There was a knock on the window.
International Memorial board member Irina Shcherbakova discusses how the Wagner PMC mutiny has impacted the future of post-Putin Russia..
A historian discusses what future awaits Russia after Putin Irina Shcherbakova I reflected in an interview with the Telegram channel "NotMoscow Speaking" earlier this year. Even then, she expressed Concerns that, during the current war with Ukraine, part of the population is arming itself and criminal elements are joining the army. According to her, this created the conditions for a very large gap in society and the threat of civil war.
After the attempted military coup by the head of the Wagner PMC Evgeny Prigozhin, "NeMoscow" spoke with the historian again.
Irina Shcherbakova, historian, publicist, and head of educational programs at International Memorial, was born in 1949 in Moscow and graduated from the Philology Department of Moscow State University. Beginning in 1979, she recorded interviews with Gulag prisoners and collected archival data. In 1988, she co-founded the first Soviet non-governmental organization, Memorial. From 1992 to 2006, she taught at the Russian State University for the Humanities and was a visiting professor at the universities of Salzburg, Bremen, and Jena. Since 1999, she has been head of educational programs at International Memorial. She is the author of books on Stalinism and the culture of memory.
Has your vision of Russia's future changed in the wake of the military mutiny orchestrated by Yevgeny Prigozhin?
"On the one hand, it seemed like he hadn't changed at all. I didn't at all share the euphoria that suddenly arose in some people [after the mutiny was declared]."
On the other hand, there's no need to downplay it either. After all, some very important things have happened: we've been shown that Putin isn't omnipotent. Previously, many thought Koshchei's death was in a needle, and the needle was in an egg, and the egg was at the bottom of the ocean, and it was not so easy to reach.
And now everyone has seen that it turns out that it is possible to reach it.
We also saw that people didn't understand the meaning of what was happening: no one resisted anyone, Prigozhin was applauded in Rostov, and some expressed sympathy and support. In any case, no National Guard stood in his way. As the saying goes, this isn't about chasing old ladies or young girls with truncheons.
The rebellion had a powerful effect of desacralizing this power and its stability. And these are very important things for the future.
In January, you said Russians couldn't predict their future because they'd forgotten the past. Do you think this weekend has forced society to remember something?
"Russians have truly forgotten about various kinds of danger, which has helped them come to terms with terror, lack of freedom, violence, and denunciations. This has led to a depoliticization and atomization of society, where no one trusts anyone anymore."
At the same time, many people reacted to the military mutiny with some kind of sixth sense, recalling what their grandmothers did in such moments. When the dollar soared, people rushed to the store to buy buckwheat. And while this wasn't yet so obvious in Moscow, in the provinces it was widely discussed.
In response to Putin's menacing call for unity, people scattered, retreating to their dachas and hiding. No one was planning to build barricades to protect the Kremlin. On the contrary, everyone, following the old-fashioned plan, hid under a snag, hoping somehow they'd get away with it.
That is, all these old practices suddenly came to life again.
You also said that defeat in the war could trigger political change. Could Prigozhin's rebellion lead to such changes?
— Cause-and-effect relationships always exist in history, but it is not always clear what triggers them.
Perhaps this whole Prigozhin affair won't affect the current situation. It won't lead to our front with Ukraine crumbling right now.
But it's already clear that they did try to rip this king's clothes off. And that this was an attack from within, not some bribed liberals or agents.
We clearly saw the authorities' absolute helplessness in the face of a truly small group of people who marched freely through several regions and stopped 200 kilometers from Moscow. And no one could detain them.
All this, of course, is evidence of weakness and chaos. It also shows that no one is willing to lay down their lives for the Tsar, or at least very few do. Even the propaganda has gone silent. Its fear and helplessness have shown that this is no monolith.
And it turns out there seem to be holes in this concrete wall. First, of course, Ukraine punched them with its blood and incredible resistance. And now it's starting to work from within, too. There's a knock on the window, quite seriously. And if we live a little longer, maybe we'll see something. Although a week ago, I didn't think so.
What kind analogies What does this event evoke in you as a historian? What can it be compared to?
"This is some kind of parody of Mussolini, who in October 1922 led 10 to 30 of his armed supporters to the outskirts of Rome. But Mussolini achieved the post of prime minister on this basis, while what Prigozhin achieved is unclear."
In part, it is a parody of the Beer Hall Putsch, in which disgruntled soldiers, led by the young Hitler, attempted to seize control of the Bavarian government in November 1923.
Some compare the action of Prigozhin's troops to the mutiny of General Kornilov, who in August 1917 attempted to establish firm power in Russia by introducing a military dictatorship.
It seems to me that Prigozhin's rebellion is a mixture of all of the above. A kind of postmodernist concoction. As, incidentally, is the entire Putin regime, for which no scientific definition has yet been found.
You know, to defeat the villain in a fairy tale, you have to name him, which is often hidden, like that very same Koshchei needle. We have roughly the same thing now. The new Russia, which has not identified or condemned the Soviet regime in any way, is once again dealing with elements of a totalitarian system, modified.
Putin's regime isn't exactly a hybrid... In my view, it's a postmodern chimera, with the head of a lion, the body of a goat, the tail of a snake, and so on. It has absorbed elements of Soviet ideology, the market economy, and even fascism. It's precisely this chimera-like quality that prevents ordinary people from understanding what's going on. That's why we see so much support for it in the country.
The Prigozhin rebellion, which, as I already said, absorbed a little bit of everything, can also be compared to a similar Chimera.
According to one theory, Yevgeny Prigozhin turned his troops back because he saw no popular support. Could this lack of support be linked to the fact that he never named the evil, refusing to criticize Putin?
"I compare Prigozhin's speeches to stewed fruit. His main attack was that the Ministry of Defense was riddled with corruption, and that corruption had eaten everything away. He only began attacking the system itself toward the end, when he declared that there was no point in starting this war."
But I don’t agree with the version that people didn’t support him.
Firstly, for quite a long time, posters advertising the Wagner PMC hung all over the country, and Prigozhin himself gained popularity online thanks to his statements and swearing.
Secondly, no one barricaded his path or cursed him. On the contrary, people took photos with him, smiled, and waved. We didn't see Rostov residents cowering in terror, waiting for these murderers to leave.
By the way, in Moscow, where Putin was at that time, many people were scared, and some streets were empty.
Thirdly, it's unlikely that Prigozhin himself planned to lead a popular movement. He hardly expected crowds to take to the streets. He certainly counted on some support, but his main goal, it seems to me, was simply to intimidate the leadership. He's the kind of character Shalamov wrote about in his stories: the kind of criminals, backed against the wall, start ripping their vests, screaming hysterically, and waving knives.
Six months ago, you were concerned about "criminal elements infiltrating the army," which, after Putin's departure, could become the preconditions for a civil war. What do you think now?
“I don’t see any preconditions for a civil war—it would require completely different forces and components.”
But Prigozhin's story has shown that there are entirely different threats. For example, the seizure of power by such criminal structures and the outbreak of a chaotic war among themselves.
When the government is completely weak and people don't understand the future, it could very well happen that Voronezh, for example, will be captured by one private army, Rostov by another, and someone else will make their mark in Krasnodar and Pskov.
I still hope that after Putin leaves, someone will have the intelligence and political will to pursue regime change. Perhaps it will be people from his current circle who will start saying they never wanted this war, that Putin is to blame, and that we'll just crawl away, make peace with everyone, declare a thaw, and start trading with the West. In such a scenario, structures like PMCs will simply disintegrate.
Was there a chance for democratization in Russia this weekend?
— The only thing we can say with certainty is that the government has cracked, and this is important for the long term.
As for the chance for democratization, it is still a long way off.
Remember how Putin's regime began with the ban on the "Dolls" program? In one of the last episodes, Putin performed There, he was the ugly Little Tsakhes. But because Berezovsky, in the role of a fairy, combed his hair with a magical television comb, the public never ceased to admire him. The magic wore off only after several of Tsakhes's hairs were plucked.
Twenty-three years later, we see that instead of a beautiful fairy, Putin's hair is now being styled by some terrifying Macbeth-like witches. The magic has begun to fade, and the evil that sustained him is fading and weakening. But this, unfortunately, is not a quick process.