Time to read: 9 minutes(s)

Prigozhin's recent rebellion has demonstrated that central power in Russia isn't as strong as it once seemed. Can we expect initiatives to secede from Russia's national republics as the federal center weakens? Can Russia avoid civil war after the fall of the current regime? How should relations between the center and the national republics develop in the Russia of the future?

NeMoskva spoke about this with Ruslan Totrov, a political journalist from North Ossetia. Ruslan Totrov is one of the founders of the online media outlet Osnova. He became the first journalist in the republic to be charged with discrediting the Russian army after the war in Ukraine began.

Totorov's charges were based on two interviews he gave—one with the New York Times and one with Echo of the Caucasus. In them, the journalist expressed his opinion on the general mobilization in the North Caucasus, and in North Ossetia in particular.

Ruslan Totrov runs his project "Freedom Square" on Telegram and YouTube. He holds a master's degree in political communications from Western Kentucky University. He left Russia before the war.

How do you see the Russian state structure after Putin?

— It’s not at all a fact that this will be the “beautiful Russia of the future.”

I fully admit that, if events unfavorably develop for all of us, power will simply transfer from Putin to one of his inner circle. Yes, perhaps one more loyal (or, more accurately, more pragmatic) to the West, but one who remains a staunch part of the same sinister System.

If we talk about the desired state structure of the country, then, of course, I will not be original: Russia must become a truly European and democratic country, building healthy relationships with its neighbors and respecting their right to their own path.

"Who, if not Putin?" How would you answer the favorite question of Russians who believe Putin has no alternative?

"I'd suggest taking a slightly broader view of the tired old parable about the irreplaceable Putin. 'Who, if not Putin?' is, after all, a simplified version of the question, 'What, if not that Russia?'"

And my answer for the public, trained by long years of information machinations, is simple: if not Putin, then real political competition, free expression of will and a turn away from destructive isolationism towards what Russian propagandists today dismissively call the “civilized world.”

What useful Russian experience should be carried forward into the future?

— Certainly, experience building world-class technology companies with their extensive ecosystems. Pre-sanctions companies like Sber and Yandex were shining examples of Russia's non-militaristic capabilities.

Will Russia remain a unified state or not? Which do you think is best?

Russia must undoubtedly remain a unified state. Yes, the right of nations to self-determination is one of the cornerstones of democracy, but so is the principle of the indivisibility of borders. I always say that the former often directly contradicts the latter, and that there is generally no ready-made recipe for a bloodless redistribution of territories. However, in the case of Russia, I proceed primarily from the interests of my Ossetian people—at this point in history, there is no reasonable alternative to North Ossetia remaining part of the Russian Federation.

At the same time, South Ossetia must remain an independent state ( the independence of South Ossetia, proclaimed in 1992, is recognized Besides Russia, there are four other countries: Syria, Nauru, Nicaragua and Venezuela – ed.). There can be no talk of any absorption by Russia.

Is there a model to follow? Or does Russia have its own path?

"The talk of a 'special path' is a common, but admittedly quite successful, attempt by Russian regimes to inoculate their own population with the virus of slavery. As if they didn't already have plenty of it. In terms of government structure, Russia should orient itself exclusively toward the West: democratic institutions, an independent judicial system, genuine freedom of the press and expression."

What is the desired transition model for post-Putin Russia? And what is the most likely?

— As I already said, the probability that what is desired and what is actually achieved will differ significantly is quite high.

The desired model for power transfer in post-Putin Russia is democratic forces oriented toward constructive, partnership-based relations with both the West and the East, toward the country's return to international institutions, and toward the legitimization of all things Russian.

This model is impossible without a detailed understanding and condemnation of the international and domestic crimes of the current regime, without maximum distancing from it, and without symbolic acts such as the denazification of the consciousness of Russian “hawks,” reparations, and lustration.

The most likely model is a transfer of power within the System to a person who will be capable of reaching an agreement sufficiently to establish some kind of dialogue with the West, withdraw from the war, and conduct lengthy negotiations with the international community about Russia's role and place in the new world order.

Can Russia avoid civil war after the fall of the current regime?

— Even if we're talking specifically about the fall of the regime, it's still possible. Where were the millions of militant demonstrators and resistance fighters when the Soviet Union went to hell?

So it is here. Humans are remarkably adaptive and conformist creatures. The overwhelming majority of ardent Putinists and proponents of war would instantly beat their swords into ploughshares and become true bulwarks of democracy if a radical change in the political system occurred in Russia.

Who, in your opinion, can be the source of positive change now? Especially in a situation where the opposition has been destroyed or is in jail, and bright and talented people continue to leave the country? Can national entities be the agents of such change?

“I believe not only in the charisma of opposition politicians (especially since the main players are either in prison or are located outside of Russia), but also in the passionate outbursts in the regions.

Using North Ossetia as an example, a classic national republic, I can say that in a situation where the population is overwhelmed by the all-consuming Z-euphoria, I believe the role of the Ossetian intellectual elite is critically important. These opinion leaders are essentially bearing a heavy cross, caught between a rock and a hard place. Their task is to prevent a society infected with the virus of state fascism from completely forgetting the primacy of Ossetian national interests and the fact that these interests are not always identical to those of all of Russia.

How should relations between the center and the national republics develop in the beautiful Russia of the future? Can we predict which vector of change will be desirable for them: full sovereignty or something else?

— Definitely total federalization and maximum sovereignty. Let me remind you that in the early 90s, the first version of the Constitution of North Ossetia defined the republic as a state within Russia, which perfectly matched my ideal model of the relationship between the subject and the Federation.

National republics must be able to determine their own policies and daily life without constantly looking back at Big Brother from the Center.

If Russia remains a unified state, what should be the distribution of powers between the center and the regions? And what is the most important change?

Regional legislation must take into account the cultural and other characteristics of each constituent entity of the Federation. Direct elections must be reinstated at all levels, without any involvement from Moscow in terms of administrative resources: no approvals, filters, or other overtly discriminatory or corruptible instruments. Finally, the practice of completely siphoning revenues from the regions to the center must be stopped.

Which direction should Russia's future look more closely—to the West, with which relations are currently tense, or to the East, with which rapprochement is taking place in the current reality?

I've been consistently formulating my position for many years now. Russia's future lies in close integration with the West, partnership with the East, and maximizing the benefits of both.

Did Russia have a chance to democratize in the 20th century? If so, what went wrong?

Russia certainly had a chance to pursue a democratic course in the 1990s, but the reliance on former Soviet intelligence officers and what Sergei Guriev later called an information autocracy negated any efforts and opportunities. The irreplaceable President Putin and his regime are undoubtedly to blame for this.

If we imagine a situation where Russia disintegrates, could Ossetia exist as a sovereign state?

“I would not even like to imagine such a situation, since Russia must not disintegrate, but rather cleanse itself of neo-fascist filth and once again become an integral part of the world community.

If you insist on an imaginary scenario, I can't imagine the existence of a united and independent Ossetia without the total political and financial support (read: provision) of a regional power center like Turkey. Or without the direct participation of, say, the European Union. Both scenarios are entirely fanciful, as befits the situation.

I would like to emphasize once again that the only viable model today is North Ossetia as part of Russia with broad autonomous powers, and South Ossetia, which continues to develop as an independent state.

What will happen to the Ossetian language, which is in danger of disappearing? Why, in your opinion, the language is dying and what are the solutions to the problem?

"Ossetian should not only be the official language (it already is on paper), but also mandatory for all schools and a dominant language in government agencies. This is a matter of political will and the cascading of a language strategy from the top down. Without aggressive state support, the language is truly doomed. Here, it would be appropriate, for example, to turn to the Welsh experience and study the nuances of actually saving the language in Wales."

Three years ago, Putin declared September 3rd as Military Glory Day. Could this be considered another attempt to consign Beslan to oblivion? And why has September 3rd never become a national day of mourning?

Once our conversation is published, September 3rd will be declared by law in Russia as "Victory Day over militarist Japan and the end of World War II."

Naturally, this is a slap in the face to all Ossetians. The state first privatized our tragedy, presenting the criminal storming of the school and the deaths of 334 people as an unprecedented success of the security services, and now it's finally destroying the memory of Beslan, erasing it from official records with a newly designated holiday.

Personally, I didn’t expect anything else from the Russian regime.

"I'm for a strict vertical power structure. Elections and democracy are two different things. Elections are a technology," said Sergei Menyailo in 2016.Head of the Republic of North Ossetia — ed.Do you agree with this statement? And is there a place for direct gubernatorial elections in post-Putin Russia?

"Mr. Menyailo is the very embodiment of today's official Russia. A conformist, a populist, and, most importantly, one of the main ideologists behind the mass recruitment of Ossetians for the war with Ukraine. And I'm not talking about the regular army here, but about those who go there of their own free will, having listened to hawks like Menyailo."

It is quite obvious that this man’s opinion about the vertical power structure is identical to the regime’s position and has nothing to do with the country’s democratic structure.

In a post-Putin Russia, we will definitely restore direct elections at all levels, and the former head of North Ossetia will observe this process from behind bars—the lives of dozens, if not hundreds, of Ossetians who absorbed the mendacious propaganda of Menyailo's team and lost their lives in Ukraine are on the conscience of this gentleman and his aides.

Prigozhin's rebellion demonstrated that central power in Russia isn't as strong as it seemed. Can we expect initiatives to secede from Russia for national republics as the federal center weakens?

— Yes, Prigozhin, in essence, debunked the myth of the all-powerful state Leviathan and revealed the two main pain points of the regime.

First, it turns out the emperor, figuratively speaking, has no clothes. Vladimir Putin, it turns out, can't even control his closest confidantes, as evidenced by the president's poorly concealed rage during his urgent televised address.

Secondly (and most importantly), Yevgeny Prigozhin clearly demonstrated that the "Teflon" nature of the system is nothing more than a myth. In less than 24 hours, the Wagnerites took control of a city of over a million people and launched a decisive march on the capital, encountering virtually no resistance along the way.

Even Putin's most bulletproof followers have realized that this regime can be overthrown much more quickly than anyone could have imagined.

What are the chances that the same thought hasn't occurred to the president? None! It will now be very interesting to monitor both his actions to strengthen the vertical power structure and any possible attempts by the "elites" to probe new sore spots within the state.

However, raising the question of the separation of national republics seems to me today to be an overstatement.

Let's not forget that Yevgeny Prigozhin controls not just a multi-thousand-strong army, but also one of the most highly trained paramilitary structures in the world in terms of practical experience.

None of the national republics can even come close to boasting a significant power bloc, which is vitally necessary for carrying out such a delicate task as secession from the state.

If you're referring to Chechnya, we simply don't know the actual combat strength of the "Kadyrovites" compared to, say, the Wagner PMC. Moreover, right now, official Grozny remains the de facto outpost of the Russian regime in the Caucasus, and there are no signs of change.
However, it's worth remembering that the most dramatic and destructive events for a country usually unfold swiftly and unexpectedly, so it's impossible to completely rule out an attempt by one of the regional leaders to probe federal weaknesses. But I emphasize again that this is extremely unlikely right now. Rather, it's worth considering a delayed or cumulative effect.

Photo by Echo of the Caucasus