Time to read: 19 minutes(s)

Boris Nadezhdin: "I should have gone into open opposition earlier"

A presidential candidate who opposes the "special operation" discusses election plans, reparations to Ukraine, and the development of Russia's regions.

Boris Nadezhdin is the only candidate in the 2024 presidential campaign with an anti-war agenda. Upon becoming president, he promises to propose a ceasefire to Ukraine on his first day. He will finish collecting signatures in support on Thursday, January 25, and there's every chance he'll make it. The rest is up to the Central Election Commission.

While people in the regions are lining up queueIn order to sign for him, Boris Nadezhdin told NeMoskva how exactly he intends to complete the “special operation,” what he thinks about reparations to Ukraine, and why he opposes the “collective responsibility” of Russians.

Boris Nadezhdin is a Russian politician. Born in 1963, he holds degrees from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology and a law degree. In the late 80s, he was a "Soviet entrepreneur" and chairman of a cooperative. He entered politics in 1990, becoming a city council member in Dolgoprudny, a town near Moscow.

In 1995, he ran for the State Duma for the first time as a member of the Party of Russian Unity and Harmony, but lost.

In the late 90s, he was an assistant to Boris Nemtsov and Sergei Kiriyenko in the Russian government. He also, according to him, briefly have worked in the presidential administration.

In 1999, he became a State Duma deputy representing the Union of Right Forces. For the past 20 years, he has regularly participated in elections at various levels, from municipal ones to the Moscow City Duma and State Duma. He was a member of the political council and ran for various parties, from Right Cause to A Just Russia. In 2019, he was re-elected as a deputy of the Dolgoprudny City Council from the latter party.

Boris Nadezhdin is the founder and president of the Institute of Regional Projects and Legislation. He regularly appeared on political talk shows on Russian television, where, in his words, he tried to "get through to the viewers." In the spring of 2023, he appeared on NTV. saidthat under the current regime Russia “has no chance of returning to Europe” and suggested choosing “someone other than Putin.”

After being nominated as a presidential candidate, Nadezhdin repeatedly asked about his contacts with the Kremlin, and was suspected of acting as a spoiler. He refuted any suspicions on this matter. Nadezhdin himself claims that he went to the elections because Putin is "dragging Russia into the past." After the Central Election Commission barred Ekaterina Duntsova from participating in the presidential campaign, she supported the Nadezhdin, calling on his supporters to help him collect signatures.

"I'm not a rebel at all."

Last June, interview You told Sobesednik that you were certain you wouldn't be able to run for president as an opposition candidate. But you announced your candidacy in October. What happened in the last few months to change your mind?

"Here's the story. I ran for governor of the Moscow region, and then it turned out I couldn't pass the so-called 'municipal filter'—the requirement to collect signatures from local deputies in my favor. It turned out that almost every deputy in the Moscow region, about 1,500 of them, was literally bussed in to sign for the current governor. As a result, I simply couldn't technically pass the 'filter.' This is a direct violation—back in 2012, the Constitutional Court ruled that collecting more deputies' signatures than required for registration is prohibited. I went to court and complained to the Central Election Commission. And there, right at the meeting, I declared, 'Oh, so that's how it is! Since you won't let me run for governor, I'll give you a hard time—I'll even run for president.'"

Well, I said it, and it was a rash decision. I've helped people get elected president more than once: in the 1990s, as a federal official, I worked on Boris Yeltsin's campaign. Then there was Irina Khakamada, Mikhail Prokhorov, Boris Titov... But I myself was never a candidate. And to be honest, I was expecting some powerful figure to come forward [in 2023]—remember, went conversations about Venediktov, Muratov (Both are recognized as foreign agents – note from "NotMoscow Speaking"), Roizman? But they refused.

And I thought, "What the heck? I'll give it a try." Next came negotiations with the Civil Initiative party, and a huge thank you to its leader, Andrei Nechaev, and the entire political council for supporting me. That was already October. From that moment on, everything became serious and official.

– Why didn’t you try running for president in 2018?

"Well, firstly, there were a lot of other people running back then – Yavlinsky, Titov, Ksenia Sobchak. Secondly, my understanding of where Putin was leading the country was different."

There hadn't been a "special operation" yet, no isolation, no such obvious authoritarianism. In 2018, people weren't being jailed for long periods simply for writing the word "Peace."

You've been in politics for over 30 years. Let's imagine you need to briefly introduce yourself to our readers. What are your top three greatest achievements during this time—and your biggest mistakes?

Let's start with the good news. I think the most important legacy I'll leave behind in the Russian state is the enormous number of laws, decrees, and government resolutions I wrote. Most of this was done in the 1990s and 2000s, when I held important positions and was a State Duma deputy.

Let's take, for example, the Civil Code - the section concerning legal entities, "joint-stock companies", "LLC", was largely written by me.

Next is the electoral legislation, Federal Law "On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights..."I recently counted – it's been changed over 130 times over the past 20 years! But much of what I wrote there still remains. For example, the fact that in Russia, election results are published down to the specific polling station. This means you can take any campaign – from presidential to municipal – and see how the data from each polling station was entered into the State Automated System "Elections." This, by the way, is rare. This doesn't happen in Belarus – and election results there can simply be made up. Just write it down on a piece of paper and you're done. But that's not the case in Russia.

– It’s already working.

"No. In Russia, falsifiers have to do something at every polling station. And then, after the data is entered into the district election commission, everything is calculated automatically. That's a great thing."

My second achievement is that I've been training election observers for decades. They're primarily concentrated in the Moscow region, of course, where I usually run. Take Dubna and Dolgoprudny—they count the votes honestly. But there have been many educational projects across the country as well. There are plenty of people willing to monitor the vote count. That's certainly going to come in handy now.

And thirdly, thanks to the work of my institute, thousands of people engaged in social and political activities have appeared in Russia. Many of those who participated in our projects like "For Clean Power," "Personnel Reserve," are already quite well-known people who are members of different parties.

So, those are the three points: legislation, election monitoring, and training young politicians. Is it necessary to talk about the failures?

- Of course. But you can call them "insights."

– (Is thinking). There are things I did longer than I should have. For example, I collaborated with parties (and even belonged to some) organized by the presidential administration, like Right Cause or Mikhail Prokhorov's party. Perhaps I should have moved into open opposition earlier—like now. But then again, I'm not exactly a wild person. I'm certainly not a person with the temperament of, say, Ilya Yashin.

I'm more calm and inclined to compromise. So, I tried to cooperate with the authorities until the very end, trying to get something out of them. But disillusionment set in in 2020, after the constitutional amendments were introduced. And after the "special operation" began, there's nothing more to say. They got me, too.

Given your experience in elections, how do you plan to combat fraud? And now, with remote electronic voting (REV), which is completely impossible to control?

"These are two different issues. As for the falsifications, naturally, I'll be deploying observers. Everything has already been calculated. The goal is to cover 50,000 polling stations across the country. There are about 100,000 of them in total, but many are small, with only 100 to 200 people attending. So, by covering the large ones, you're effectively monitoring 80% of voters."

The DEG is a bad idea. I've always spoken out against it. But don't think it's a universal weapon in the hands of the authorities. Yes, it can change the voting results in Moscow, but it won't affect the rest of the country. After all, the overwhelming majority of people come to vote with their feet, and we will campaign for that.

- And where are you going to find 50 thousand observers? Especially considering everything restrictions.

– First of all, we will work with those who signed for me – that’s tens of thousands of people. Online You can sign up to work at the headquarters or as an observer. People submit applications there too. But please understand – right now we're primarily busy collecting signatures and donations. First, you need to register as a candidate, and then begin the next stage.

"Let's talk about the next stage. Two negative scenarios: you're not allowed to run, or you're allowed but for one reason or another you only get a minimum of half a percent. What will you do next?"

"Listen, I have both a plan B and a plan C, but let me reveal them as we get closer. What's the point of telling you what I'll do if I'm not allowed in, when we're doing everything we can to get in? In the regions, people are..." queues They're standing there to sign for me. Why demotivate them?

"Okay, then let's consider the positive scenario. You're gaining 20%—even under the most positive circumstances, it's unlikely to be higher. What next?"

"Nothing is predetermined. In Belarus, too, people were initially skeptical about Tikhanovskaya, but in reality, Lukashenko didn't win the election."

I think 20% is a perfectly achievable target. These are the same people who, even according to Kremlin polling, don't support Putin and the "special operation." We just need to convince them to go to the polls. There are still many challenges ahead, but if I manage to get 20%, it will mark a morale boost for a new political force in the country.

What's next? I'm a member of the Civil Initiative party, and its leader is Andrei Nechayev. We have a complete understanding, and we're already making plans for the Moscow City Duma elections next September. That's how we'll move forward.

You say you're not a rebel, and in all your interviews you emphasize that you act only in accordance with Russian law. Does this mean that if you have to seize power on, say, a Maidan, you'll back down?

"There are people who are revolutionaries in their mentality and way of acting. Take Lenin or Fidel Castro. Sometimes they actually come to power [through a coup]."

But in the 21st century, politicians most often do this legally. I'm one of them – I prefer peaceful elections to a Maidan. I'm against Maidans, and I'll stick to that until the last minute.

Boris Nadezhdin

"Confrontation with NATO is a far-fetched problem"

Let's imagine you do become president. What will be your first steps? And how do you plan to stop the fighting, given that the Ukrainian authorities' stated goal is to restore the 1991 borders?

- Look, I have one. document titled "Nadezhdin's Plan: First Day, First Week, First Month, First Term." I'll be publishing it gradually.

But I'll say it briefly. On the very first day, I intend to release political prisoners and appeal to the Ukrainian leadership with a proposal for a ceasefire.

What's next is lengthy negotiations. It won't be easy, because Ukraine still thinks it can retake Crimea militarily. I don't think that's possible.

Look how the front line has changed over the past year, despite the widely publicized counteroffensive, and the enormous losses. The military operation has entered a phase reminiscent of World War I—everyone has dug in, laid minefields, and won't budge. So negotiations will be difficult, but they must be conducted—including with the coalition leaders who support Ukraine.

– But what is the ideal outcome of these negotiations for you?

"Ideally, there would be a lasting peace. Even if Putin and Zelenskyy somehow miraculously agree not to shoot, what will each side do? Stockpile weapons for another attack. This is a bad story, and it will never end. Therefore, here are three conditions that I intend to adhere to. First of all, this must not be a unilateral decision. Until the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, the US, and the EU countries sign the peace treaty, nothing will change."

Second, everything must be decided in full compliance with the Russian Constitution. Please note that I will comply with all chapters, including ninth, which outlines the procedure for changing it. And thirdly, issues should be resolved based on the opinions of the people who live in these [annexed] territories, or who have left but want to return. This is the most important argument in the disputes with Ukraine—what kind of country do people really want to live in?

– Do you allow for the possibility of returning the captured territories?

"Nobody knows where the front line will be during the negotiations. The Z-patriots say Nadezhdin will give up everything, Crimea and Donetsk... I won't give up anything. I will defend Russia's interests to the fullest extent."

"I'm just curious how you plan to navigate this dilemma between Scylla and Charybdis. The liberal camp will say the new territories were annexed in a war of conquest. The patriotic camp will say they were drenched in Russian blood and that reclaiming them would be treason."

"I don't have an answer that will satisfy all parties. It doesn't exist. Therefore, these are complex negotiations, involving a multitude of levers and compromise options. It's difficult work, and I expect it will take several years. It's possible to [try] to stop the shooting in a day. But even that's not guaranteed to happen quickly: for Zelenskyy and Zaluzhny, this is also a difficult situation. And you're asking me where the line will be drawn. We still have to live to see that."

– Then a more strategic question for you as president. Would you agree to NATO placing bases on the Russian border or accepting Ukraine into the alliance?

"I think the NATO problem is kind of… [imaginary]. It's a purely Putinist story—an alliance opposing Russia. Globally, if there's trust between Russia and the Western world, the NATO issue won't be such a pressing issue."

This, incidentally, is clearly evident in NATO's budget—it gradually declined after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But it began to grow rapidly in 2014. Guess why? Putin is the main reason NATO is growing stronger.

Putin himself also said that attempts to accommodate the West ultimately resulted in NATO—and it's true—constantly expanding eastward. Do you think this is an insignificant problem?

- Well, it's unpleasant, but the question is how you feel about NATO. By the way, Putin, at the dawn of his career, in the early 2000s, was not против for Russia to join the alliance. It was agreement about partnership, if you remember.

The question of what NATO is must be addressed in a different context: what will the world be like in 50 years? Where will America be in that world? My prediction is that it won't be everywhere. And Russia will become part of a united Europe. In this context, NATO will simply disappear as a military force directed against Russia and effectively controlled by the United States. All of this will dissipate.

– Do you think America will lose its leadership?

"It won't. But it won't be as large-scale as it is now, when the US can simultaneously deal with Ukraine and Taiwan. Look at global forecasts: in 50 years, China will be the largest economy, and then India will overtake it. And Russia's real choice is this. Either it follows Putin's lead—that is, it cuts off ties with Europe, and automatically becomes China's vassal. In fact, this is already happening. China, in principle, doesn't treat anyone as an equal partner. It's ten times larger than us in population, and soon it will be ten times larger in economy as well."

Or there is another option - we unite with Europe, and then our combined population will be larger than that of the United States, and our economy will be comparable to China.

"There will be no reparations to Ukraine"

– What do you think about the idea of ​​reparations to Ukraine?

"There will be no reparations. Germany paid them because it lost both world wars, and Russia will not lose this conflict; that's impossible."

"Let's call it something else – 'compensation.' For destroyed cities, for example. Many believe this is necessary and fair."

"If these are people who left the country and no longer associate their lives with Russia, it's easy for them to discuss such topics. Now imagine: I have 40 million pensioners and disabled people in my country. And then I tell them the "good" news that I'll be paying them fewer pensions and benefits because I'll give everything to Ukraine? What do you think they'll do to me?"

- That is, you do not share the principle of “collective Liability"?

– No. There are 146 million citizens in the country – some of them were initially against the “special operation,” but the majority are gradually realizing it was a bad idea.

A huge number of people have loved ones in the trenches; many died or returned disabled. What's so good about that? Do these people still have any responsibility?

- At the beginning of this year you have met You've spoken to the wives of the mobilized soldiers and repeatedly emphasized that you've been in touch with them for a long time. Has their attitude toward the "special operation" changed—and how widespread is it?

"This is an important story, so I'll answer it in detail. Initially, Russian society as a whole responded positively to the idea of ​​the 'special operation.' And many who were mobilized went [to the military recruitment offices] with enthusiasm: 'Let's help the Motherland, defeat Nazism,' and so on. Propaganda works, after all. Then they split into two groups—I'm not prepared to say which is larger, but I know people from both. Some of those conscripted have settled into their new lives quite well, fighting and believing they're doing a good deed. But a significant number have become completely disillusioned with everything and simply want to stay alive and return home. All the stories are very different.

As for the families of those mobilized, things are different. Naturally, people initially wanted their husbands, brothers, and sons to return alive and well. But when they wrote petitions for the return of the mobilized, they began with something like this: "Of course, we support the 'special operation' and our president, but it would be good to carry out a rotation and send some other men in place of ours." They went to the presidential administration, appealed to members of parliament... And nothing happened. Only a few tried to help them.

And people have become deeply radicalized. Now they're cursing Putin and everyone who started this, and they're vehemently opposing the "special operation." They're outraged that their families are being treated like expendable material.

And the arguments they get back are completely insane. They say the wives of the mobilized soldiers are financed by the Center for Social and Political Action (CIPSO) and the State Department—complete nonsense. But these are ordinary Russian women, completely unpoliticized. They told me, "We've always voted for Putin and United Russia—why are they treating us like this?"

"I'll ask again about responsibility. You've repeatedly emphasized that the blame for launching the "special operation" lies with the country's leadership. But tens of thousands of our fellow citizens, primarily those mobilized, took up arms and went to another country to kill. Don't you hold them responsible for this decision?"

"That's a very strange approach. You're a Russian citizen, and everyone in your circle believes there's a war going on against Nazism. And you sincerely believe that. But even if you don't, you still get a summons. What can you do?"

– Not going to the military registration and enlistment office, for example.

"So what next?" Those who wanted to leave left, and those who were prepared to go to jail did. And 99% of people in this situation act lawfully—making any moral claims against them is pointless. Moreover, the majority considered the "special operation" the right decision.

"There should be more authority at the local level"

– What are the top three problems facing Russia's regions that, in your opinion, the president should address first?

"My task for the first year [of my presidency] is to completely overhaul the country's budget system. What's happening in the regions now? There burst The pipes are failing, the heat is disappearing, and in the Moscow region, half a million people were left without heat in temperatures of -20°C and below. And it's the same everywhere. Why? Because the state has other priorities. In many cities, 80% of heating mains are worn out. A significant portion of them were built during the Soviet era. To repair all of this, 4,5 million people are needed. trillion rubles. Enormous sums. But at the same time, in 2024 alone, our military spending will increase by over five trillion. That is, in 2023, Russia spent approximately 6,4 trillion, and this year is planned 11. The additional funds allocated by the budget would be enough to replace all the pipes in the country—and people wouldn't freeze. This is a global problem.

Therefore, the first task is to change the budget system so that regions receive more money and can address issues in housing and communal services, healthcare, and so on.

The second problem is the correct balance of powers. And within it, the task is to bring back real elections for governors and mayors. Not just send people a "horse in a coat" and have them vote for him.

It's the same with regional parliaments—United Russia is in them, and its deputies vote as the governor says, even if their decisions harm residents. I see this myself as a municipal deputy.

And the third problem, which is partly a federal one, is that Russia is a "torn" country. My agenda includes many items related to road construction, ports, and airport expansion...

"Let's discuss free gubernatorial elections. Opponents will say that if they are reintroduced, corrupt local elites will once again take power in the regions, and a "sabbat of independence" will begin, like in the 1990s.

"Yes, they always talk about this in the presidential administration—that if we give people freedom, [regional power] will be dominated by thieves. But excuse me, are there fewer bribes at the federal level? Who has the grander palaces, I wonder—Putin's friends or the local governors?"

– Well, what do you think of the argument that Russia is too big and needs a rigid vertical?

There's no universal answer to which system is better. You can't say that vertical power or complete freedom is better. A balance is needed. It's clear that in the 1990s, there was an imbalance in regional autonomy. I'll never forget Boris Yeltsin trying to call Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev, but he didn't answer the phone. I witnessed it myself. It's unimaginable today. But the problem is that by starting with the construction of a "vertical power," Putin essentially completely destroyed federalism and local self-government. Today, it's clear that development demands greater responsibility and authority at the local level.

- You toldIt's true that your ancestors were Orthodox priests for 150 years. Given this past, how do you feel about the Russian Orthodox Church now essentially advocating for war? And why do you think this happened?

"This is a difficult question for me. I wouldn't say I'm particularly religious, but I honor family traditions. My children are baptized, and I try to bring them to church on major holidays—it's part of our culture. It's painful to hear church leaders advocate for a 'special operation.' Perhaps a believer shouldn't speak like that... But I seriously doubt Patriarch Kirill has read the New Testament carefully. The Old Testament, where God is cruel and strikes everyone with fire, resonated with him. But the Gospel and the Sermon on the Mount, in my opinion, not so much. Because the main thrust of Christianity is love, forgiveness, and the sowing of peace."

And then, unfortunately, since the time of Peter the Great, the Russian Orthodox Church has essentially been part of the state apparatus, to varying degrees. This weakened somewhat during Soviet times, but under Putin, religious leaders have practically merged with the state. And they directly broadcast its ideology. And that's very bad.