Regions are being fenced off
When will it be time for our own currencies?
Author: Tatyana Rybakova
The fuel crisis has brought back the practices of the early 90s. Back then, regions, trying to cope with shortages and rising prices, imposed various restrictions on the movement of goods, from food stamps to customs posts at their administrative borders. In some places, they even went so far as to introduce their own currencies or equivalents. But back then, governors were mostly elected by local residents or appointees of local elites. Can we expect a "parade of sovereignties" from today's governors, installed by the Kremlin?
Digital borders
More and more regions are introducing vehicle refueling based on license plates and Q-codes. The rule is simple: only vehicles with specific first digits in their license plates can refuel on each day of the week: for example, "0" and "1" on Monday, "2" and "3" on Tuesday, and so on. Another measure is obtaining a Q-code, which entitles you to refuel a specific amount of fuel. After refueling, the code expires, and you must wait until you receive a new one.
The pioneer of the new measure was Orel regionGovernor Andrei Klychkov announced this on July 1, and the measure itself went into effect on July 4. Drivers were given a sweeter deal by increasing the fuel limit from 30 to 50 liters. Emergency and social service vehicles can still refuel without waiting in line. And so it went.
В The Nizhny Novgorod region At first, they tested refueling using Q-codes in one of the districts, but on July 9, they also switched to refueling using vehicle registration numbers.
On the same day, refueling by numbers was introduced Mordovia — here the game of “even”/“odd” is played according to the last digit of the car’s license plate.
At the same time, the measure was introduced in Astrakhan region — here they also fill up according to the last digits of the number.
A day later, on July 10, a similar measure was introduced in Pskov region — here they preferred to count by the first digit of the number.
Lipetsk region introduced refueling based on the first digits of a car's license plate from July 11.
The latest news concerns St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region: here the authorities are currently debating whether to introduce Q-codes or also refuel using vehicle registration numbers.
They go gossipthat Ivanovo, Tambov and Yaroslavl regions are next in line.
Restrictions are stricter in some places, more lenient in others: for example, in the Nizhny Novgorod region, an exception was made for gas stations on federal highways; in some places, they dispense 30 liters at a time, while in others, they dispense 50. All these restrictions have one thing in common: as a result, local residents are granted the right to refuel. Out-of-towners may be allowed to use a gas station (for example, on a federal highway or for a smaller number of liters), or they may not.
Memories of the future
The first to point out what this reminds one of was one of the most notorious propagandists, Margarita Simonyan. "No gasoline? In the 90s, food was actually rationed," said She remembered how people used to tear off coupons in stores when buying groceries.
In fact, cards, often referred to coyly as "shopper cards," were introduced earlier, in 1989–90. Meat and butter, however, had been distributed with coupons in various regions since the late 70s. As far as I remember, the Voronezh Region was the first to introduce such a system. But Simonyan was absolutely clear about what was happening: this wasn't simply a restriction on the sale of scarce goods. It was the beginning of the segregation of regional markets.
Back then, in the late 80s and early 90s, regions weren't simply introducing food stamps. Self-made customs posts quickly began appearing at the administrative borders of the regions: export regulations or outright bans on goods were imposed, and these newly minted "customs officers" inspected cars and rummaged through the luggage of train and bus passengers. Then restrictions began to be placed on the export of regional products: underfunded by the center, regional leaders began trading among themselves what they had. Quite exotic professions emerged, involving barter or other exchanges of metal for oil, oil for timber, timber for fuel, and so on. And naturally, their own ersatz currencies began to emerge.
In 1991-92 years Tatarstan In addition to food stamps, the government is introducing social security checks to pay salaries. They also considered issuing their own currency, the altyn, but it never came to fruition.
In 1992, the then governor The Nizhny Novgorod region Boris Nemtsov introduced payment vouchers ("Nemtsovki") for the purchase of essential goods. Nemtsovki were widely traded and exchanged—in short, they were treated like local currency.
In 1993 year Sverdlovsk region A movement to create a Ural Republic began. Governor Anton Bakov introduced his own currency: the "Ural franc."
What would later be called a "parade of sovereignties" didn't spring from a desire for freedom. Everything followed the same path Russia is now on: amid economic collapse, the collapse of many industries, primarily those fueling the war effort, the disruption of production chains, and rampant inflation, regional leaders were trying not so much to make life easier for voters as to avoid a social upheaval. "Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow"—Boris Yeltsin's phrase on August 6, 1990, in Kazan was not without reason: with the federal budget empty, the only way the center could help the regions was by giving the go-ahead for what would help them survive independently.
Right now, exactly the same process has begun, only it began not in the food market, but in the fuel market. In a situation where Ukrainian drones have visited the entire top ten largest oil refineries Russia, many of them repeatedly, and there's no doubt they'll visit them again—as well as fuel depots, pumping stations, fuel pipelines, and so on. When fuel reserves and replenishment options vary from region to region, giving preferential refueling options to their own residents is a natural reaction for governors. An equally natural reaction is speculation on price differences across regions, known in market economics as arbitrage. Hence, the next inevitable step: introducing restrictions on fuel exports from the regions. Today, according to experts, restrictions on fuel sales have been introduced, in one form or another, in more than 40 regionsWhich of them will be the first to set up posts on the administrative border? So far, restrictions have been imposed. Kazakhstan, but there is no doubt that this experience is already being closely studied in regional administrations.
Restrictions on the movement of food and other goods could also arise. Fuel shortages mean problems with delivery of goods. Furthermore, Russian farmers are already warning that, given the diesel shortage, harvest Under threat. If the harvest fails, expect problems with food supplies. Under normal market conditions, we would only be talking about rising prices, but the authorities' move to administrative restrictions on the fuel market demonstrates that they are not prepared to allow prices to rise until a new level of normal distribution is established. This is understandable: the recent protests in Iran, where people took to the streets precisely because of the sharp rise in food and fuel prices under sanctions, are not yet forgotten. With polls showing a sharp decline in approval ratings and growing social unrest, administrative restrictions and the "fight against speculators" seem like the lesser evil. So it's possible that Margarita Simonyan will yet show her viewers how to properly clip coupons from food stamps.
From enclosure to sovereignty
Under these conditions, the path from coupons, Q-codes, and other restrictions to regional quasi-currencies is not far off. Digitalization, which is suddenly being promoted so actively, could help. On the one hand, a digital ruble is a powerful lever in the hands of the Central Bank and the Kremlin, allowing them to simply block certain transactions. On the other hand, if the Center overreacts, alternative means of payment simply cannot emerge, official or not. These could be completely different things, and they could be called anything—food stamps, local Q-codes, or text messages granting access to a particular resource. The essence of these rights is that these rights will be detached from a specific consumer and become a commodity. The emergence of trade in certain permits/permits/rights will usher in the emergence of regional quasi-currencies.
But how close is the path from regional enclosures to demands for greater sovereignty? After all, such processes in the early 1990s took place in completely different conditions. The central government itself was relatively young, democratically minded, and quite shaky—the events of 1993, with the parliamentary revolt and the White House shooting, demonstrate that allowing the regions to "seize sovereignty" was more a matter of putting a brave face on a bad situation than a desirable step. On the other hand, regional leaders were much more politically powerful. They won their seats through competitive elections, often in fierce battles. Even those supported by strong regional elites, such as in Tatarstan or the Kemerovo Region, were dependent on the local population and were forced, at a minimum, to play the role of "people's defenders." At the same time, the center's power was quite limited: the president could support a candidate or, conversely, oppose them, but he could not remove a governor and, in fact, could not imprison him.
Today, the role of governors, who are not elected but appointed by the Kremlin, is more like that of viceroys. Their job is to implement central policy locally and deliver what's demanded: funds for the federal budget, contract soldiers for the war, and other resources. And, of course, to ensure that the people in their assigned territories remain quiet. Removing them is easy, but imprisoning them, as experience shows, is even easier—each carries a trail of abuses, and each has a "daddy." Meanwhile, the center shows no sign of loosening the reins. On the contrary, as evidence from the local level shows, the pressure is intensifying: a rare region is spared from the horde of federal prosecutors; FSB representatives play the role of oprichniks, opening any door at will; the "governor fall" continues unabated—again, a rare region where at least one deputy governor hasn't been removed or imprisoned.
And yet, there are processes that the Kremlin is powerless to regulate. For example, the problem of budget deficits. On the one hand, it is growing regional budget deficitMoscow's budget has already become deficit-ridden, to say nothing of the depressed regions—of which, by the way, there are more and more. The government, which itself federal budget deficit Almost double the planned amount, it can do little to help the regions—only write off their debts. And it is writing them off—already 277 billion rubles since the beginning of the year. But the government can only forgive debts on budget loans, and many regions, in desperation, have also borrowed from commercial banks. Banks, unlike the government, are not willing to write off debts.
On the other hand, when the government offers no assistance in overcoming the fuel crisis, nor in funding compensation for citizens' destroyed homes, nor in resettling refugees, even the most loyal governors appointed by the Center are forced to raise their voices.
The Belgorod Region is a typical example. No sooner had the Kremlin removed Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov, who had begun criticizing the federal authorities (for example, for blocking Telegram, which resulted in residents no longer receiving warnings about shelling), than the newly appointed head of the region, General Alexander Shuvaev, a veteran of the war, took office. spoke up That the region's residents want nothing more than an end to the war. The worse the situation in the regions becomes, the less aid comes from the center, the more likely regional leaders will become recalcitrant. This depends not on the person appointed, but on the logic of the process.
How quickly the process of fencing off regions, and then securing sovereignty, will proceed depends on many factors, among which the Ukrainian Armed Forces' strikes deep into Russia play a significant role. The recent NATO summit in Ankara demonstrated that the West, including the United States, will not impede such strikes, including those targeting infrastructure only loosely related to the war. And if Ukrainian drones begin raiding gas infrastructure (gas is exported, meaning the money for it can be used for the war) and energy infrastructure (power plants supply, among other things, military factories), it will only be a matter of time before governors choose the latter between popular revolt and dissatisfaction with the Kremlin. In fact, the moment they realize federal prosecutors or the FSB won't be able to arrest them, they will. And why they won't be able to—whether because the people will rally like a wall or because there won't be enough gasoline to reach the region—is of secondary importance.
