"They've worn themselves out." Why do opponents of the war read Z-channels?
The name of Ivan Filippov's Telegram channel contains five Zs. Every day, Filippov sifts through numerous pro-war "patriotic" channels in search of truthful information about the war—information that doesn't leak to television, anti-war media, or blogs.
— This distorting mirror reveals the true scale of the sheer horror that this war represents, — Ivan thinks.
Who writes in these channels, and who reads them? How do these people envision the end of the war? How do they explain the need for its continuation? Or, to use the wording in the Telegram channel header, All Quiet on the Western Front — "What are the Z-nits whining about today?"
NeMoskva spoke with Ivan Filippov about this.
How did you come up with the idea to take on this strange endeavor? Did you wake up one morning and decide: I'll dedicate the rest of my life to reviewing Z-channels?
"You'll laugh, but I was hired by Vedomosti 17 years ago because of a story about the launch of Russia Today—it was the cover story. I've always loved reading propaganda because you can read so much between the lines. You notice what it doesn't say, what events it talks about in a particular way, what it emphasizes, what wording it uses. And this always gives you a better idea of what the speaker really means than if they said it outright. You don't have to take it seriously, but you do need to understand what you can get out of it—like prospectors panning sand and finding gold. With my channel, it's simple: since the beginning of the war, I've periodically followed military personnel because, unlike the official media, they gave more credible casualty figures, posted a lot of videos, and talked about the progress of the offensive. But I can't read this alone—I want to share it. I started sending this to various chats with friends, and people started yelling at me: "Vanya, stop sending me such nasty stuff." And when they threatened that one more link would get me kicked out, I created a sort of warehouse for storing the most interesting posts—that very channel. I thought I could write a book from the collected material later—and I definitely will someday. But unexpectedly, my channel became very popular.
— What is the subject of your research – Z-space?
There are several thousand Telegram channels that write about the war and practically provide information support for the fighting in Ukraine. Among their authors are active military personnel, so sometimes you'll read someone and suddenly—bam—they've stopped writing because they were killed. There are retired military personnel, and there are those who work at training grounds or in military logistics. Not all of these Telegram channels are new; many of them have been around since 2014, run by people who fought in the Donbas.
There are only a few hundred authors who generate original content, while the rest simply republish their materials. And significance in this vast ecosystem is often determined not by media exposure: someone like Yuriy Podolyaka, with 2,5 million subscribers, is less valuable for research or understanding the course of the war than someone like ¡No Pasaràn!, run by a former military man of Russian-Spanish descent and with only 8,5 subscribers. This is a man who makes homemade dynamic armor containers for tanks and understands the state of affairs on the front lines far more than Defense Ministry specialists, because he travels to Donbas several times a month and speaks with the soldiers who weld these boxes of his to their tanks. Podolyaka, meanwhile, is constantly on Russian television, and he's also a fugitive Ukrainian traitor who speaks very expressively and quite radically, but always wavers in line with the party line. There are very important channels that have few subscribers, but they are very closely integrated into this ecosystem because they give large channels, like Rybar, which has about one and a half million subscribers, the opportunity to do forwards or reposts.
— Who are the readers of these channels?
A significant portion of our citizens suddenly realized that television is lying, that Shoigu is lying, that Putin is lying, and they began looking for other information. And Z-space, operating in parallel with the main propaganda machine, provides them with this information. Not in its entirety, of course, but often much closer to the reality of the war. For three years now, Z-media authors have been demanding the truth about the war from the Ministry of Defense—but, of course, no one is telling the truth. Moreover, the attempt to combine the reality of war on Z-channel with the reality of war on the airwaves is doomed to failure. Take, for example, the word "grinding."
- What does it mean?
"It's a commonly used term in Z-space that refers to the process of destroying "manpower." If, after an operation, say, only 30% of a platoon remains capable of handling a weapon, the platoon is worn out." Platoon, company, battalion—it doesn't matter. Two years ago, this term was rare, but now it's thrown around casually. But it's impossible to imagine someone saying on Channel One that "a battalion is worn out." These realities simply cannot intersect. And that makes it all the more important to study this space, because even if it's a distorting mirror, this distorting mirror reflects the war much more clearly and accurately than the official media or Channel One. And it reveals the sheer horror of this war.
— What is the approximate total audience reach of Z-channels?
"I think it's somewhere between 5 and 7 million people, but you have to subtract about a million journalists and people with our convictions. The fact is that very few Russians are truly involved in the war. The fact that more people died in the battle for Bakhmut than in ten years of the war in Afghanistan is known, so to speak, to readers of Mediazona on one hand and readers of Z-channels on the other. But 95% of Russians are completely unaware—and that's without any moral judgments, just a figure. People involved in the war, interested in the war, and understanding even the basics of what's happening on the front are very few. One of the most interesting things you can learn from reading and studying Z-channels is that somewhere around 5-7% of the country's population actively supports the war." The Z-authors themselves say: we don't care that you've donated the letter Z; the only form of support for the war is participation in combat, financial contribution, or volunteer work. That is, if you don't fight, donate to the front, weave camouflage nets, or transport supplies to Donbas, we don't consider you supportive of the war, and you're more our enemy than our friend. As soon as we apply this definition to Russian citizens, it turns out that such people make up no more than 5-7%. Two years ago, I said 7%, but now it's clearly less, because every third post about fundraising begins with the statement that very few people donate.
I'm not particularly fond of making such sweeping assessments, but in my opinion, the structure of Russian society now looks roughly like this: as I already said, 5-7% are pro-war activists, 15% are actively (not necessarily publicly) anti-war. And the largest portion—75-80%—are those who voluntarily went into internal exile, built a protective information bubble, and want to know nothing about the war. Moreover, in the first year of the war, many felt it was impossible to live like that, but now it's possible to hide, pretend there's no war, and try to live peacefully. And again, I repeat: I'm not making any moral judgments—I'm only speaking about the facts.
— Have you ever observed the proverbial "we don't abandon our own" in practice? Were there any attempts to support, for example, Strelkov or anyone else?
"War supporters lack political agency. Far more people attended the trial of Russia's most obscure political prisoner than Strelkov's main hearing. This awareness that even though I could be beaten with a truncheon, jailed, my career and life ruined, I still can't help but take to the streets—that's something Navalny's supporters have, but the war supporters lack. They didn't come out for either Prigozhin or Strelkov. They talk loudly about how great Prigozhin was, a servant to the Tsar, a father to the soldiers, but when Putin said he sniffed cocaine and juggled grenades, they swallowed it. And if they jail Popov now—a genuine combat general with authority among the troops—they won't do anything either."
— How has Z-space changed during the two years of war?
"There's a tremendous amount of fatigue and frustration, and volunteer support is dwindling every day. Endless losses, endless problems. The president says there's no goal of taking Kharkiv—for them, it's too difficult and insulting. I suspect that, in their worldview, SPIEF participants evoke more hatred than Ukrainians, because 'while we're dying here under drones, you're out there having fun with escorts.'"
— How do they imagine the end of the war?
"They have no idea. They certainly write the ritualistic "we will win," but they stopped talking about what that victory should look like, I think, a year ago. They don't have a vision of a wonderful future; at least, I haven't read anything about it."
— And how do they explain to themselves the need to continue this war?
"I think there are still reasonable people there who understand that if they start asking this question, they might come to the same conclusion we did. It seems to me that they simply don't want to ask a question to which they already know the answer."
— What will happen to these people when the war ends, one way or another?
"Many of them understand that if the war ends now, it will bring them more problems than if it continues. They write about PTSD, the inevitable problems with adaptation, the inevitable rise in crime. They write outright that the country doesn't need them. They remember what it was like after Afghanistan and Chechnya—at first, many thought things would be different, but now they no longer do. There are authors who have already returned, wounded and disabled, and they talk about society's indifference toward them."
