The Genius of de Gennin, or How One German Organized Russia
Author: Andrey Filimonov
On October 10, 1931, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) issued a decree “On the beginning of construction of a canal between Moscow and the Volga,” as if specially timed to coincide with the birthday of the man who designed this canal 200 years before Soviet power, on the orders of Peter the Great.

The project's author was named Georg Wilhelm de Hennin. He was born in Germany (or Holland) on October 11, 1665, and entered Russian service at the age of 32.
In his "resume," de Gennin described himself as a pyrotechnician and designer, an expert in "amusing firearms," skilled in "cutting out images on paper and other tricks." He had apparently heard that the young Russian tsar had established a mock army and a mock navy near Moscow, and was generally fond of all sorts of tricks and gimmicks.
But the young German (or Dutchman) had to deal with far more serious matters. Willem Ivanovich (as he chose to be known in Russia) would probably have been greatly surprised to learn that he was signing a lifelong contract for half a century; that he would never return to his homeland; and that he was destined to become the founding father of three cities in the Russian Empire—Petrozavodsk, Yekaterinburg, and Perm. The metallurgical plants built under the direction of de Gennin were the mainstays of these cities.
Iron ore served as one of the most important strategic resources in the 18th century. Naturally, this was in combination with the technology of iron and steel smelting. Before Peter the Great, the Russian state lacked this technology, so it imported cannons, cannonballs, anchors, bells, sabres, nails, and many other metallurgical products. In the first quarter of the 18th century, the situation changed, largely thanks to the hard work and iron will of de Gennin, who explored dozens of iron ore deposits from Lake Ladoga to the Urals and built dozens of blast furnaces there.
He began his service in Russia in 1698 with the modest rank of lance corporal fireworker with a salary of "shti rublev" (6 rubles) per month. But he confidently and quickly advanced in the army thanks to the Northern War, in which Peter the Great took an active part, eager to quickly carve a window to Europe through Sweden.

De Gennin's career star rose in 1710, when he met the future emperor in person. It was the most fruitful year for Russia during the entire military campaign. In the summer and fall, the Russians captured Riga, Reval (now Tallinn), Vyborg, and Kexholm, wresting a substantial chunk of the Baltic coast from Charles XII.

Under the walls of the Kexholm fortress, de Gennin distinguished himself as an artillery officer (now a major), commanding three siege batteries. Apparently, his cannons, deployed against the fortress walls, looked so impressive that the Kexholm commandant chose not to test the walls' strength, but sent a truce envoy to the Russian camp with an offer of an honorable surrender. This was the custom in those days of "gallant wars"—if the besieged surrendered "on the accord," that is, voluntarily and before the assault, they had the right to emerge from the fortress gates with unfurled banners to the music of a military band. The victors accepted the surrender, which resembled a parade.
In the evening, victors and vanquished feasted together, raising toasts in German and French. Russian was primarily spoken in the Russian army at that time by the lower ranks, who were not invited to banquets.
The commander of the Russian army, Roman Willemovich Bruce, sent one of the culprits of this victory, Major Willem Ivanovich Degennin, to St. Petersburg with a report on the latest victory.
After hearing the report and reviewing the reporter's own drawings of the captured fortress, Peter was in high spirits and generously rewarded Bryusov's envoy. According to de Gennin's memoirs, "for the capture of Kexholm," he received a gold medal with diamonds worth 150 rubles (a major's salary for six months) and the village of Azila, also in Kexholm district, a thriving farmstead consisting of 66 peasant households with a well-equipped manor house, salmon farms, a sawmill, and a flour mill.
But the main result of the audience was, of course, not the material benefits, but the favorable impression the 45-year-old officer made on the Russian autocrat. From that moment on, de Gennin's name entered history.
Yes, his skills as a master of entertainment also came in handy when he staged a New Year's fireworks extravaganza on January 1, 1712, in front of Prince Menshikov's palace on Vasilievsky Island. Residents of the northern capital had never seen such a spectacle. The sky was filled with the figures of Peter the Great on horseback, the goddess Ceres with a spear and a cornucopia, and Sweden appeared as a snake, writhing between the crowns of Russia, Turkey, and Poland. Then the eagle, symbolizing Russia, struck hapless Sweden with arrows, after which the fortress of St. Petersburg rose from the sea waves, with ships sailing into its harbor.
For any clever courtier, this performance alone would have been enough to further his career. But not for Willem Ivanovich, who left the army and St. Petersburg in 1713 to take up the post of commandant of the Olonetsky factories in Karelia.
It was the largest metallurgical holding in the Muscovite kingdom at the time, producing edged weapons and ammunition—everything for the front, everything for victory in the Northern War. The workers were so-called state peasants, formally free, unlike serfs, but assigned to factories. More than 12 peasant families were employed at the Olonetsky factories. They worked poorly, in a slipshod manner. De Gennin's first task as general manager of the defense enterprise was to understand the causes of defective products and shoddy work that were depressing production figures.
And he figured it out. It was obvious to a European that the forced labor of state peasants was ineffective, no matter how many overseers you placed over them. The peasants simply bore their labor obligations, resisting any attempts to modernize production.
In this hopeless situation, the commandant needed to create a new business model for the enterprise. In the capital, they expected him not to come up with abstract ideas (ideally, the peasants should have been liberated), but to deliver practical results—more bayonets and shells.

De Gennin found unexpected allies in the local Old Believer communities of the Vygovskaya Hermitage. Economically, these were autonomous labor communes. The Old Believers were forced not only to provide for themselves but also to pay double taxes to the state, which thus penalized them for their theological dissidence.
And they coped. Not just surviving, but thriving, especially against the backdrop of failing state-owned factories. De Gennin began gradually employing "dissenters" in his enterprises, which soon led to improved product quality and exceeding production targets. "The desert dwellers who live in the forest deliver ore and lime to the factory without any hesitation and are more diligent than anyone else," the commandant reported to the tsar.
In the frenzy of war, the Tsar wasn't particularly interested in the reasons for the Olonetsk factories' labor achievements. All he cared about was that they delivered new cannons to the active army on time. The star of this talented manager rose ever higher. He celebrated his twentieth anniversary in the Tsar's service with the rank of general.
But 57-year-old de Gennin was not destined to rest on his laurels. Suddenly, Peter the Great ordered him to travel to the Urals to replicate the Olonetsk economic miracle.
The Great Northern War had recently ended, but Peter, who had appointed himself emperor in honor of his victory over the Swedes, was planning new conquests. This required doubling the production of cannons and other "military equipment." Both in his youth and in his mature years, Peter acted with the impetuosity of youth. Having given an order, he seemed to forget it completely and become preoccupied with other matters. However, at any moment, he could suddenly recall his previous orders. If his will was not carried out, he would punish the culprit with all the severity of Peter's reign—even to the point of beheading or hanging them in a prominent place as a warning to his other subjects.
Knowing this peculiarity of the sovereign, de Gennin was in no hurry to set out without careful preparation. The expedition to the Urals had to be organized as a small military expedition. Traveling through Russia with government funds and without armed guards would have been extremely foolish. In reality, however, this mission was a journey beyond Russia's borders. The metropolis ended at the Volga; beyond lay the Bashkir and Tatar lands, obscure not only to Europeans, but even to Muscovites. There, the capital's governors often behaved like brutal conquerors.
In the early 18th century, Sergeyev, the governor of the Ufa province, arrived in Ufa, summoned the Bashkir elders, and gave them a threatening reception. He "decorated" the road to his residence with cannons and a formation of armed soldiers, "and led all the people through such bravery." Frightened by this reception, the Bashkirs presented the governor with a small herd of horses worth 400 rubles.
Soon, Peter himself needed Bashkir horses for his endless war, and Sergeev received a task—"a tale about delivering five thousand horses and a thousand fugitives to His Imperial Majesty." The commander then took a hundred Bashkirs hostage and, having locked them in a "strong garden," forcibly plied them with "wine and potion," so that, drunk, they "lay unconscious." Sergeev personally tortured them, demonstrating his imagination and erudition: he ignited gunpowder poured into his palms and, using a mirror, captured the sun's rays to "scorch their faces and heads." But even this wasn't enough for the inventive commander; he ordered ten cannons to be set up around the Bashkirs lying on the ground and fired grapeshot into the air until evening.
These methods were used to establish a vertical chain of command in the Russian Empire. In response, the Bashkirs and other conquered peoples periodically rebelled or retreated into the forests, subsisting by robbing travelers.
De Gennin, who had lived in Russia for a quarter of a century, was well aware of all this. So he remained in St. Petersburg, bombarding the government chancery with petitions: "I request... that you provide me with soldiers trained in drill, with rifles and ammunition, to guard against thieves and to stand guard."
After a lengthy correspondence, he was finally sent soldiers who had rifles but nothing to fire them with. The military department spared the ammunition, thinking that a detachment bristling with bayonets would frighten off any dangerous people on the road to the Urals. But de Gennin knew how to achieve his goals. In July 1722, he wrote to the Mining Collegium (the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian Empire):
“Since I must now go to Siberia (under Peter the Great, the Urals and Perm were part of the Siberian province - ed.)... and I will have with me a treasury to pay the artisans, then to protect that treasury from thieves and Bashkirs on the way, I need 50 hand grenades and tubes, one pood of hand gunpowder, 500 musket balls, for this reason the Berg-collegium would be pleased to release these grenades, gunpowder and bullets.”
After he received grenades, he finally set out. A respectable man with serious intentions and an important government mission.
The fact is that in the Urals in the 18th century, the Demidov gunsmiths from Tula ruled the roost. Legend has it that the founder of this dynasty, Nikita Demidov, once repaired the young tsar's favorite German pistol and then finally won his trust by quickly fulfilling an order for "three hundred pistols." From then on, Peter the Great patronized the Demidov house, giving rise to legends about the incredible quality of Tula weapons that survived into the 20th century and were exploited by Stalin's propaganda during World War II.
By the end of Peter the Great's reign, the Demidov clan wielded almost unlimited power in the Urals. State-owned peasants worked in private factories, receiving virtually no wages, judging by their "snitches" to the Mining Board, which officials kept under wraps, knowing better than to tangle with the Demidovs.
The Ural voivodes' attempts to achieve any transparency in this business were harshly suppressed by the Tula residents. As soon as Nikita or his son Akinfiy traveled to St. Petersburg and sought an audience with Peter, the offending official was removed from their domain.

The last such official was the Ural mining chief Vasily Tatishchev, an artillery engineer best known as the author of the multi-volume "Russian History." Tatishchev came to the Urals to build new state-owned metallurgical plants. The Demidovs were not pleased with this. They were particularly indignant at Tatishchev's concern for the education of peasant children and the opening of schools for them. The Tula industrialists reasonably believed that literate workers would be harder to cheat.
Therefore, old man Nikita went to the capital and personally handed Peter a denunciation in which he accused Tatishchev of bribery.

They say that after this, the Emperor summoned the accused to the carpet and asked him point-blank if he took bribes. "Of course I do," Tatishchev replied, astonished by the Tsar's naivety. "But everyone does, Your Majesty." He said, "It's not me—it's the times."
The answer wounded Peter's pride, once again realizing that his attempt to turn Russia into Holland was failing. He dismissed Tatishchev and dispatched a genuine Dutchman (or German), de Gennin, to the Urals to sort things out.

Willem Ivanovich's conclusions were entirely in favor of Tatishchev. Moreover, in his report to Peter, Gennin didn't hesitate to characterize Nikita Demidov himself as a quarrelsome old man who didn't like the fact that "others started watching his cards." As for Vasily Tatishchev, Gennin pleaded with Peter on his behalf: "Please don't be angry with him and bring him out of his sorrow."
Thanks to this letter, Tatishchev was completely acquitted, and Demidov was sentenced to a gigantic fine of 30 thousand rubles for false denunciation, which, however, he never paid.
De Gennin himself conducted this investigation in his spare time. His first priority was to explore iron deposits. It soon became clear that in the Urals, iron ore lay in "great nests" almost on the surface. The ore could be mined "without firing gunpowder"—with just picks and shovels. Moreover, the iron content was such that 100 poods of ore yielded 50 poods of cast iron.

In 1735, de Gennin published the book "Description of the Ural and Siberian Factories," summarizing the experiences of his expedition to the Urals. This was under Empress Anna Ioannovna, who awarded Willem Ivanovich the Order of Alexander Nevsky. The 70-year-old knight's achievements were obvious: iron and steel production in the Russian Empire increased exponentially, and new cities appeared on the imperial map. The Yegoshikha plant, around which Perm grew, was founded by Tatishchev, but was brought to fruition through the efforts of de Gennin.

Interestingly, while awarding him the order, the Empress was also eradicating the liberties de Gennin had allowed the Old Believers in the Urals. Drawing on his experience gained in the Olonetsk province, he hired teams of "zealots of ancient piety" and ignored the complaints of the Tobolsk consistory, which was trying to eradicate Old Believers from the factories. But the opposite was true. Under Willem Ivanovich, the Old Believers flourished and continued to thrive after his departure for the capital. The Old Believers hired priests from Georgia (the clergy there were considered "not infected with the Nikonian heresy") and were so bold that they even wrote to Empress Anna Ioannovna asking her to legalize their Ural community. This enraged the empress, who had begun her reign by tearing up the Constitutions that limited autocratic power. And here were some heretics demanding freedom of conscience. As a result, Tatishchev was sent back to the Urals, where he organized a census of Old Believers in the factories. Vasily Nikitich assured their leaders, the clerks, that it was a "mere formality," that if a person worked honestly and paid double taxes, no one would touch them. This turned out to be untrue; the census results were submitted to the Holy Synod, which launched an investigation into the "unheard-of audacity of the schismatics," which ended in repression and arrests, known as the "Tatishchev expulsions." But that's another story.
By that time, Willim Ivanovich de Gennin had retired from all business and was living out his days in peace in the village of Asila, which Peter had given him, the name of which, if written in Latin letters - Asyla - means "refuge".
As for the Volga-Moscow Canal project, it remained on paper as a minor episode in de Gennin's career. He had many such episodes. For example, while serving as commandant of the Olonetsky factories, he built Russia's first sanatorium near a mineral spring in Karelia. So he can also be considered the father of Russian balneology.

Peter the Great certainly knew how to select personnel. Almost like Stalin. Oh, and by the way, de Gennin's "Description of Siberian and Ural Factories" was republished in the Soviet Union in 1937.