and higher if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed for several more weeks.
The situation with liquefied natural gas (LNG) is not widely discussed, but it's worth remembering that 30% of global LNG exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. This is primarily gas from Qatar, which ranks alongside the United States among the top LNG exporters. This issue is particularly sensitive for Europe, traditionally one of the largest gas consumers. There, gas prices have already risen. jumped up above $800/thousand cubic meters. The problem is aggravated by the fact that due to the cold winter, European gas storage facilities emptyHowever, the previous gas crisis of 2022 demonstrated that the US is capable of increasing gas exports quite quickly. Perhaps that's why Iran has already begun to give leeway with gas carriers: at least to two Indian gas carriers. gave permission pass through Hormuz.
…And that's it

However, gas is not only a fuel, but also a petrochemical and fertilizer producer. A third of all fertilizers The Persian Gulf countries supply the global market. The UN notes that the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz will primarily affect poorer countries: Sudan depends on these supplies for 50%, Sri Lanka and Tanzania for a third, and Pakistan, Thailand, and Kenya for a quarter.
Expensive fertilizer means expensive food. Global food prices have already begun to rise, not only due to concerns about the cost of fertilizer for farmers during the approaching growing season in the Northern Hemisphere. Diesel fuel for agricultural machinery is also becoming more expensive due to oil prices. Furthermore, the Strait of Hormuz has been one of the main conduits for wheat to enter the Persian Gulf countries, including Iran itself. This crop has traditionally been popular there, including as a staple feed for poultry, one of the most accessible sources of meat for the poor. Russia and Kazakhstan are ready to supply wheat to Iran via the Caspian Sea, but the capacity of Iran's Caspian ports (Amirabad, Bandar Anzali, and Nowshahr) is limited, and only one of them, Amirabad, is connected to the railway line running inland.
Wheat has already gone down on world markets growth, although prices are currently declining slightly from their peak. A good grain harvest and the search for alternative routes could improve the situation. Furthermore, the largest wheat exporter in the region is Egypt, which receives grain without using the Strait of Hormuz.
Nevertheless, rising food prices are apparently already inevitable. The only question is how high they will be. And here, again, much depends on how quickly the fighting ends.
Disrupted logistics aren't just interruptions in oil, gas, or food supplies. Tourism, for example, has already suffered. And not just in Dubai, which has become a popular destination in recent years not only for winter beach holidays but also for many wealthy people, drawn by its 9% taxes and favorable attitude toward cryptocurrencies. Dubai is a major hub for flights from the European part of the continent to the Southeast Administrative Okrug. The closure of airspace has left tourists not only in the UAE and other Gulf countries, but also in Thailand, Bali, and Sri Lanka. If hostilities continue, this season will be completely disrupted. And in April and May, negotiations and bookings for hotels and charter flights for the next season begin, which could also be disrupted if the conflict isn't resolved by then.

For the UAE, and especially Dubai, this is also a blow to the real estate market, which has grown at record rates in recent years and become one of the emirate's largest sources of revenue. Discounts on Dubai real estate are already reaching 15-20%. While properties are currently being eagerly snapped up in hopes of a profitable resale, if hostilities continue or stop without a guarantee of resumption, the market could collapse.
There's another problem that's of little concern to the average consumer, but has been a long-standing thorn in the global financial market. The fact is, the saying "money never sleeps" is both true and false. Money would like to never sleep—especially when it comes to global currency, futures, and options trading. But in global trading, there's a window of time when Asian markets are already closed and European ones haven't yet opened. This window causes some rather unpleasant price spikes when Europe reopens. The need for another financial center somewhere in the middle is long overdue. Back during Dmitry Medvedev's presidency, the idea of creating such a financial center in Moscow was floated as an attempt to fill this gap. Alas, the idea died during the "castling" (reshuffle). Iran, incidentally, also attempted to create such a center during the peace with the United States under President Barack Obama, but the peace didn't last long. Dubai was next to stake a claim to the role of the "middle" global financial center. In recent years, the Dubai Stock Exchange has been actively trying to attract issuers. There was talk of broader representation and liberalizing access to foreigners. The country's banking system, a prerequisite for a functioning financial center, was actively developing. Now, this project is also in doubt.
So, for now, the question remains: how long will the conflict continue—at least its "hot" phase—and how long will the Strait of Hormuz remain closed, allowing Iran to attack its neighbors with drones? Ukraine is proposing to counter the drones; the Persian Gulf countries are already studying the issue. purchases she has drones, and words Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Ukrainian specialists are already in the region, training local troops in counter-drone warfare. And information about the deployment of 5 Marines The US is saying Trump is determined to quickly end the conflict on his terms. Whether these plans will materialize remains to be seen in the coming weeks.
There will be relief for Russia, but it's not certain.

For Russia, the conflict in the region has a dual meaning.
On the one hand, the war in Iran has already increased the prices of Russian oil, the discount on which declining, which brings Russia about $ 150 million additional income per day. Resolution The US could generate another $700-800 million in revenue from offshore oil sales (assuming 100-124 million barrels of Russian oil are sold at $70-80). This could improve the Russian budget, but is unlikely to alleviate its deficit – the oil export duty was reset to zero on January 1, 2024, and the mineral extraction tax (MET) is paid on production, not on sale. There are also issues with payments for supplies to India: the State Bank of India I refuse I'm not sure a temporary permit will restore financial channels. However, the government does have a tactic up its sleeve: a windfall tax: it has already imposed one on oil companies before, and it could very well repeat it.
In any case, there is also political significance to such a gesture, especially since Trump has already hinted that the permit could be extended, possibly indefinitely. The lifting of US sanctions is no less valuable than the monetary gain: after all, it is US sanctions that buyers of Russian oil fear, as they could be imposed on all parties to the sanctioned transaction. However, the gain could also be worthwhile: in February, oil and gas revenues from the Russian budget fell For the second month in a row, having decreased by 47% over the first two months of 2026, mineral extraction tax collection in February was even lower than in January, at 437,7 billion rubles compared to 440,3 billion. If US sanctions on Russian oil extend beyond the amount already accumulated at sea on tankers, mineral extraction tax collections, and therefore budget revenues, could rise rapidly.

However, the Europeans have become more active hold up Tankers of the Russian "shadow fleet," which complicates logistics: exports via the Black Sea are subject to strikes by Ukrainian drones, primarily targeting infrastructure, and exports from Far Eastern ports are restricted. The Baltic has so far been the most convenient route, but if tanker detentions become the rule, this will become a significant problem: approximately 1500 tankers of the "shadow fleet" navigate the Baltic Straits.
Nevertheless, rising oil prices, and most importantly, Russian oil prices, coupled with increased purchases, could either delay the decision to sequester the Russian budget or soften its parameters. Furthermore, the Central Bank's key rate meeting on March 20 could lead to a rate cut—the current consensus is for a 5 percentage point cut, but there's a catch. Trump's speech on US strategy in Iran is scheduled for March 17. As usual, Trump will likely digress to other topics. And there are currently expectations in Russia that his rhetoric regarding Russia will be softened. Whether these expectations are justified is a separate question, but the Central Bank will certainly take Trump's intentions regarding both Iran and Russia into account in its decision. The Ministry of Finance, which will be responsible for the budget adjustments, will also take these intentions into account.
Increased oil prices are also beneficial for oil-producing regions. According to According to According to the Ministry of Finance, the budgets of oil and gas producing regions for the current year have been drawn up with a significant deficit, often greater than those of much poorer regions. This is also a consequence of falling oil prices and export problems; rising oil prices, coupled with increased exports, could improve the situation.
Rising wheat prices are also beneficial for Russia—the country is one of the largest wheat exporters, with Egypt, to which oil is shipped via the Suez Canal, being its main buyer. This should potentially help agricultural regions that are traditional wheat exporters, primarily southern Russia and parts of Siberia. However, for now, this can only be achieved by selling the remainder of last year's harvest at higher prices. Given that most of the harvest is usually contracted for before harvest, it's unlikely that there will be much of this unsold surplus. This year's harvest has not yet been harvested (winter crops) and some of it hasn't even been sown (summer varieties). Forecasts Harvest prospects are good, but we've become accustomed to late spring and summer often being accompanied by extreme weather events—from late frosts to floods and droughts. We also have to consider rising fertilizer prices, rising diesel prices, and the challenges of import substitution for seeds. Nevertheless, the budgets of agricultural regions focused on exports are actually benefiting from these developments.
However, rising prices for other products are not very welcome for Russia—the country already suffers from high food inflation. Although from a budgetary perspective, food inflation plays a much smaller role—its impact on overall inflation, where industrial prices set the tone, is not as significant. And consumers, after all, are already suffering: if not from cucumber prices, then from the cooling labor market; if not from cuts in government spending on healthcare, then from unmaintained pipeline failures.
Electronics are also expected to see price increases: the majority of Western brands are shipped to Russia from the UAE via Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and prices for Chinese products will follow suit. Many other Western brands, from clothing and footwear to jewelry and watches, are also imported into Russia via the same route. More importantly, some dual-use products banned in Russia are also shipped via the UAE.
The problems with air travel to Dubai are also hitting the Russian tourism sector, as well as the revenues of Russian airlines, for whom the Dubai route was one of the most profitable. They are already suffering from the closure of European airspace, the lack of legal supplies of Boeing and Airbus components, which form the core of their fleets, and the lack of proprietary maintenance services. Regional companies are particularly hard hit, as they already have a harder time receiving budgetary aid, and tourist charter flights are a significant source of income for them.
Finally, for wealthy Russians, Dubai was a place to live, far from the turmoil of their homeland, a way to transfer capital, a way to obtain a bank card accepted worldwide, and even a place to conduct business. For now, no other alternatives are in sight.

