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SERGEY ABASHIN: This grassroots self-government—both in the Russian Empire and in the early Soviet era—wasn't because they wanted to build such a democratic society, but because there was no substitute. How else could it be? Like the judicial system. How else could it be organized? Let them organize it somehow on their own, establish some kind of order. Rather than have complete chaos, and we wouldn't know what to do with it.

STUDIO: Actually, this is about building democracy in the territories annexed by the Russian Empire in Central Asia. Different territories had different statuses, and the differences lay primarily in how tightly they were governed. This is the podcast "We'll Manage It Ourselves From Now On." My name is Andrey Allahverdov. Hello..

In the Soviet Union, this vast region was called Central Asia and Kazakhstan. And in Tsarist Russia, there were differences in the governance of these territories. Kazakhstan deserves a separate discussion, but today we'll discuss the part of the region known as Central Asia with anthropologist and historian Sergei Abashin, professor in the Department of Anthropology at the European University. Hello, Sergei.

SERGEY ABASHIN: Hello.

STUDIO: Compared to other lands, these territories—what was known as Central Asia—were annexed by Russia relatively late, in the mid-19th century. Let's begin with how and under what status these territories came to be part of the Russian Empire.

SERGEY ABASHIN: In fact, it all happened quite quickly. The beginning is counted in the mid-19th century, in 1853, when the Kokand fortress was captured by storm. There had been previous attempts, but they had ended in failure, but this was a successful attempt. And after that, gradual progress occurred, coming from two directions. On one side, from the Kokand fortress up the Syr Darya, this movement proceeded under the command of the Orenburg Governorate-General. And from the east, another line extends toward Semirechye, today's southern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and so on. At some point, this advance is slowed by the outbreak of the Eastern, or Crimean, War, and all attention, military forces, and resources are diverted there. But as soon as the war ends, in the early 1860s, the southward movement from these two lines resumes. And these lines converge in 1864-65 with the capture of Tashkent, a major city and a major commercial and political center. Initially, plans were even made to create a separate protectorate. In general, in Central Asia, the Russian government initially wanted to limit itself to creating protectorates—that is, state entities that were fairly autonomous internally but controlled externally, meaning they were under the complete control of the Russian Empire. This policy was dictated by the fact that there weren't enough forces and resources to include its own forces in such a remote outskirts and deal with this vast territory and its unfamiliar Muslim population. Therefore, they initially considered creating a Tashkent Khanate, but quickly abandoned this and created the Turkestan Region in 1865-66. Then, as the movement south continued, the Turkestan Region expanded, and in 1867, it was decided to create a separate Turkestan Governorate-General consisting of two regions: Semirechensk and Syrdarya. Semirechensk is where Almaty is now, Syrdarya is where Tashkent is now, and also the Kazakh city of Shymkent.

STUDIO: There was also a direction for the development of this territory from the Caspian Sea? Fortified forts were built, and then there was an inland movement, correct?

SERGEY ABASHIN: This is a separate story. It developed in parallel, but separately. Indeed, forts were established on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea by the Orenburg Governorate-General in the 1860s. These were small territories that were initially subordinate to the Orenburg Governorate-General and later came under the jurisdiction of the Caucasus Viceroyalty. The eastern shore of the Caspian Sea was more easily accessible from the western shore, as they boarded ships and sailed there rather than traverse deserts, steppes, and hostile territories. Therefore, military development proceeded from the Caucasus, and for a time these territories, now part of Turkmenistan, were subordinate to the Caucasus Viceroyalty and administered from there. They were then transferred to the direct control of the Ministry of War, and then, almost 30-40 years later, Turkestan and the Transcaspian region were united into a single, larger Turkestan Governorate-General. In 1867, the Turkestan Governorate-General was established, somewhat similar in its autonomy to the Caucasus Viceroyalty. Typically, the governor was either a relative, a Romanov, or someone very close to the Romanovs, a figure who would directly, bypassing all ministries and departments, appeal to the emperor and resolve matters. Kaufman, the first Governor-General of the Turkestan region, although not a Romanov and perhaps not the highest in the hierarchy, was nevertheless quite close to Alexander II and was granted by him the right to a fairly autonomous rule, pursuing a virtually independent foreign and domestic policy. But this was only under Kaufman; later, all this was curtailed. Under Alexander II and Kaufman, the region was actively reconquered.

From the Treaty of Gendemian between Russia and Khiva, August 12, 1873.

In fulfillment of the highest will of His Imperial Majesty, the Sovereign Emperor of All the Russias, the Turkestan Governor-General, Adjutant General von Kaufman […] entered the city of Khiva on May 29 of this year and took possession of the entire khanate. Since the annexation of the newly conquered country to the Russian Empire was not part of the imperially prescribed plan of action, the Turkestan Governor-General invited the legitimate ruler of the khanate, who had then retired to the Turkmens, to return to the capital to accept his lost authority and former rights. Following this invitation […] the khan arrived at the camp of the Russian troops stationed outside the walls of Khiva and expressed his full and sincere readiness to fulfill all demands and accept any conditions offered to him by the commander of the army. […] Thus, peace was established in the khanate. All subjects immediately submitted to the new state of affairs [...] with the exception of the majority of Turkmen clans, who in fact did not recognize the khan's authority and did not comply with the demands of the commander of the Russian troops. They were punished and subdued by the force of Russian arms.

SERGEY ABASHIN: Initially, a treaty was concluded with the Kokand Khanate, effectively turning it into a semi-protectorate. But then came a clash with Bukhara, then with Khiva. As a result, a system of protectorates was created. The Kokand Khanate remained, the Bukhara Emirate remained, and the Khiva Khanate around Turkestan remained. They concluded treaties that essentially placed them in a dependent position under the Russian Empire, but the treaties were generally rather amorphous, and the empire's control was still not very effective. At the very least, the Turkestan leadership always faced the dilemma of whether they would violate these treaties, unite among themselves, and what would we do with them? Kaufman feared that all these forces would unite at some point. Therefore, at some point, the Kokand Khanate was liquidated: it was decided to incorporate it into the Turkestan region. This conquest occurred in 1876. In general, this can be considered the moment when the Turkestan Governorate-General essentially took shape in its current size. Two protectorates remained: Khiva and Bukhara. In the 1880s, Merv was annexed by Skobelev, creating a fully-fledged Transcaspian Region. By the end of the 19th century, a rather complex system of subordination had emerged, although St. Petersburg certainly attempted to simplify this situation and make it not just unified but also consistent with the system of internal governance throughout the Russian Empire.

STUDIO: As far as I understand, the system of governance of the protectorates differed from that of the territories directly incorporated into the empire? You just said they were quite autonomous.

SERGEY ABASHIN: Protectorates are a unique system. Even Finland, which enjoyed a fairly high degree of autonomy within the Russian Empire, still lacked the characteristics of independent states, while Bukhara and Khiva remained formally independent states, but they entered into treaties with the Russian Empire. The Khan of Khiva suffered defeat in 1873 and concluded a treaty. The treaty stated that he declared himself a servant of the Russian Emperor and pledged to have no relations with other states without the consent of St. Petersburg and to conduct no foreign policy. At the same time, the internal system of governance was fully preserved, just as it had been a khanate, except that slavery was abolished according to this treaty. The rest of the Islamic system—administrative, inheritance, and so on—was preserved intact. The Russian Empire tried not to interfere too much. Of course, it monitored this, and if the khan passed his throne to an heir, this was, of course, agreed upon with St. Petersburg. It was a complex system.

It was even more complicated in Bukhara, because the treaty didn't even formally stipulate that he was obligated not to engage in any foreign relations. That is, from the perspective of the treaty, his sovereignty, as they say now, was much stronger and more fundamental. But this treaty was also subject to some informal relations. Much like the Khan of Khiva, the Emir of Bukhara fully coordinated his foreign policy with St. Petersburg. All domestic policy was at the discretion of the Emir of Bukhara. A political agency was established near Bukhara, which was supposed to manage Russian subjects in Bukhara, but in reality, it served as a kind of supervisory body and advisor. In other words, the Emir of Bukhara coordinated all his decisions, including domestic ones, with the political agent, essentially Russia. And if anything happened, there were certainly situations where Russian troops would quickly appear and restore order. For example, in 1910, there were quite severe unrest in Bukhara, where Sunnis and Shiites clashed. Bukhara had a significant Shiite population. These were typically Persians, either captured as slaves or brought as traders. Not only were they a large part of the population, but their representatives were at the top of the government, constituting a significant part of the influential elite. Clashes erupted, and Russian troops had to be deployed to quell the situation and bring it back under full control. The Russian Empire debated dismantling these protectorates and incorporating them into the Russian Empire. But they ultimately decided against taking on this seemingly additional burden. They generally tried to leave these internal problems to their own devices. This was done under Soviet rule.

From the Treaty between the Russian Empire and the Emirate of Bukhara of 1873

– In that part of the Amu Darya River that belongs to the Bukharan Emir, free navigation along the river is granted to Russian steamships and other Russian vessels, both government and private, on an equal basis with Bukharan ships.

"In those places on the Bukharan banks of the Amu Darya where it is deemed necessary and convenient, Russians have the right to establish their own docks and warehouses for goods. The Bukharan government will oversee the safety and security of these docks and warehouses. Approval of the chosen docking sites depends on the highest Russian authority in Central Asia."

All cities and villages of the Bukhara Khanate are open to Russian trade. Russian merchants and caravans may travel freely throughout the khanate and enjoy special protection from local authorities. The Bukhara government is responsible for the security of Russian caravans within the Bukhara borders.

SERGEY ABASHIN: The Emir of Bukhara was a lieutenant general, a fairly high position, while the Khan of Khiva was a major general. The Khiva Khanate was smaller and weaker. The Emir of Bukhara frequently met with Alexander II and Alexander III, and their relations were almost friendly. The Khan of Khiva, however, had less influence, but personal relationships were still significant. They regularly met directly with the emperor and resolved certain issues, bypassing ministers, with leading Russian entrepreneurs. They sent all their children, at least their heirs, to study in St. Petersburg, at military institutions. The last Emir of Bukhara, Alimkhan, who was later overthrown by the Soviet regime, spoke good Russian and lived in St. Petersburg for a long time. These military ranks were largely symbolic. In fact, even the Muslims of the Turkestan region, which became part of the Russian Empire, were exempted from military service by decision of the tsar, primarily Alexander II. It was like a double privilege. We granted this privilege—we're liberating you—to gain some kind of loyalty in exchange. But in reality, when this was discussed, it wasn't just a question of loyalty: they didn't want to arm the local population because they were genuinely afraid they would rise up with these weapons. No mobilizations were carried out in Bukhara or Khiva. In fact, the troops there were quite limited. Russia didn't encourage the creation of any powerful army in Bukhara and Khiva, and they weren't involved in any military operations.

STUDIO: Let's look at how the governance of the territories that became a direct part of the empire was organized.s

SERGEY ABASHIN: There were three parts with slightly different systems of governance: the Samarkand region, the Fergana region, and the Syr Darya region, which formed the basis of the Turkestan region. Several decisions and administrative reforms were made, but the final governance was established by the 1886 regulation governing the Turkestan region. These three regions were essentially governed by this regulation. There was also a separate Semirechensk region, but the twist was that in 1881, a reform took place, and the Semirechensk region was removed from the Turkestan region and incorporated into the steppe governorate-general along with other nomadic regions, which we now call Kazakhstan. The governance system there was structured somewhat differently. And there was also the Transcaspian region, which also had its own peculiarities, because it was conquered with the Caucasian Viceroyalty, and was considered a border region, because it was on the border with Persia and the areas of influence of the British Empire already began there.

From the Regulations on the Governance of the Turkestan Territory

Cities populated by natives are divided into sections, the number of which is determined by decree of the Regional Government or the Military Governor. Management of these sections is entrusted to elders (aksakals), chosen by the homeowners. Supreme political oversight in the city is entrusted to the senior aksakal, appointed by the Military Governor from among the natives, who is responsible for the lower-ranking native police officers. The entire upkeep of the police department in native cities is charged to city revenues. In the cities and sections of cities in the Turkestan region populated by natives, the senior aksakal and elders (aksakals) have the right to impose penalties on residents under their jurisdiction for minor police offenses, to the extent that this authority is vested in volost administrators and village elders.

SERGEY ABASHIN: In principle, they were all moving toward some unification with all-Russian rules, where governance was supposed to be civilian, through a ministry, with the Ministry of Finance handling financial matters, the Ministry of Internal Affairs handling internal administrative matters, and the judiciary being common to all, and so on. But, of course, when these regions were conquered, a slightly different system was created, something called military-people's governance, which implied that all the upper echelons of governance were occupied by Russian military personnel. That is, the Turkestan governor-general reported to the Minister of War and had to formally coordinate all appointments and decisions with him. The Semirechensk region was a little more complex, because some regions there already had civilian governance, reporting to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, so the relationship between the military and civilian components was structured somewhat differently. This was most severe in the Transcaspian region. Even when the Transcaspian region became part of the Turkestan region, it wasn't formally subordinated to the 1886 regulations, but was incorporated in 1899. Therefore, it continued to be governed by its own regulations, employing a rather rigid system. Not only was there a military official at the helm, but at the lower levels—down to the district level—there were also Russian military officials. There was also a rather rigid system of popular governance. In other words, popular-military governance implies that the upper level—the military—governs, while the lower level—the population itself—elects elders and judges from among its ranks, making decisions according to its own laws. This is the level of a rural community, aul community, or volost (a volost is something between a district and an individual rural community). In other words, several rural communities are united into volosts. The population itself would be governed by its own laws, in this case, Muslim ones, and would somehow participate in the selection of officials at this level. But in the Trans-Caspian region, all of this was under rather strict control, specifically by the military administration. This meant that they often appointed village and volost elders from among the local elite. They exercised direct control over them, and many judicial matters were decided by military officials themselves, meaning they actively interfered in everyday life. Kuropatkin was one of the first leaders of the Trans-Caspian region, and not only was he a proponent of strict military control over everything that happened, but he also opposed any attempt at Islamization. He wanted to keep all Islamic life under his control. He actively sought to monitor Islamic influence and promote customary law as a system regulating local life among Turkmens. To this end, he actively intervened in all domestic affairs.

Note by Lieutenant Colonel Georgy Alekseevich Arendarenko, head of the Samarkand district – On the prestige of Russian power in Central Asia

For a long time after our initial conquests in Central Asia, the people remained not only impressed by our glorious victories but also under the spell of a strong government that had provided the conquered country with a governance as simple as Asian life itself, yet sufficiently responsive to the needs of the region—a governance based on a united, swiftly functioning government, on justice, and on concern for the people's needs. The fruits of such a regional governance organization were too striking to go unnoticed; they quickly restored peace in the conquered country, quickly returned the population to normal activities, and brought about such general peace that every Russian traveler traveled both along the highway and in rural areas in complete safety. Politically and militarily, such a firm system of governance rendered the state a great service.

SERGEY ABASHIN: In the Turkestan region itself—in the Fergana, Samarkand, and Syrdarya regions—the system was more civilian, although all the upper echelons—the governor-general, the provincial governors, and the district governors—were essentially military positions. At the same time, the provincial governors or the governor-general commanded the troops stationed in their territories, and they reported primarily to the Ministry of War. Nevertheless, the 1886 regulations attempted, firstly, to strengthen some kind of civilian rule. There was a fairly strong police department, that is, the Ministry of Internal Affairs; the Ministry of Finance had some authority; they had individual officials who, as it were, had dual subordination. And most importantly, the local Muslim population was granted quite a lot of autonomy. Indeed, there was an electoral system. They elected their village elders, their volost elders. They elected their village elders at a meeting; there was an entire organized system. This was a gathering attended by the heads of households, usually men, elected by a majority vote of the village elders. The volost governors were also elected at the volost congress, as was the judge, the people's judge, who was effectively a Muslim qadi.

From the Regulations on the Governance of the Turkestan Territory

– The settled natives and nomads have separate people's courts that resolve cases within their jurisdiction on the basis of the customs that exist in each of the aforementioned parts of the population.

– The following shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the people's court: 1) all cases of crimes and misdemeanors committed by natives, with the exception of those specified in Articles 141 and 142, and 2) all civil cases arising between natives under the jurisdiction of the same people's court, unless these cases are based on documents executed or witnessed with the participation of Russian authorities. Ibid., Article 209.

Two candidates are elected for each judicial position. The Governor decides whether to approve one of them as a judge and the other as a candidate for the position. If the Governor does not approve the aforementioned candidates, he or she will call a new election. In the event of a judge's absence, illness, or death, a candidate judge, with the Governor's permission, will assume the position.

SERGEY ABASHIN: An amendment was introduced stating that if a region is under a special status, elections can be cancelled. The governor-general can say, "There's unrest here, I'm introducing a special administration, and the elections are cancelled, and we'll appoint your leaders." As we understand, this region was complex, and it was under a special status almost all the time, and elections were often cancelled, and officials directly appointed these supposed leaders. Nevertheless, religious life was quite free. The 1886 regulations didn't regulate religious life in any way, meaning Russian officials had no right to regulate it. Open as many mosques as you want—that's your business. Organize as many mullahs as you want, perform whatever religious rituals you want. The Russian government doesn't interfere.

And Semirechensk was also a separate region. On the one hand, it had more civil administration, in part because Russian Cossacks and Slavs were actively resettling there. And it was organized according to civil rules, the same as all the other provinces. Plus, there was the idea that since Kazakhs and nomads lived there, they weren't really Muslims, they were enemies, and so let's protect them from the Muslim influence of the sedentary population. And so, religious life in the Semirechensk region was quite strictly regulated. That is, for example, only one mullah could be appointed for the entire volost, and this mullah was approved by the regional governor. In other words, there was quite strict control. Despite the fact that in many other respects, there was more of a civil life there.

SERGEY ABASHIN: This self-government from below, both in the Russian Empire and earlier in the Soviet era, wasn't because they wanted to build such a democratic society, but because there was no substitute. How else? Take, for example, the judicial system. How else could it be organized? Just let them somehow organize it themselves, establish some kind of order. They already have established practices. Rather than complete chaos, and we don't know what to do here. That is... rather than complete chaos, and we kind of don't know what to do here. Although there were various disputes and discussions around this, because, for example, the same electoral system from below, it was essentially reintroduced, because in the Bukhara Emirate, the Khiva Khanate, and the Kokand Khanate, such an electoral system formally didn't exist, and the khan appointed everything from the top down. So when Russia came, they sort of told them, "Well, you choose." For the local population, this was a new practice. And there were quite a few complications there: parties began to form, and crazy conflicts arose between these parties, leading to the promotion of their own candidates, even to the point of murder. Crazy corruption ensued. Basically, the Russian government was constantly worried about this. It didn't know what to do about it. And it can't be reversed, because it's impossible to govern everything. There's a huge county, a huge population, and for this county, there are only a few people—officials who don't speak the language, who have no connections—so how are they going to manage all this with unknown people, with unknown rules and regulations? This was also a challenge for the Russian government. They were constantly debating what to do, what's best. They discussed it for 20 years, but nothing was worked out because the contradictions were too strong, opinions diverged radically: some said a more civilian system was needed, others, on the contrary, said the military system should be preserved. A compromise was impossible.

So, under Nicholas II, yes, in 1905, there was this manifesto on freedoms. It, of course, gave a completely different picture, some new impetus for thinking about what we should do in Turkestan. Including introducing some kind of civil order. So, elections to the State Duma were scheduled, let's say, for the Turkestan region, this vast region, it was decided to elect 13 deputies. Of these, six were from the Muslim population and seven from the Russian population. Well, one of them was from the Cossacks, from Semirechye, and the rest were from the Russian population. So, it seemed to be equally divided, even slightly more from the Russian population. Considering that Muslims made up 90 percent of the region's population. So, the inequality was already clear here. But nevertheless, the Muslims did have the right to elect six deputies. This meant that these deputies could participate in developing decisions for the entire Russian Empire.

But as we know, the First Duma was dissolved before it even began functioning. The Second Duma managed to function briefly. When it was dissolved, a decree was issued establishing a new electoral system. According to this decree, Turkestan was deprived of its deputies altogether. In other words, it was granted the right to elect deputies in 1905, but in 1907, this right was taken away. Incidentally, this decision was made for both Muslims and Russians. It was an interesting situation: a colony of the Russian Empire elected leftists, while its Russian part elected leftist deputies. And the Muslim deputies weren't exactly oppositional; they didn't join any Russian political parties, right or left, but formed their own Muslim faction. But they were also determined to demand something from the Russian Empire, to say that we lacked something, that we lacked our rights. Therefore, they were also seen as a troublesome leader. That’s why, when new decisions were being made in 1907, they decided that Turkestan was causing too many problems.

We must recognize the gaps that existed in Turkestan—between Muslims, Russians, the Russian government, the military, and the local population. At some point, they were apparently inevitable, and there was no other choice for how to structure the government. They were inevitable, but at some point, they had to be overcome somehow. And we see that the government failed to overcome them. The story of the State Duma elections, and other stories. We see that the government failed to overcome these gaps, failed to give people equal rights, and maintained many restrictions and a strong militaristic military outlook, which was based not only on military logic but also on underlying racist ideas. It's clear that they viewed foreigners in some kind of wrong way: first, let's make them Russian, enlightened, but on the other hand, if we can't make them enlightened Russians, then let's keep them under some kind of strict control. All the gaps persisted, and the issue went unresolved for a long time, leading to what it did: collapse, wars, ethnic cleansing, and mutual, protracted conflicts. That is, we must include people as much as possible in decision-making. So that we don't govern them, but rather they govern themselves, and so that they participate equally with us in creating this system of governance, so that they are, as it were, agents, subjects of this process. If we don't, then tension and conflict arise.

STUDIO: I thank anthropologist and historian Sergei Abashin, professor in the Faculty of Anthropology at the European University in St. Petersburg, for his engaging presentation. It was part of the podcast "We'll Do It Ourselves." Listen to us, comment, we're very interested in your opinions. See you there.