11 June 1992
Voucher privatization has begun in Russia—part of the market reforms and “shock therapy” of the 90s.
I put my voucher in
In a worthwhile promotion.
So, my life was not in vain.
My asshole life
(ditty song from the 90s)
The Supreme Council approved the state program, the decree on which Boris Yeltsin signed back in late 1991.
The idea of voucher privatization comes from Soviet times: in the 1980s, it was proposed by an economist and researcher at the USSR State Planning Committee Vitaly Naishul. However, by the beginning of the 90s he was already against the voucher scheme.
It requires a powerful state capable of redistributing property in accordance with the established privatization scheme. In 1981, when I proposed vouchers, such a state still existed, but in the 90s, it certainly didn't. There was no one to ensure the voucher privatization process.
By the end of 1991, the new state was effectively bankrupt. And it sought to transfer state property into private hands as quickly as possible—this was already a political issue.
We knew that every sold plant was a nail in the coffin of communism. Whether it was expensive, cheap, free, or with a surcharge—that was the last question!
(Anatoly Chubais)
Mass privatization began on October 1. The authorities valued the country's enterprises at 4 trillion rubles. Of these assets, 35% (1,5 trillion rubles) were decided to be transferred to citizens. Loans worth this amount were issued. 146 million vouchers (privatization checks) - to all Russians, including children.
The nominal value of one voucher was 10 thousand rubles. They could be used to buy shares of various values and different companies. The chief ideologist of privatization and head of the State Property Committee Anatoly Chubais He gave a universally understood equivalent: two Volga cars. Of course, it was impossible to buy them in exchange for a voucher.
There were four options for using the voucher: purchase shares of your company, participate in a voucher auction, spend it on shares of a voucher investment fund, or sell it.
Meanwhile, the ruble continued to fall, and many, ignorant of the intricacies of the market economy, opted to immediately get rid of the "incomprehensible" pieces of paper. For whatever price.
On the Moscow metro, vouchers sold for 20 rubles. In the provinces, they sometimes sold for a bottle of vodka.
The most cautious invested in the shares of the company where they worked. However, due to delays in salary payments, many soon sold their shares before receiving dividends. They were snapped up at bargain prices by future oligarchs.
Private investment funds (PIFs) also grew exponentially—more than 600 of them opened. The idea was to use the vouchers they collected to buy real assets, manage them, and share the profits with shareholders. But in reality, the funds were slow to pay dividends, convincing investors that these were "long-term investments." Many funds disappeared immediately after receiving vouchers. No more than 150 survived—they became mutual funds.
At voucher auctions, too, as a rule, they offered kopecks.
There were several reasons for the reform's failure. The main ones were that the public was not told what to do with the vouchers, and their value was greatly undervalued—in the year since privatization began, prices increased 30-fold.
As a result, the “red directors” and party functionaries, and later the financial-industrial groups, benefited from the “privatization,” as it was popularly called.
One of the deputies later gave Chubais two toy Volgas as a symbol of the real dividends from the voucher.
The results of voucher privatization will disappoint the population, and Chubais will be included in the list of the main "bad guys" of Russian capitalism.
(Leonid Parfenov, "The Other Day")
Each person received what they sat on.
(Vitaly Naishul)
