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Following the Ukrainian drone attacks on seven Russian regions on the night of August 29-30, the intensity of drone strikes continued into September. Ukrainian Armed Forces drones reached Rostov-on-Don, Volgograd, Moscow and the Moscow region, the Tver and Kaluga regions, not to mention multiple daily flights to the Bryansk and Belgorod regions.

NeMoskva discussed the prospects of drone warfare in Russia with military expert and editor-in-chief of MilitaryRussia.ru magazine, Dmitry Kornev, who is confident that drone warfare will reach its peak in the next year or two.  

Why have drone attacks increased so much since August of this year? By September 7, 18 Russian regions had already been hit by Ukrainian drones. What's the reason for this? After all, for a whole year, only regions bordering Ukraine were targeted by drone strikes. And now drones are falling 800 km from the border. What has changed after almost a year and a half of war?

The Ukrainian Armed Forces have found a specific formula and methodology for using drones. I proceed from the premise that the primary objective of such strikes is not military, but rather to impact the Russian population and the international community. First and foremost, it's an information war, and secondly, it's a concomitant solution to certain direct and indirect military objectives. But this is secondary, because at such distances, we see that the effectiveness of using drones against point targets is insignificant and insignificant. The information impact, however, is truly enormous. The Ukrainians have learned to exploit this and use drones for these purposes, but most importantly, they have organized the production of these devices. While a year ago these were prototypes, now we can say that some of these devices are quite effective in terms of production—that is, they are inexpensive and functional machines. Now they are organizing their mass production for future use. The corresponding infrastructure units and military units within the Ukrainian Armed Forces have already been created. Apparently, there's some kind of plan in place, and in accordance with the wishes of their senior leadership, material resources are already being acquired and are being utilized. Then they draw conclusions, improving their own operations while worsening the situation for Russia.

Let's say we're at the beginning of a long journey, or at least just a little bit after that. Unfortunately, I think we're still a long way from the peak of drone warfare. We haven't yet seen massive attacks involving dozens or hundreds of drones. I'm not sure air defenses can handle such attacks. 

At least initially, it won't be able to, and then it will start to require resources, because destroying drones requires shells and missiles. Shells aren't always effective, and missiles need to be produced; they run out, they have a habit of running out. For now, the air defense system's reserves are sufficient to cope with current activity. But if the Ukrainian Armed Forces increase their activity tenfold, the air defense will face a different kind of problem—a shortage of ammunition and precision-guided missiles.

— Which drone models can realistically fly from Ukraine to the Moscow region?

— The longest-range and most effective is the "Bober," probably the most well-known aircraft at the moment. This UAV has a canard configuration, which is very unusual: its main wing is at the rear, and the elevator and small wing are in front. It has a pusher propeller, also located at the rear. It's very streamlined, made of plastic, not metal, so the body is therefore difficult to detect by radar. And the second is the UJ-22 Airborne, also a long-range aircraft, but it looks like a regular propeller-driven aircraft. These are the two most hyped aircraft. Besides these, there are about a dozen others in a less sophisticated class. I'm talking about the UAVs used to attack Moscow and, most likely, Pskov. If a sabotage and reconnaissance group wasn't operating in Pskov, one theory is that a sabotage and reconnaissance group was involved, launching drones from short range with more precise guidance. The reasons are simple: in Pskov, each aircraft is in a separate casemate, and at least four were damaged. When operating over large areas, for example, with the Bobr drone, which is not very accurate, it is impossible to accurately hit aircraft parked in isolated shelters. However, many colleagues believe that if the Bobr's satellite navigation system has not been jammed, its hit accuracy could be three to five meters, which is a highly accurate system capable of hitting a relatively localized, limited-size target at a range of 1000 km.

— Could there have been sabotage and reconnaissance groups in Moscow?

"In Moscow, the UJ-22 Airborne and the Bober drones I was tracking were still in use, but there's no guarantee there weren't others, just as there's no guarantee there weren't attacks from the Moscow region or directly from Moscow—technically, that's possible. There's another very simple point, it's obvious, but they try to avoid it everywhere. The Ministry of Defense knows exactly which drones were used to attack what, where, and when, because the remains of the drones can be used to determine what kind of aircraft they are, their capabilities, and where they were manufactured. In our country, they don't like to publish the remains of UAVs, which can also reveal a lot, but here, that's the prerogative of the special services, who know exactly where and what.

— From the photographs of the wreckage, can we guess where the drone was launched from?

"Yes, of course, we can guess what kind of device it is, and knowing the information, we can already learn the drone's history, because if it's even remotely public, it could have been at exhibitions or presented in other public sources. For example, how do we know about the Bobr? It won a grant competition from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and was shown at some awards ceremony; it was publicly presented."

Why can't the air defense system detect the UAVs? I'd imagine Moscow's air defense system has been taken care of, but they can reach the Kremlin's roof, right? And why do attacks usually happen at night?

"Night reduces visual detection. If we station observers with binoculars and earpieces every kilometer, they won't see anything at night; this is a perfectly exploitable advantage. Now, in the fall, the hours of darkness will be longer, giving drones more room to maneuver. That's the first point, and second, why aren't air defense radars detecting them? All radars have a lower detection limit—they don't detect objects below 10-30 meters, depending on the terrain. So, if you're over a hill, you won't be visible to a radar. Let's say you're in a river floodplain and you're flying 10 meters above the Moscow River, almost no radar will see you if they're slightly higher. That's one reason, and second, even if you're within radar coverage, you should theoretically be visible. But take the Bobr drone, for example. Its piston engine reflects radio waves, and it's small, about the size of a schoolchild's backpack. Radar can detect such an object at a short distance, but at a distance of hundreds of kilometers, it's invisible. Plus, if it's flying at low altitude, it's not visible at all, or it's flying through interference from the surrounding terrain. It's small, it's already small, and then there's the interference, the lower edge of the radar field—and, in fact, they exploit this. It turns out that for fully-fledged, mature air defense systems designed to detect aircraft, cruise missiles, helicopters, and objects—iron and large—this tiny thing flying is simply invisible. In Ukraine, observers detect Russian drones, for example, by the noise and sound they produce, and report them, followed by infrared detection, although the tracking range is significantly reduced there—5-10 kilometers at most. With such a range, you detect such a device late, you don’t have time to shoot it down; if you had 100 kilometers in reserve, you could have time to prepare, but when it’s spotted for a minute and is already moving away, then it’s impossible to hit it – you won’t have time.

"And if an air defense system detects a drone over Moscow or any other city and shoots it down, isn't that dangerous for residents? Surely they could shoot it down with missiles, too?"

The very first method of downing a drone, and the most environmentally friendly, is electronic countermeasures (ECM). This jams the satellite navigation system, interfering with the drone's control system, causing it to lose control and, say, crash. It could also explode, but if this is done over uninhabited areas, the chances of it falling on someone are minimized. It's a similar situation with missiles: if you use them over a populated or densely populated area, there could, of course, be consequences. Furthermore, the consequences of anti-aircraft missiles can include damage to buildings, which has happened repeatedly in both Ukraine and Russia. But what can you do? If the drone reaches its target without being shot down, it may cause more damage because it would be targeted, whereas otherwise it would be collateral damage, indirect damage, or maybe you'll get lucky.

— You say the peak of drone warfare is still a long way off. Let's say a tank is moving, a drone flies up, and drops a munition on it. The tank isn't there. It turns out that a cheap "bird" is more effective than a multi-million-dollar tank. When will warfare finally become unmanned? How long can a drone war last?

You've raised a complex issue. Everything will move in that direction. The role of drones will grow; you're absolutely right that cheaply manufactured drones will compete with expensive manned, human-controlled aircraft. This will likely be a gradual process. In the next few years, we won't see warfare become a drone war. Expensive human-controlled aircraft will still exist, and the transition to drone warfare is possible, perhaps, in 15-20 years. But the role of inexpensive drones is growing, and the last year and a half has seen an absolute revolution in cheap drones capable of striking on the battlefield—so-called FPV (First Person View) drones capable of striking at tactical depth, from a few to tens of kilometers, and drones of strategic importance with a range of up to 1000 kilometers. Kamikaze drones like these haven't been used on such a massive scale before, but they're still developing. We haven't seen their peak yet; it will happen in the next year or two or three.

— Is this the first time in human history that drones have been used on such a large scale in war?

"What we're seeing now in Ukraine is unprecedented in its scale. But it's more accurate to call the first drone war the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict three years ago, when we first saw the effective use of Bayraktar-type UAVs against targets on the ground. That war is considered the trigger for the drone race."

"Can we say today that, beyond the informational "intimidation," life in Moscow is becoming as dangerous from drone strikes as in Novaya Tavolzhanka in the Belgorod region, where drones dropping grenades on people and buildings have become commonplace? The Kremlin has been attacked, as has Moscow City, the iconic symbol of the capital's prosperity..."

— From a security standpoint, purely statistically, no. Moscow is a large metropolis with the best air defense system. Moscow won't be allowed to suffer. The government will do everything possible to ensure Muscovites don't experience these attacks, just as residents of Tavolzhanka may. But basically, a year ago we weren't even talking about this, and now we're seeing drone attacks if not every day, then every week. And there's no sign of it ending anytime soon. Accordingly, from a security standpoint for Moscow and from an information security standpoint, there's no positive outlook, unless we start building some additional air defense systems or something else. There haven't been any strikes on Moscow City for a month. Perhaps this is a consequence of the systemic air defense system's work; we don't know for sure. But the fact that the attacks continue indicates that the threat exists.