Time to read: 16 minutes(s)

Goodbye, Internet?

Tatiana Rybakova

The fight to migrate Russian citizens to the domestic MAX messenger is gradually evolving into a fight against the internet in general, and even mobile communications. Will it result in the creation of a full-fledged "Cheburnet" modeled on the North Korean model? Or will China's version of a relatively closed internet be able to hold on? And is it even possible to remain connected to the global network?

The Telegram block was a hot topic last week. Roskomnadzor, it seems, has succeeded in making Telegram unavailable without a good VPN, and even with a VPN, it's often impossible to watch or upload videos. But while Telegram users mourned the previously blocked YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, Signal, and WhatsApp, a new disaster loomed: the authorities are threatening to crack down on VPN services as well. And perhaps even the entire internet and mobile communications too. How serious are these threats?

Chronicle of a Declared Death

"Starting April 1st, Telegram will be blocked. Switch to our channel in MAX," these ads appeared on all Russian Telegram channels. Channels of independent (and blocked in Russia) media outlets posted a different message: they offered to download their apps or recommended a reliable VPN. Opposition bloggers usually offered nothing. "If someone reads my channel, they've long been smart enough to install a good VPN, and more than one," the author of one such channel explained to me. The hardest hit were those channels and bloggers who targeted both compatriots abroad and a Russian audience outside of the political agenda. For example, a real battle broke out between subscribers on one well-known investment channel: those living in Russia complained that charts and video tutorials were no longer loading in Telegram and demanded they switch to MAX, while those living abroad protested that they couldn't even load the Russian messenger and suggested that those in Russia install a VPN.

Telegram hasn't been blocked since April 1st, but problems with loading images and videos remain. Against this backdrop, the number of VPN queries on Google has increased to record level. "Even the most backward sections of the population have installed VPNs," my Russian friend joked. Incidentally, at that time, she herself decided to install several paid VPNs at once and paid for an annual subscription.

The authorities responded to this by cracking down on VPN services themselves: Ministry of Digital Development insistently "asked" By April 15, Russia's largest online platforms will impose restrictions on users with VPNs enabled and announce new ways to circumvent the blocking. At the same time, the Ministry of Digital Development has decided to create a "whitelist" and a "blacklist" of VPNs. The former will allow access to blocked services and will include corporate VPNs so that companies can continue operating. VPNs were originally designed to ensure secure connections, so they are used everywhere where sensitive information needs to be exchanged remotely—from banks to mining companies that remotely control equipment in oil fields, for example. Experts are skeptical of the ministry's initiative—there is no reliable way to distinguish permitted VPN traffic from prohibited—but a new problem has loomed.

Mobile internet outages have begun in Moscow. While previously outages occurred in the regions and/or lasted only briefly, this time mobile internet was virtually nonexistent in the city center from March 5 to 24, and the outages continue. Most importantly, officials' tone has changed. While they previously attributed such outages to the danger of drone attacks, they've now begun to state outright: they've had enough of the internet, and that's enough. The head of Rostelecom went the furthest, proposing a complete return to landline telephones.

At the same time, attacks on providers and mobile operators began. The Ministry of Digital Development is considering lifting the moratorium for scheduled inspections: otherwise, it's impossible to ensure their timely installation of SORM (special equipment that allows law enforcement agencies and the FSB to remotely access user conversations, internet traffic, and data). Currently, to connect to SORM, an operator must submit an application to the FSB within 45 days of receiving a license, then develop an action plan within three months, and the system's implementation itself takes one and a half to two years. The Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media wants the company to be unable to provide services until SORM is operational.

The internet providers themselves decided enlargeToday, many small ISPs are allowing prohibited traffic—some due to ideological resistance, while others are simply unable to install the necessary traffic filtering equipment. The Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media wants to eliminate small ISPs from the market by introducing paid licenses costing up to 50 million rubles, banning the issuance of licenses to individual entrepreneurs, and requiring ISPs to connect to the SORM system, with violators having their licenses revoked.

Man-made chaos

The government's fight against Telegram and the internet has cost, according to experts, only in Moscow and only in the first five days of blocking 3-5 billion rubles. Couriers and taxi drivers couldn't find customers' addresses, stores wouldn't accept card payments, and even the Moscow metro was forced to let passengers ride for free because card payments weren't processing. And then, on April 3, a major outage occurred. largest banks Russia. Payments and transfers were not processed at Sberbank, VTB, Alfa-Bank, and T-Bank, as well as the Central Bank's Faster Payment System (FPS). Apps and card payments were not working in stores, and withdrawals were impossible at ATMs or in-store.

The media directly linked this to the Telegram block. Roskomnadzor previously allowed the messenger's proxy traffic through because it was disguised as a connection to Russian services. Now, experts believe the blocking is based on Telegram's TLS fingerprint, which is why MTProxy stopped working. The outage at the banks was caused by Roskomnadzor's attempt to completely block the bypasses disguised as bank servers. Roskomnadzor responded to these accusations simply: demanded Remove this information from Russian media and channels.

Russian media have complied, but the problem remains. While the largest banks are suffering from Roskomnadzor's actions, smaller banks are simply are dying: They're not included on the "white list" and, during internet outages (which happen much more frequently in the regions than in the capital), they simply can't serve customers. Incidentally, there are 305 banks in Russia, and only five are on the "white list." The remaining 300 are those serving regional businesses, including small businesses, and handle the small stuff that the big banks don't care about. And yes, unlike large banks, they are less dependent on the state.

However, state-owned companies are also getting their share of criticism from Roskomnadzor and the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media. The problem is that many of them are still transitioning to domestic software, as required by law. And creating new software is a job for highly qualified senior specialists. Many of them left for abroad in 2022, but continue to collaborate with Russian entities, including those fulfilling government contracts. And, of course, remote work now requires a VPN. As a result, as reported by source in the industrySome IT companies have already notified customers that they are taking a break until the situation with the list of banned VPN services becomes clearer.

Now, due to Telegram blocking, mobile internet outages, and the fight against VPNs, it's not just highly qualified IT specialists who are starting to leave. Many people involved in the IT industry are moving or thinking about moving. An internet marketing company familiar to the author is moving to Serbia. A company delivering goods from China is moving its operations from Russia to the CIS countries. Even Belarus, and not only those connected to the IT sector, but also those who are simply tired of the VPN fuss and mobile internet outages. Against this backdrop, it's not surprising that Putin's approval rating fell, and the actions of the authorities are criticized not only by the opposition and Pavel Durov, but also quite pro-government figures.

North Korea instead of China?

The severity of internet restrictions in Russia has already surpassed Chinese measures, says a businessman who recently returned from China. "Yes, there are provinces there with very strict restrictions and penalties for VPNs—for example, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. But there are also regions, such as..." Hong Kong i "There are many large developed cities and research centers where internet access is virtually unlimited. In the rest of China, internet access is limited, but VPNs are being largely ignored. However, for most of the population, foreign platforms aren't particularly necessary; their own services are very well developed. And with a foreign SIM card, there are no problems at all," he says. So, is Russia now following the North Korean path, not the Chinese one?

"To put it bluntly, the state already has almost all the technological tools to build a closed internet, and Russia has been systematically moving toward this in recent years," — says IT entrepreneur and technical director of Most Media, Maxim Novichkov.

There are three key elements, he explains. The first is the well-known DPI (Deep Packet Inspection)—equipment that analyzes internet traffic not just by address, but by content and type. "This allows us to understand which services and protocols a person is using and block not only websites but also certain VPN protocols, instant messaging apps, and any non-standard communication methods," says Novichkov. While this equipment is currently insufficient and occasionally malfunctions, this is temporary. The second element is centralized traffic routing management. "This means the state can control how data flows through the network and, at any time, restrict or completely block international traffic, leaving only the internal circuit," says Novichkov. The third element is "whitelisting," which allows only pre-approved IP addresses, domains, and services to operate.

It's the combination of the second and third tools that could ultimately eliminate VPNs entirely, Novichkov believes. "If only domestic traffic to Russian addresses is allowed, and international traffic is restricted to restricted and heavily filtered access points, then connecting to an external VPN server becomes simply impossible—the connection won't be established at the network level," he says.

Novichkov believes that this very goal—cutting Russia off from the outside internet—was the country's leadership's goal from the very beginning. Our informed source in Russia, who requested anonymity, believes that before the assassination of Iran's Supreme Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the authorities were moving toward a Chinese-style internet regulation: while the elite enjoys free access, the rest are forced into conditions that make access to the free internet too difficult and expensive. Those who want to can certainly get in, but most will prefer to stick with Russian and authorized resources.

He believes that the MAX messenger, designed to replace Telegram, was created precisely for this purpose. But MAX turned out to be so flawed, and the leaking of data from it by law enforcement agencies to scammers was so widespread, that it became clear that people wouldn't use MAX voluntarily. It's no wonder that officials themselves install the messenger on a separate phone—such phones are already called "maxphones"—and use it only for official purposes. "That's when the decision was made to start cracking down on Telegram," the source says. But something went wrong—pro-government forces, including the Z community and even some parliamentarians and propagandists, spoke out against the Telegram block. The reason is quite clear: they derive their benefits from the war precisely through Telegram: they collect donations, receive donations, and communicate with their audiences there. Because of the block, Z bloggers and propagandists are effectively losing their income, while parliamentarians are losing their electorate ahead of elections. This is not to mention that the Russian military is now directly stating that the Ukrainian army's offensive, and consequently the Russian army's failures, are connected to the fact that, following the loss of connection via Elon Musk's Starlink (after users re-registered in Ukraine), they lost their only stable connection via Telegram.

Perhaps the creators of MAX, including Sergei Kiriyenko's son, would have had time to fix at least the major flaws, but after Khamenei's assassination, aided by Israel's hacking of street cameras in Tehran, security officials approached Putin and threatened him with the possibility of a similar attack in Russia, according to a persistent rumor. "I believe this rumor 99,9%," says our Russian source. He argues that while Kiriyenko's group lobbied for the Telegram shutdown, the FSB is to blame for the entire mobile internet shutdown. "They essentially cut off the resources of not only the Kiriyenko group, which includes the Ministry of Digital Development and Roskomnadzor, but also the military and its supporters—they have long been suspicious of them, and after Prigozhin's mutiny, Putin began to share these suspicions," he says. This, he believes, is how the concept of a "Chinese" internet was replaced by a "North Korean" one. And now, all the measures proposed by the Ministry of Digital Development are an attempt to wrest control from the FSB. "The Kiriyenko group believes that a poor internet is better than no internet at all—they know, after all, that a fully sovereign internet is impossible to create right now," the source says.

The process went

According to Novichkov, it's not the lack of technology that's preventing the development of a fully-fledged "Cheburnet," but the scale and complexity of the problem. "Russia isn't North Korea; it's a vast infrastructure with thousands of operators, complex routes, and businesses dependent on external services. In China, it took decades to build such a system. In Russia, they're trying to do it abruptly, administratively and forcefully, which is why there are constant failures: banks are collapsing, services are breaking down, even 'authorized' systems are down," he says. Furthermore, complete isolation is detrimental to finance, IT, and logistics. "The third problem is the architectural heterogeneity of the network. That's why initiatives to consolidate operators are emerging: small providers are harder to control, their networks sometimes allow for bypassing blocking or simply don't filter traffic properly," Novichkov adds. Nevertheless, he believes that sooner or later, all bypass routes will be blocked, and the internet in Russia will become completely closed. "I estimate 2-4 years for this to happen," Novichkov says.

Moreover, there is a possibility to replace the use of corporate VPNs in Russia, and these solutions have been known for ten years, says economist Sergei Petrov. “For those same banks, government agencies, and other structures, it is enough to distribute encryption keys, and backdoors "They'll be in the relevant authorities—that's all. This approach has been followed for quite some time now—in fact, the very certificates needed to open certain internet resources are such keys. We even have our own encryption systems—Kuznechik, for example," he says. The problem right now is that we don't yet have all the necessary drivers for domestic software, but this can be resolved—we can order them from China. "Gradually, everyone will be voluntarily or forcibly transferred to such a system, and then ATMs will start working and stores will accept cards," Petrov is confident.

As for businesses, Novichkov is confident they will be forced to switch to local solutions because foreign APIs, clouds, and services will become unstable or unavailable. Whitelists of "permitted" foreign services that are indispensable may be created, but access to them will be strictly controlled. Small banks, services, and IT companies will begin to drop out of the system—first as a side effect, then as a natural consequence. For ordinary citizens, the internet will become slow, unstable, and predictably limited. VPNs will either stop working altogether (due to the expansion of "whitelists" to filter foreign traffic) or become expensive and risky, especially since there are already suggestions of criminalizing block circumvention tools. Some familiar services will simply disappear. And the key change is the "permitted internet" effect. "Formally, you're online, but in practice, you're in a strictly filtered environment. And judging by the experience of recent years, society is adapting to this fairly quickly—we shouldn't expect widespread resistance. “Such are, unfortunately, the historical and cultural characteristics of Russian society,” says Novichkov.

A little sun in cold water

And yet, resistance still exists, and is quite widespread, across all levels of society. Sometimes it takes on rather grotesque features, in the style of "money triumphs over evil." Such, for example, are the Ministry of Digital Development's proposals to paid Internet traffic over 15 GB per month costs 150 rubles per additional gigabyte. It's possible, our anonymous source believes, that Russian security forces will follow the path of the Iranian IRGC, which is known to control most VPNs and profit from them.

"There's a real money-making opportunity here: data leaks and the ability to shut down one service or another. Your boss gives you a medal, and you make a killing selling a new VPN service for more money." "The interviewee laughs. And, of course, a considerable amount of money will go to those who can ensure businesses get on the necessary lists and access to certain resources. “Essentially, a new digital economy is being formed, where value is created not by service, but by access,” — says Novichkov.

As long as it exists and regional differenceThis is due to uneven infrastructure: different regions are connected differently, and equipment is deployed at varying depths, making restrictions appear uneven. But this is temporary, Novichkov believes: with the transition to a model of strict filtering of external traffic at the backbone network level and the introduction of whitelists of foreign services, this difference will begin to disappear. "Control will be exercised not at the level of a specific region, but at the level of the entire country through key routing points," he says.

However, Petrov notes that there are already places in the border regions in the west of the country with access to foreign internet.

"It's not far from the border, no more than 10 km, and it seems to be a private initiative for now, with some private individuals opening their own Wi-Fi. But what's stopping this from being done, if not at the government level, then at the level of public and human rights organizations? A powerful router is inexpensive and has a range of up to 30 km.", He says.

Right now people are sharing their experiences using it foreign e-SIM — French, Kazakh, Armenian, and others. So far, the experience has been mixed: these virtual SIM cards work best in areas with multiple mobile operators, but roaming costs are quite high.

Another promising idea is to use Elon Musk's project to receive satellite signals on a regular phone with a 4G network. He is already testing this technology (It's called DTC—Direct-to-Cell) has been around for about a year, and the problem is that it requires a special, complex antenna with a phased array, which is currently installed on a small number of Musk's satellites, explains Petrov. "But Bezos (Blue Origin) and Branson (Virgin Galactic) also have similar projects, so we can expect the emergence of mass satellite mobile internet soon," says Petrov. He also points out that while transmitting images, especially video, is quite expensive, text is very lightweight. "To put this into perspective, the entire text of War and Peace takes up only 1,2 megabytes. That is, transmitting text files costs practically nothing," says Petrov.

In this regard, he does not rule out that someone in Europe or the United States may remember the story with Chekhov Publishing House — it was financed by the CIA and published classics of Russian diaspora literature banned in the USSR from 1952 to 56. Nowadays, funding Musk's free distribution of, for example, texts from Russian opposition publications is within the reach of not only government agencies but even human rights organizations. And considering that Musk owns the social network X, which he'll certainly be willing to launch via satellite, the prospects look good. For now, we can only hope that nothing gets done quickly and well in Russia—and more often than not, nothing gets done quickly or well.