The case of Siberia's separation from Russia
Andrey Filimonov

"To the Patriots of Siberia"—that's how an anonymous appeal discovered in Omsk at the end of May 1865 began. The leaflet called for the creation of a republic independent of Russia and a political alliance with the United States of America, which could provide military assistance to Siberia if St. Petersburg sent a punitive expedition against it.
In the capital, there were indeed fears that the Americans could “squeeze” Siberia away from Russia.
"But what will happen if the population gets closer to the English and the Americans, who will take upon themselves the easy task of convincing the people that it is more convenient for them to receive from them for their gold what has hitherto been delivered from Russia, and that, if necessary, they will support this deal with arms..." wrote the Governor-General of Western Siberia, Prince Gorchakov, to Prince Chernyshev, Chairman of the State Council, head of the Siberian Committee, back in 1850, fifteen years before the ill-fated leaflet.
Nicholas was still in power, the ill-fated Crimean War and Alexander's reforms hadn't happened. All of that was still to come. But the authorities were already fearful of Siberian separatism.
Several years before the proclamation's discovery, American businessman Perry Collins submitted a plan to Alexander II to build a railway from the Pacific Ocean to Lake Baikal. This idea was perceived at court as the first step by the United States to establish control over the Asian part of the empire. As a result, Collins was denied permission to build the 19th-century Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) with American funds.
In the proclamation "To the Patriots of Siberia," Russian authorities saw direct evidence that "foreign agents" were attempting to "destroy the country." Immediately afterward, a political case for separatism was opened. Gendarmes, members of the investigative commission, and senators in St. Petersburg spent three years meticulously studying the proclamation, every line of which reeked of sedition:
"No matter how the government treats Siberia, it will be unable, due to its distance, to understand its needs; its officials will always be alien to the people; its unique territory, production, population, and interests—all this demands Siberia's independence, and it must separate from Russia for the good of its people, creating its own state based on popular self-government. The democratic composition of society particularly favors Siberia's ability to create a republic consisting of states, like America..."
"Set up secret printing presses and lithographs for free speech. Raise money for revolutionary causes. The Siberian Independence Society will unite you and assist you through its organization... Come on! Fear neither torture nor execution, for the sacred cause of liberation, with a cry of "Long live the Independence of Siberia!" Long live our free people! Long live our glorious future!!!"
The leaflet was discovered by chance by Usov, a cadet from the Omsk Military Academy, while rummaging through his older brother's desk for cigarettes. The cadet found the leaflet's contents interesting, so he brought it back to the building and began reading it to his comrades.
"The warden noticed and covered them; the agitator wanted to hide the paper in his pocket, but the warden noticed this and, thinking to take away the cigarettes, took the paper away..." - the historian Shashkov, one of the defendants in the case "on the separation of Siberia from Russia," later recalled.
The leaflet's contents horrified the school administration. The anti-colonialist text, written in the spirit of Herzen's "The Bell," castigated the Russian autocracy.
"What has the government done for Siberia, for the education of its inhabitants, for the development of its countless natural resources? Worse than nothing! For three centuries now, it has only beaten and plundered, plundered and beaten Siberia! Tens of thousands of poods of precious metals have been mined in Siberia, but where are they? The inhabitants of the northern Eldorado are as poor now as they were before the discovery of gold placers. All the treasures have fallen into the hands of dissolute owners who could not control them, thieving officials, and then dumped abroad by a depraved government!"
The leaflet was immediately handed over to the gendarmerie headquarters. Arrests soon began across the country, from Irkutsk to St. Petersburg. Investigators had no idea who authored the proclamation or whether the secret society "Independence of Siberia" actually existed. Therefore, the gendarmes resorted to the simplest and most obvious method—to round up anyone suspected.
At that time (as always, in fact), the authorities were most suspicious of intellectuals, especially those who wrote articles and gave public lectures. So, that's where they started.

In late May 1865, three young men were arrested near Tomsk: journalists Grigory Potanin and Nikolai Yadrintsev, along with teacher Yevgeny Kolosov. There was no evidence against the three, but any one of them could easily have been a conspirator. Yadrintsev had recently given a speech calling for the opening of a university in Siberia, and any gendarme knows that students are only interested in causing trouble.
Kolosov founded a private school in Tomsk and preached "progressive views," which also boded ill. Several years ago, Grigory Potanin was a regular visitor to the home of the exiled anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, who later fled Tomsk for America. The investigation concluded that the case was linked abroad, to political émigrés who urged the Russian peasant to take up the axe.
In fact, Bakunin once helped the young Potanin move to St. Petersburg to realize his dream of higher education.

"I am sending and recommending to you the Siberian Lomonosov, a Cossack, retired Lieutenant Potanin (Grigory Nikolaevich), who left the service to study and is burning with an invincible desire to attend lectures at St. Petersburg University. He is a young man, wild, naive, sometimes strange, and still very young, but gifted with an independent, albeit still undeveloped, mind, and a love of truth that sometimes verges on indecent quixoticism..." Bakunin wrote to his cousins in the capital in 1858.
That's all their relationship was.
After spending three years in the capital as a university auditor, Grigory Potanin was arrested and imprisoned for several months in the Peter and Paul Fortress, along with other students who had taken the Tsar's manifesto on the emancipation of the peasants too seriously.
In early 1865, Potanin returned to Tomsk in search of work. He met with Tomsk Governor Hermann Lerche, whose office contained unsorted piles of documents on peasant and non-Russian affairs, some of which were over a meter thick. Potanin began working on the documents while simultaneously writing articles for the Tomsk Provincial Gazette. He recruited his Siberian friends, whom he had met in St. Petersburg, to join the journalism profession.
Locals viewed the bespectacled, hairy men with horror, as if they were nihilists. One homeowner, whose house Potanin often passed by, would point out the window and tell her maid, "That man is going to set my house on fire."
The poor woman felt a strange tide of trouble, as if she knew the future of Siberia was being discussed in Potanin's circle. At that time (Potanin recalls), it was considered seditious to use expressions like "our Siberia" or "we Siberians" in conversation, much less in print—that is, to distinguish oneself from the common fatherland. It was forbidden to love Siberia in isolation; it was imperative to love all of Russia en masse.
But the young people who gathered at Grigory Nikolaevich's place believed it was impossible for a small man to love such a vast entity as the Russian Empire. Especially since it was, in reality, an abstraction, composed of regions. Hence the name of their theory—regionalism. "When God came to the idea that Siberia should secede in the future, He called me into existence," Potanin wrote to Shchukin in one of his letters. For such arrogance, he and his like-minded colleagues were arrested in Tomsk.
Meanwhile, a young Cossack officer, Grigory Usov, who had started the whole affair, was arrested in the steppe. Demanding the names of the other "conspirators," the ataman personally threatened to "execute" him, causing Usov to become nervous and start rattling off names. Among others, he named local historian Serafim Shashkov, who had lectured in Krasnoyarsk, Omsk, and Tomsk on the annexation of Siberia to Russia.

Shashkov was arrested in Krasnoyarsk and taken to Omsk. "Siberia's independent existence is certain"—this phrase from the lecture became a symbol of treason for the investigators. General Panov, a member of the investigative commission, stamped his feet on Shashkov and called him "Pugachev."
The historian was then placed in solitary confinement, where, by his own admission, he "almost went crazy": "I began to fall into a heavy sleep at night, a nightmare suffocated me... thoughts came to me: should I commit suicide?" Shashkov recalled.
The investigative commission used these methods to extract "repentance" from the suspects. Shashkov was accused of the "Russophobic" content of his lectures. The investigator was outraged that, after outlining the history of the conquest of Siberia, the lecturer continually painted "only grim pictures of the suffering of non-Russians under Russian rule." The defendant responded that his lectures had been censored three times, and that Governor Lerche himself had attended his speech in Tomsk without expressing any outrage.
The investigative commission had its own complaints against the Tomsk governor, due to Lerche's extreme carelessness in allowing the suspects to be transported from Tomsk to Omsk "without isolation," for which he received a reprimand: "... these omissions could have a very detrimental effect on the course of the case, since they gave Potanin, Yadrintsev, and Kolosov the opportunity... to agree on how to answer questions."
The experienced administrator Lerche, in order to deflect his superiors' wrath, pulled off a cunning maneuver. After all, it was his police chief, Serzhpinsky, who arrested the dangerous "Carbonari" Potanin and Yadrintsev.
As a reward for solving the case of "criminals who intended to separate Siberia from Russia and establish a republic there in the style of the North American States," Lerche demanded that the Tomsk Duma recognize him as an honorary citizen of the city, which was granted. However, in St. Petersburg, this elegant administrative intrigue was not appreciated and Lerche was ordered to vacate his governor's seat.
The personality is extremely harmful
Grigory Potanin received particular attention from the investigative commission. After reviewing his letters, Moscow gendarmerie staff officer A.V. Voyeikov assessed him as "an extremely harmful individual."
Although Potanin was unaware of the leaflet's contents before his arrest, he heroically took full responsibility, identifying himself as the author of the proclamation and the leader of all the (non-existent) conspiracies. Later, in his memoirs, he explained his position during the investigation as follows.
"I declared that I had been spreading separatist ideas, that I had convinced my comrades to share my thoughts, that everyone involved in this idea had been captivated by me... My actions had a dark side. With my confession, I cast a separatist cloak over my entire group of friends and lent color to the entire affair. But imagine what would have happened if I hadn't made this 'frank confession.' Apart from this confession, there was no other, more compelling evidence against me: the letters contained not a single word about spreading separatism. In the testimonies of my comrades in the case, no one called me their mentor, and it could have ended in my friends Yadrintsev, Shashkov, and others suffering more than I did, while I considered myself the ringleader..."
Potanin explained to the investigator that the appeal "To the Patriots of Siberia" was a pamphlet written to shock "Siberian society" and awaken local patriotism by presenting the locals with the idea of a great future for Siberia: "It seemed that no matter what picture of the region's future prosperity one painted, it would not captivate Siberian society or make them consider the fate of their region. The idea of an independent Siberian state, however, would cause a radical change in their minds, move them forward, and compel them to work. Even the proclamations themselves, of course, were written solely to create a sensation in Siberian society. The separatists believed that even if Siberian society immediately rejected the idea of Siberia's separation, a high-profile case would arise, draw society's attention to the idea, and they would reflect on the humiliated position of their region, and that was the most important thing," Potanin said.
The investigation took Grigory Nikolaevich's "confession" into account. However, it was not satisfied with them. After all, it was still a long way off from Vyshinsky's arrival with his thesis that "confession is the queen of evidence." The Moscow officials who served on the investigative commission refused to believe that provincial dropouts (Potanin, Yadrintsev, and Shashkov were merely auditors and "had never graduated from university") were capable of formulating the conceptual idea of a "United States of Siberia."
“The main culprits were sent to St. Petersburg…” the commission decided meaningfully.
Moreover, the investigation was looking for a "Polish connection" in this case. They alleged that the idea of independence could have been brought to Siberia by exiled Poles who participated in the Warsaw Uprising of 1863. The proud rebels had no intention of giving up, even when they found themselves in remote locations.
While investigators in Omsk were struggling to uncover an imaginary conspiracy of Siberian intellectuals, an armed uprising of exiles, predominantly Poles, was being prepared on the shores of Lake Baikal. The conspirators wanted to establish a "Republic of Svobodoslavia" in Siberia, to be led by Nikolai Chernyshevsky (who was serving time in Yakutia). However, at the most crucial moment, the conspiracy's leader, Chernyshevsky's friend Nikolai Serno-Solovyevich, died in an accident.

But in the summer of 1866, a skirmish broke out at Kultuk station. A group of 500 Polish exiles, having seized weapons from their guards, attempted to break through to Mongolia. For several weeks, heated firefights raged around Lake Baikal, subsiding only when the rebels ran out of ammunition.
So, the Moscow investigators working in Omsk were right in their own way—the rebellion could have broken out anywhere, since Siberia was teeming with disloyal elements. But who was exporting them there? That is the question.
In total, approximately 60 people were arrested in connection with the case of Siberia's secession from Russia. At the Omsk guardhouse, the defendants behaved differently: nobly, like Potanin, or hardworking, like Yadrintsev, who wrote a lengthy article, "Women in Siberia in the 17th and 18th Centuries," while behind bars.
Some quietly went mad, like Serafim Shashkov, while others acted dishonestly, like Nikolai Shchukin, an Irkutsk journalist who was found in possession of a second copy of the proclamation "To the Patriots of Siberia." Shchukin actively cooperated with the investigation, shamelessly fabricating denunciations of his friends and drinking buddies from Irkutsk.
Tomsk researcher Nikolai Serebrennikov, in his book "The Case of Siberia's Separation from Russia," recounts an anecdotal episode: at Shchukin's instigation, a practically naked man, the Irkutsk writer Usharov, a chronic alcoholic, was brought to the guardhouse. During one of his binges, he "drank himself into oblivion and was hospitalized... During his illness, his last underwear, clothes, boots, and cap were stolen—all that was left were his glasses, and he was wearing only official attire. The police arrived, led by Fire Chief Pashinnikov, but a difficulty immediately arose: what should Usharov be transported in? Official underwear and a dressing gown were prohibited; the guard wouldn't provide them, he had nothing of his own, and being naked felt somehow awkward. They pooled their resources: the guard gave an old hospital cap; "The fire chief had his uniform coat, burnt through by fires, and some sick man had felt boots (it was the June heat). In this guise, the "conspirator" was transported to Omsk, 2000 miles, and Usharov later recounted how everyone looked at him with bewilderment on the way, in his cap, his knee-length police coat, his old felt boots, his glasses, but without pants or shirt!"
It's important to note an interesting fact here. Having rounded up almost all the freaks and clever people in Western and Eastern Siberia, the investigative commission still hasn't identified the true author of the proclamation. Although he, too, was among the other suspects.
His name was Stepan Popov—an eccentric Irkutsk merchant with liberal views who at one time financed the independent newspaper "Amur." A flamboyant man, Stepanov installed a Buddhist altar in his apartment instead of the Orthodox Church's icon corner.
At the turn of 1862–1863, he lived in St. Petersburg, where he became close with the Iskrist poet Vasily Kurochkin and the nearly disbanded Siberian student community. "Carried away by the current intellectual movement, the merchant composed perhaps the most cynical proclamation in the world," writes Nikolai Serebrennikov of this man.
Stepanov's name has been preserved in history only thanks to the "Affair of the Secession of Siberia...," in which he played the role of provocateur—first penning a proclamation, and then, when trouble began to brew, writing denunciations of Potanin and his friends. The former merchant ended his life in obscurity, writing columns for the Irkutsk newspaper "Eparchial News" under the pseudonym "Korennoy Sibiryak."
Potanin and Yadrintsev, on the other hand, entered history from the front door as the architects of Siberian independence. Grigory Potanin in particular, who became an unquestionable authority for subsequent generations of Siberian intellectuals, akin to Leo Tolstoy.
Perhaps it's also because Grigory Nikolaevich never held a grudge against anyone—not against people, not against the authorities, not against circumstances. He was always ready to take responsibility. He would give his last money to his neighbor, and if he didn't have any, he would announce a collection by subscription.
He himself lived in poverty until his old age, thinking first of all about the welfare of others and last of all about his own shoes. He possessed the spirituality of Mahatma Gandhi and, in his 85 years on this earth, never made a single enemy. Even the executioner in Omsk, who carried out his civil execution in 1868, looked sheepish.
Приговор
After a three-year trial, the Moscow Senate sentenced the "conspirators": Potanin, Yadrintsev, Shchukin, Shaitanov, Shashkov, F. Usov, Usharov, G. Usov, and Zolotin to hard labor in the mines—the first four to 15 years, the fifth to 12 years, the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth to 10-6 years, and the rest to short-term arrest. Such harshness toward people who had committed no act whatsoever against the existing regime outraged even its representatives.

Thanks to a petition from the State Council, the sentence was mitigated: Potanin was sentenced to five years of hard labor; Yadrintsev, Shchukin, Shashkov, F. Usov, Shaitanov, and Usharov were stripped of all rights and exiled "permanently" to the Olonetsk and Arkhangelsk provinces. Thus, the punishment for their desire for autonomy and development in their native land became exile to the "ends of the earth" in the European wilderness.
"It was a coincidence that we weren't sent to hard labor. The State Council didn't have to petition for it," Shashkov recalled. And Nikolai Yadrintsev quipped, "For the first time in Russian history, state criminals aren't being exiled to Siberia, but rather banished beyond its borders."
The "eternal exile" didn't last very long. Yadrintsev was pardoned in 1873 along with the other "criminals," with the exception of the most "dangerous" of them, Grigory Potanin, who was amnestied a year later at the request of the Imperial Geographical Society.
Over the next two decades, Potanin organized several expeditions to Turkestan, China, and Mongolia, becoming one of the founders of Russian Mongolian studies. Yadrintsev studied the archaeology of Central Asia and made a great geographical discovery by excavating Karakorum, the capital of Genghis Khan's empire. He also wrote and published in 1882 a classic work on Siberian studies with the remarkable title "Siberia as a Colony."

"When we spoke of nature and natural conditions... Everywhere we heard admiration for the region's novelty, its virginity... But when we turned to the lives of its population, and especially its civic spirit, the most bitter disappointment arose... As for the methods of developing Siberia's natural resources, not only did we fail to enrich ourselves here, not only did we fail to lay the foundation for a sound industry, but, on the contrary, we diminished and depleted the region's productivity. The reason for this was the exploitation methods we applied to it: all industrial activity in Siberia was focused... on the plundering of natural resources and natural reserves, on the destruction of forests."
But all that was in the future. And the "Affair of Separating Siberia from Russia" remains a paradigmatic example of police idiocy, when the authorities, frightened by the political fantasies of a small circle of intellectuals, made their ideas public. Since then, the idea of Siberia—as something more than a place of exile and a raw materials outskirts of the Russian Empire—has been passed down from generation to generation, continuing to frighten the imperial authorities.
