Time to read: 24 minutes(s)

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: Let's immediately make a reference to the title "It's Not Moscow Speaks," because we will be slightly deconstructing the Moscow-centric theory of the Cossacks' emergence as runaway serfs and peasants from the borders of the Moscow state to the Don, which was quite traditional in 19th-century and subsequently Soviet historiography.

STUDIO: It's impossible to discuss examples of self-government in Russian history without discussing the Cossacks, especially since they have once again become a prominent part of the country's life. This is the podcast "We'll Do It Ourselves Next" from the "Not Moscow Speaks" project. My name is Andrey Allahverdov. Hello.

When discussing the Caucasus as part of the Russian Empire, we already began discussing the Cossacks—the Terek and Don Cossacks. Today, we'll continue this topic. It, too—as, perhaps, with any other topic—is fraught with stereotypes and things we only know in general terms. Therefore, we'll be discussing this in detail with Alexander Kamenets, a historian from the European University at St. Petersburg and a Cossack researcher. Hello, Alexander.

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: Hello

STUDIO: In this case, I think it's worth starting the conversation from the ground up: where did the Cossacks come from and who are they?

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: There are many theories about the emergence of the Cossacks as a phenomenon, from the runaway-serf theory to the autochthonous claim that the Cossacks were the original inhabitants of the Don region all along. Some Cossack nationalist historians also claim that the Scythians, Sarmatians, and all the other tribal groups that lived in this area were all Cossacks. But, of course, this is also an exaggeration. I maintain that the Cossacks as a phenomenon are male, militarized, frontier communities, beginning in the 15th and 16th centuries, forming and institutionalizing into an army. This applies specifically to the Don region as the birthplace of the Cossacks. This territory between the Don and the Sea of ​​Azov was a borderland, or, as they say, a frontier—that is, a porous boundary between the Russian principalities that later united under Moscow's rule, and the Ottoman Empire, its vassals in the form of the Crimean Khanate, the fortress of Azov, which was a border fortress within the Ottoman Empire, various nomadic Turkic peoples, and the Caucasian highlanders. This territory was situated between, and this meaning of "between" was decisive for its existence. There was no definitive authority of any single state, ruler, or anything like that. And it was an attractive destination for representatives of the "dashing people" to flock there from all sides it bordered. Most of them were warriors, fugitive servicemen from the borders of the Russian state and Russian lands. These included warrior serfs, service men of various categories, and even quite noblemen, dissatisfied with the tsar's growing power for one reason or another. Flocking to these free lands, they organized themselves into male and military unions, communities that became known as stanitsas (villages), and elected their stanitsa atamans (chieftains) at popular assemblies of all residents. In other words, this was a form of direct military democracy in the 15th and 16th centuries. Subsequently, these disparate stanitsas (villages) along the entire Don River, but primarily on the Lower Don at that time, were formed and organized into a single army. That is, following the principle of this popular direct democracy, they gathered in large circles, large military circles, and there elected a military ataman and his military board, which became responsible for the management of the entire Don army for a specified period. That is, for organizing military campaigns. At that time, the Cossacks were primarily preoccupied with this military pursuit. They were free to go on campaigns and plunder absolutely anyone they wanted, regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation.

STUDIO: They could also fight against the Russian population, right?

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: This is why I say we'll deconstruct the Muscovite theory. In the initial stages, the Cossacks quite happily plundered and fought against the Russians—those we now call Russians, representatives of the Muscovite state, peasants, and so on, traders, merchants—without any compunction about being co-religionists or sharing the same ethnicity. And, naturally, they also plundered and fought against the Turks, Crimeans, and anyone else who passed through these territories. Subsequently, falling under the influence of the growing Muscovite state, the Cossacks were forced to choose to serve the Muscovite tsar, as he was becoming the most powerful ruler in the region. And naturally, the majority of Cossacks originated from Russian lands. Naturally, they interbred with all the various peoples inhabiting the area, including Turks and Caucasians. At first, if you accepted certain rules of communal life in this territory, in these societies, and became a member of the army, your origins were irrelevant, since the first such ataman of the Don Cossacks recorded in written sources is named as one Sary-Azman, clearly not a man of Slavic descent. Later, in the mid-17th century, the Cossacks increasingly came under the influence of the Moscow Tsar. In 1671, an oath of loyal service was taken, but it continued to be violated in one way or another. Thus, the Cossacks provoked the displeasure of the Tsarist authorities.

STUDIO: Why do they fall under the influence of the Moscow Tsar?

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: This was a forced choice, as at that time the Muscovite state was expanding its sphere of influence, growing stronger, uniting all the former appanage principalities under its rule, and extending its interests southward. The colonization of the southern territories, which had begun, tentatively, from the Ryazan principality, which bordered the south, steadily gained momentum in the 16th and 17th centuries. And the main population flow that formed the Cossacks at that time was still external, that is, due to an influx of migrants, largely from within the Muscovite state. These people retained certain connections; many left their families in Rus' and subsequently moved to the Don region when their economic situation improved. From the mid-17th century, Cossacks began to establish their own families, settling directly on the Don. And these, primarily cultural and economic ties between the Don and the rest of Russia, were quite strong. The Don Host constantly interacted with the Moscow ruling political elite through the Ambassadorial Prikaz, or today's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moscow effectively used the Cossacks as mercenaries, paying them generously and supplying them with ammunition, gunpowder, and so on. These contacts also established social stratification within the Cossacks, and the Cossack elders were formed. These were local, wealthy individuals who enjoyed considerable authority. Later, with their full incorporation into the Russian Empire by the end of the 18th century, the Cossack elders became full-fledged Russian nobility, with all the attendant privileges, rights, and so on.

In 1695-1696, Peter led the Azov campaigns and captured Azov. From that moment on, Muscovite power in the region grew significantly stronger. The Cossacks realized they had little choice. Either openly rebel and fight the Muscovite tsar, or cooperate in one form or another. The Cossack elders, naturally, chose cooperation. But the mass of ordinary Cossacks, the rabble, gained little from this. Expeditions were sent to the Don to census the fugitives, who continued to flock there, mindful of the "no extradition from the Don" rule. And so, first, Razin's Rebellion occurred in the 1660s. After its suppression, the Bulavin Rebellion broke out some time later. It all ended rather tragically. The tsar's army was sent to the Don, and in 1708-1709, up to a third of the Cossack population on the Don was simply slaughtered.

From the newspaper "Vedomosti" dated July 20, 1708

 "The Don Cossack, thief, and apostate Kondrashka Bulavin plotted to stir up rebellion in Ukrainian cities and among the Don Cossacks. He gathered several thieves and like-minded people to himself and sent charming letters to many cities and villages, calling for his thievish unanimity. Many such thieves and all the Don Cossacks, some out of necessity, others out of his charm, joined him. […] And for this reason, His Imperial Majesty ordered his troops to be sent under the command of Lord Dolgorukov to apprehend that thief Bulavin and destroy their evil thieving council. And now, from letters from regiments and cities, veritable information has been received: that these Bulavin thieves are not in one place, many in number, and that his chief comrade, the thief Stenka Dranoy, has been killed in his large gathering, and a considerable number of his like-minded people have been killed. […] Seeing that he could not escape the Tsar's Majesty's army, Bulavin killed himself. Many of his supporters were killed, while others were captured and remain in chains. And the Don Cossacks of all the cities confessed."

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: Around 20 Cossacks, along with Ataman Nekrasov, left the Don region, settling first in the Kuban region, which was then part of the Ottoman Empire. They later moved to the main Ottoman Empire territory and served the Ottoman Sultan, maintaining their old identity from the 18th century. They were Old Believers, and they retained this Cossack memory until the 20th century. Meanwhile, military rule was established in the Don region, and the tsarist regime placed the Cossacks in a completely subordinate position. All liberties were revoked, and by this point the Cossacks had no choice at all. This process of incorporating the Don Host and Cossack lands directly into the Russian state, now the Russian Empire, was quite violent. This undermines the idea that the Cossacks had always been the defenders of the Russian state, the Orthodox faith, and so on. The idea of ​​the Cossacks as steppe knights, fighting against a world of nomads and Muslims, defending the interests of the Russian people and the Russian state, is rather romanticized. There's no factual confirmation of this idea in the 16th and 17th centuries, when they were quite free to choose their allies, who they would plunder, and who they would fight. On the one hand, this was a natural choice in the sense that most Cossacks came from Russian lands, from within the borders of the Russian state. These contacts—religious, ethnic, and cultural—seemed to facilitate the Cossacks' direct integration into the Russian state. However, at the same time, this was accompanied by much bloodshed and the suppression of traditional Cossack freedom.

STUDIO: After joining the Russian state and the suppression of Cossack freedoms, under what rights did they exist in the state system?

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: Since 1721, the Don Host has been completely subordinate to the Military Collegium of the Russian Empire, and all traditional Cossack liberties have been virtually eliminated. The ataman is no longer elected, but appointed by order of the Russian Empire, meaning he is appointed from St. Petersburg. He subsequently ceases to be a Cossack from within the Cossack community. By the 19th century, these were mostly just officials from the Russian Empire, implementing imperial policy and seeking to integrate the territory into the empire. However, at the stanitsa level, the idea of ​​some kind of Cossack self-government persists, as the stanitsa communities themselves elect their ataman and board at a popular assembly, a meeting of the stanitsa, which resolves local administrative and economic issues, such as policing, maintaining various local roads and institutions, and ensuring everything functions as it should. On the one hand, they are, in effect, the local authority, but on the other, they are under pressure from the military government, located in Novocherkassk and appointed from the imperial capitals. The local people's assembly elects these atamans for a traditional one-year term, although according to the laws of the Russian Empire, they were required to serve for three years. However, this remnant of traditional local Cossack legislation remained in force even in the 19th century. The village assembly could replace atamans early; they could lose trust by somehow failing to fulfill the interests of the local village community. They could be accused of drunkenness or some other offense, and under this pretext, new elections could simply be held and a new village ataman installed. Therefore, this position was not particularly attractive to take. These people had more headaches than privileges and power.

STUDIO: As far as I understand, the resettlement of Cossacks to new lands added to the headache?

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: Some Cossacks were resettled in new border territories. And, for example, here's how they developed the Caucasus—first, the Caucasian War, the advance. This was still the second half of the 18th century, not Yermolov's time, but Catherine's. The Caucasian Line was formed, and the Cossack line troops, which recruited people from the Don, resettled them, and along with the war, they engaged in the economic development of this territory. This, too, didn't always go smoothly, because in 1792—the very end of Catherine's reign—the so-called "Yesaul Rebellion" or "Revolt of the 50 Stanitsas" occurred. A charter was sent to the Don, determining the number of Cossacks, three thousand Cossack families, who were to resettle with their families along this Caucasian Line and live there permanently. And this provoked the Cossacks' utter displeasure; they said it was contrary to tradition. You don't dictate the number of families; you go and live on this unsettled and dangerous Caucasian line. We will decide by lot, as we agree, in accordance with Cossack principles and traditions. And so a sharp confrontation arises between the Cossacks and the empire, the Cossack elders, who are already part of these imperial circles and have a vested interest in enforcing orders.

From Amiran Urushadze's book "The Caucasian War. Seven Stories."

"The Cossacks, lacking both resources and extensive connections, found themselves in the most disadvantageous position. Almost all of them were doomed to head for Kuban. After all, three thousand Cossacks were slated for resettlement, while just over nine thousand were in the Don stanitsas at the time. Considering that only "healthy men, in good condition, with military weapons and two horses," were to be sent to serve in the Caucasus, there were only 5832 such men on the Don. [...] The leader of the rebels was Esaul Ivan Rubtsov from Nizhne-Chirskaya. [...] Rubtsov planned to march on Cherkassk and made no secret of his intention to hang all government officials and then restore Cossack authority on the free Don. [...] The task of suppressing the rebellion was entrusted to Prince Alexei Shcherbatov, a military general who had distinguished himself in the wars with Turkey and had fought extensively against the highlanders in the Caucasus. […] Faced with such a large, well-armed army, led by an experienced general, many Cossacks began to doubt. Wealthy Cossacks abandoned Rubtsov and fled to previously pacified stanitsas. The esaul himself tried to organize an effective defense, but the forces were too unequal. On the morning of August 11, 1794, the Cherkassk gunpowder treasury (arsenal) was very crowded. […] Soon, a bound man was brought out into the square. A commotion ran through the crowd; it was precisely for him that everyone had gathered. It was the esaul Ivan Rubtsov—a state criminal and traitor whose crime was that he wanted to live as a free Don Cossack. The whip whistled in the executioner's hands. Rubtsov received 251 lashes, and then he was branded. The esaul lost consciousness and died that same day around midnight. The Don Cossacks departed to serve in Kuban."

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: Catherine granted them a charter in 1793, which established their hereditary right to own military land. That is, some concessions were made, and they were allowed to determine by lot who would actually go to conquer this line. Thus, the linear Cossack army was formed from Don Cossacks who had resettled in the Caucasus. Subsequently, the second group of Cossacks who helped conquer the Caucasus were the Black Sea Cossacks, that is, the resettled Zaporozhian Cossacks. In the 17th century, it was the ataman, with his ataman's rule, but with the approval of the people's assembly, that is, the circle, who determined the direction of their activities in terms of military campaigns and interactions with the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the 17th century. At that time, the Zaporozhian Sich was also an independent political entity. It is clear that they had their own contacts with the King of Poland and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, while the Don Cossacks primarily had contacts with the Tsar of Moscow. But still, for the most part, they completely independently determined the paths of their military companies, who to plunder, who to ally with, and so on. Take, for example, the well-known story of the capture of Azov from 1637 to 1641—a siege. In fact, the Cossacks received no sanction from the Moscow Tsar for this undertaking. The Azov-Don Cossacks were constantly at war with each other, making peace, reconciling, trading, and determining these matters independently, taking into account the political moment and the situation, but they made their own decisions. But later, this led to their forced incorporation into the orbit of the Russian state. Catherine simply forcibly ended the existence of the Zaporizhian Sich, and those of the Zaporizhian Cossacks who wanted to resettle were, in fact, resettled in the Kuban region. They were given this land, Catherine issued her charter, and signed it, granting the army of the Black Sea Cossacks this land of Kuban, where Yekaterinodar was founded, and so on.

From the Charter of Catherine II to the Black Sea Cossack Host in the Kuban lands, June 30, 1792


[...] We therefore, desiring to reward the services of the Black Sea army by strengthening its constant well-being and providing means for its safe conduct, have most graciously granted it the island of Phanagoria, located in the Tauride region, as a permanent possession, along with all the land lying on the right bank of the Kuban River from its mouth to the Ust-Labinsky redoubt, so that on one side the Kuban River and on the other the Sea of ​​Azov, as far as the town of Yeisk, shall serve as the border of the military land […]. We desire that the zemstvo administration of this army, for the sake of better order and welfare, be in accordance with the regulations issued by Us for the governance of the province. We entrust the military government with the task of punishing and punishing those who commit errors in the army, but We order that serious criminals be sent to the governor of Tauride for sentencing in accordance with the laws. […] 

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: After the Caucasus was conquered and the Caucasian War ended, a significant change occurred in Cossack life and the project to transform the army as such, because the Don Host, specifically, ceased to be a border force. It found itself in the interior of the now Russian Empire, and it became unclear why it was needed in this form at all. And from within the Cossack community, projects arose to exempt absolutely all Cossacks inhabiting the Don Host from military service and allow them to serve at their own discretion. If you didn't want to serve, you could pursue other civilian interests and feel at ease. But this never materialized. The turn of the 1860s and 1870s again proved to be a turbulent time: the Polish uprising of 1863 occurred, with the Cossacks once again being deployed as a military force. Then came the conquest of Central Asia in the 1870s, followed by the Russo-Turkish War, and a generally tense foreign policy situation. And so, in this context, they abandoned demilitarization of the military, and the Cossacks remained the only class group in the Russian Empire obligated to serve their entire lives. They continued to serve for countless years in regular service, then transferred to the reserves, but if necessary, they were immediately recalled. There were several queues—first, second, third, divided by age and experience. And this system proved quite archaic by the early 20th century.

STUDIO: Did the revolutions of the early 20th century change the system in any way?

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: At the time of the 1905 Revolution, when this liberal democratic movement gained momentum across the country, various plans regarding the Cossacks themselves, what to do with them, and how they could continue to exist, began to crystallize. Cossacks were elected as deputies to the first State Duma, and all subsequent ones, representing the Cossack troops. And in these Duma discussions, various positions were expressed.

From the speech of the representative of the Orenburg Cossacks, Timofey Sedelnikov, at the meeting of the First State Duma on April 29, 1906: 

"The State Duma must ensure that there is no fratricidal Cossack class, like a military class, separated from the rest by a Chinese wall. Cossacks must be citizens, and the first step toward this must be the return of all Cossacks serving in the internal service home."

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: Cossack nationalists also participated, advocating for autonomy, for the return of the former autonomy of the Cossack regions, with self-government, elections, and all the rest. There were people completely integrated into this service system; they were primarily military men and continued the course of Cossack service to the Russian state, believing that this was how things should be; they still held a rather conservative position. At the same time, there were also socialist Cossacks who advocated decossackization. This ultimately happened under Soviet rule. And precisely when the revolution of 1917 occurred, first the February Revolution, the circle was restored in the Don region—that is, a democratic assembly of so-called Cossack residents, who were considered equal to citizens. And here it is important to consider that at the beginning of the 20th century, the population of the Cossack regions was far from monolithically Cossack, as Cossacks accounted for less than half of the total population. The social interests of the Cossacks, non-residents, and peasants were in sharp conflict. Cossacks owned 80% of the land, while they accounted for slightly less than half. And non-resident peasants felt somewhat disadvantaged by this situation. Consequently, in these new revolutionary circumstances, they attempted to rectify this situation. But Cossack nationalists had their own vision of how things should unfold. After the October Revolution, independent political entities emerged in the Kuban region, such as the Kuban People's Republic, or Kuban Cossack Rada. And in the Don region, correspondingly, by the spring of 1918, the Don Republic, or the Great Don Host, was formed, where laws were passed that discriminated against non-residents. That is, they were stripped of their voting rights and not invited to Cossack circles. And their opinions generally ceased to be taken into account. So, this group of Cossack nationalists seized power at that time, elected their atamans, and believed that we were separating from Russia.

From the speech of Ataman Pyotr Krasnov at the Great Military Circle on August 16, 1918.

"Hands off our Cossack cause, those who spilled our Cossack blood, those who hissed and cursed the Cossacks with anger. The Don is for the Don Cossacks! We conquered this land and enriched it with our blood, and we, we alone, are the masters of this land. You will be troubled by the aggrieved cities and peasants. Do not trust them. Remember where the famous parity led Ataman Kaledin. Do not trust wolves in sheep's clothing. They covet your lands and reach out to them with greedy hands. Let them live freely and at liberty on the Don as guests, but we alone are the masters, we alone... Cossacks!" 

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: In Novocherkassk, the military government becomes independent of anyone except circumstances and the economic situation. And in the stanitsas, the assemblies, the stanitsa atamans, and the system of self-government continue to function. Another issue is that, during the civil war, Soviet power is established in places, and some Cossacks support it. And these councils also advocate local self-government and, in theory, direct democracy. But by the end of 1918, the Soviet government loses the support of the Cossack population in these regions due to its rather ill-advised policy toward the Cossacks. The process of decossackization begins. In January 19, the Soviet government begins a policy of mass terror, and large numbers of Cossacks are executed—several hundred in four days. This leads to the Veshenka or Upper Don Uprising. That is, at the level of the entire Cossack masses, they see large numbers of unarmed Cossacks being shot. And naturally, they think they'll come for us now. And a mass uprising breaks out, during which, according to researchers, approximately 7-10 thousand people die.

From Mikhail Sholokhov's novel "Quiet Flows the Don"

"The uprising failed to spread to the villages of the Khopersky and Ust-Medveditsky districts. There was unrest there, too, and messengers came from there with requests to move forces to Buzuluk and the upper reaches of the Khoper River to rouse the Cossacks, but the rebel command did not dare go beyond the Upper Don District, knowing that the majority of the Khoper people supported Soviet power and would not take up arms. And the messengers did not promise success, truthfully reporting that there were not many dissatisfied with the Reds in the farmsteads, that the officers remaining in the remote corners of the Khopersky District were hiding, and that they could not muster significant forces sympathetic to the uprising, since the front-line soldiers were either at home or with the Reds, and the old men were herded like calves into a pen, and no longer had either the strength or the former weight. […] The uprising had become confined to the borders of the Upper Don District. And it was becoming increasingly clear to everyone, starting with the rebel command, that they wouldn't have to defend their native kurens for long—sooner or later, the Red Army, turning away from the Donets, would crush them."

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: For the Soviet regime, the existence of Cossacks as a social phenomenon, with their privileges and land ownership, was archaic and counterrevolutionary. Stereotypically, for the Soviet regime, Cossacks in this form were enemies. This raises the controversial issue of the policy of decossackization, which the Soviet regime was beginning to implement, a policy that Cossack nationalists themselves called a policy of genocide and the extermination of Cossacks based on their affiliation with the Cossacks. But this is a very dangerous game of concepts, because genocide is, after all, a legal term. And this rather situational policy of the Soviet regime during the civil war does not quite fit with the deliberate destruction of the Cossacks as a community. Because the goal of the Soviet regime was the abolition of a social phenomenon—not the physical extermination of these people specifically because they belonged to the Cossack class, but the abolition of the very existence of the class. That is, if you do not resist Soviet power and do not fight for your class privileges, then we have no particular questions for you; you can continue to live in your villages, and everything will generally be fine there.

On January 24, 1919, the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks sent a secret circular letter to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, which spoke about the policy towards the Cossack population of the Don and announced the beginning of mass terror.

From the Circular Letter of the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on the attitude towards the Cossacks. January 24, 1919

Recent events on various fronts in Cossack regions—our advances deep into Cossack settlements and the disintegration of the Cossack troops—compel us to issue instructions to party workers regarding the nature of their work in re-establishing and strengthening Soviet power in these regions. Taking into account the experience of the civil war with the Cossacks, it is essential to recognize the most merciless struggle against all Cossack leaders through their total extermination as the only correct course. No compromises, no halfway measures are permissible. Therefore, it is necessary:

Conduct mass terror against the wealthy Cossacks, exterminating them completely; conduct merciless mass terror against all Cossacks who took any direct or indirect part in the struggle against Soviet power. All measures must be taken against the middle Cossacks that will guarantee against any further attempts on their part to rebel against Soviet power.

ALEXANDER KAMENTSEV: That is, it is explicitly stated there that categories of the Cossack population who were directly or indirectly involved in the struggle against Soviet power are subject to extermination, physical extermination—those whom Krasnov's Don Army officers, wealthy Cossacks—but this was the class struggle of the Bolsheviks, not only Cossacks, but also nobles and the bourgeoisie, were exterminated. That is, against specific groups of the Cossack population, and not against all Cossacks in general. And tribunals were established, military revolutionary tribunals, which determined who specifically should be shot. That is, this is an institutional form, legally justified by the new government. We are sentencing you to death for this and that. Not because you are a Cossack by nature, by descent, but because you resisted Soviet power, and so on. And that, in a way, was the principled nature of this decision. And secondly, it was put into practice, the executions were carried out directly for 4 days, and after a month and a half the decree was rolled back, in principle, the decree was cancelled, and this policy ceased.

Naturally, after the civil war, first of all, administrative-territorial units were abolished, such as the Don and Kuban Hosts. And naturally, all military governance institutions, such as the atamans who commanded the entire army, whether elected or appointed, were abolished. Local self-government, in the form of village assemblies and village atamans, was also, of course, abolished; everything was restructured under the Soviet system, essentially reorganized under Soviet rule. The Cossack identity, the Cossack land—all of that disappeared. But in 1936, the campaign for Soviet Cossackdom began, and this was the very normalization of the Cossacks. Cossacks were again allowed to serve in the army, for example, to wear their uniforms, to openly declare themselves Cossacks, and so on. But this was done because the Soviet government benefited from attracting this population, making them loyal in the face of the looming threat of war, and using them as a human resource for mobilization. After World War II, the Cossacks were once again abolished as a unit within the Red Army. They were no longer needed, and all these Cossack formations were disbanded and withdrawn. The Cossacks became ordinary collective farmers in the Rostov Region, Krasnodar Krai, and Stavropol Krai. Then came a process of urbanization that hit the Cossacks and the Cossack population even harder than the Soviet repressions, as young people simply dispersed to the cities and migrated to different parts of the country. As a result, by the 90s, the population identifying as Cossacks or descendants of Cossacks in the Rostov Region and Krasnodar Krai turned out to be no more than 15 percent.

And this whole Cossack revival movement—it wasn't just millions of people, it was somewhere around 100, or several hundred thousand, in the 90s. The idea of ​​a return, of a revival, what they wanted to revive, was stated as the restoration of local ataman rule and self-government. But the trick was that they had to take into account the opinions of the local population, who only make up 15% of Cossacks or descendants of Cossacks, while the rest of the country's ordinary citizens are unlikely to have any interest in having any kind of Cossack authority back home. It's unclear why. So, in fact, it all ended rather unsuccessfully for those who promoted the revival, either in the form of simple public organizations, like hobby clubs, or in this system of public service, whereby Cossack societies, in squads, patrol the streets or assist the police. One of the Revival activists is Vladimir Melikhov. In his interpretation, the whole point should be to restore the Cossack principle of civic responsibility, whereby the best are chosen from among the most worthy as atamans. And they determine, in essence, how to make life in their land good. That is, if a sufficient number of the population supports a certain candidate for the post of head of local government, and that candidate happens to be a Cossack, it seems to me that it doesn't really matter whether they're called an ataman or a chairman or something else. The very principle of honest democratic elections of representatives of the most worthy citizens, to which the Cossack tradition of self-government appeals, is a very attractive concept for Russia. Building such a system under current conditions may be challenging, but the very idea of ​​such direct democratic self-government, I think, is quite appealing.

STUDIO: I thank historian and Cossack expert Alexander Kamenev for his engaging story. This was the podcast "We'll Do It Ourselves." Listen to us and comment. Your opinions are very important to us. See you there.