Time to read: 12 minutes(s)

Author: Tatyana Rybakova

The recent visit of Russian Presidential Special Representative Kirill Dmitriev to the United States appears to have been unsuccessful. At least, not successful in promoting any joint projects. However, it's possible that with the warming of relations with the United States, such projects will again be on the table. And the construction of a tunnel between Russia and Alaska will certainly be among them. Because something similar has been conceived many times before, and for a long time. And this idea is based on something much more serious: the deep conviction of the Russian government (and a large portion of the public) that, as in the 17th and 18th centuries, territorial expansion is the foundation of national prosperity and security.

Russia is seriously considering a tunnel project that would connect Chukotka and Alaska through the Bering Strait, said Kirill Dmitriev, Special Representative of the President of Russia for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries and Head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), in an interview with CNN. The proposal was made by Dmitriev. did Following a phone call between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, in which they agreed to meet in Budapest. The meeting, as is well known, was cancelled by Trump (or postponed, as the Russian side claims) following a phone call between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. But few experts doubt that a brighter patch will emerge in the Putin-Trump relationship. It's possible that it will be quite long-lasting. And there's equally little doubt that during this period, the tunnel project will be back on the table.

A century and a half of history

The idea of ​​somehow connecting Chukotka and Alaska dates back to the 19th century. Incidentally, it was the Americans who first proposed this idea. In 1890, former California Governor William Gilpin proposed a railway ferry. He offered Russia the construction of a railway in Eastern Siberia as a bonus.

The Russian authorities rejected the proposal. Gilpin's own personality may have played a role: he was removed from his post as governor for fraudulent dealings with promissory notes, and the project was lobbied for by American railroad magnates. It seems that Alexander III, the ruler of the Russian Empire at the time, despite being nicknamed the Peacemaker, was not inclined to allow foreign capital to flourish peacefully in Russia's vast expanses. A couple of years later, engineer Joseph Strouss, later famous for building the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, allegedly proposed to the Russian government the construction of a railway bridge across the Bering Strait, but there are no traces of this project. Nevertheless, Alexander III's son, Nicholas II, expressed interest and even personally approved plans to build a tunnel under the Bering Strait. But it was 1905, and the tsar soon had no time for a tunnel.

The persistence with which such ideas have emerged can be understood by looking at a map: between Cape Dezhnev, the easternmost point of continental Russia, and Cape Prince of Wales, the westernmost point of Alaska, there are only 86 kilometers. The temptation to somehow connect the two continents immediately arises, especially as the distance between them increases further south. But the cool attitude toward such projects on the part of Russian authorities is also understandable.

Not only do temperatures here drop to minus 50 degrees Celsius in winter, with raging winds and horrific ice conditions (it was here that the famous steamship Chelyuskin was trapped in the ice, beginning its long drift)—at that time, both the American and Russian sides were surrounded by an icy wasteland on either side of Cape Dezhnev and Cape Prince of Wales. The Trans-Siberian Railway in its original form was only completed in 1916 (and even then, thanks to World War I, when the railway was needed for the rapid movement of troops and weapons), and the railway to Anadyr, the closest city on the Russian side, was only extended in the 1950s. On the American side, even today, all major highways terminate in central Alaska, near the city of Fairbanks (and Russian highways terminate in Yakutsk, with the railway lines ending on the right bank of the Lena River, in the city's industrial zone; a bridge to the city itself has yet to be built). However, when Alaska was connected to the rest of the US by the first highway in 1943, the possibility of linking Russia with Alaska was again discussed, in part due to the security of Lend-Lease supplies, but the war ultimately prevented any further discussion.

Go nowhere, bring nothing

In fact, little has changed even today: neither the American nor the Russian side can connect the proposed tunnel or bridge to the railway. True, there was a project in Russia Transpolar Railway From the Barents Sea to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and Chukotka. Begun in 1947, this highway was called the "Road of Death" because it was built by Gulag prisoners. It was never completed; only certain sections remain operational. The current project is North latitudinal way, which began in 2003, partly follows the outlines of the previous project, but so far only individual sections are operational – there is no through connection from the Barents Sea to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk.

The problem here isn't just the ever-increasing cost of construction (the project's cost had doubled by 2019). Economist Nikolai Kulbaka explains that virtually no one is building new railways these days, especially in remote areas—it's economically unfeasible.

"Railway, in principle, offers no cost advantage over sea transport: a modern container ship can transport approximately a week's worth of cargo on the Trans-Siberian Railway in one voyage," - he says.

Moreover, even if the entire Northern Latitudinal Passage, the tunnel to Alaska, and even the connection to Yakutsk are built, there will still be either nothing to transport or it will be unprofitable. Total freight volume on the Trans-Siberian Railway and Baikal-Amur Mainline in 2024 reached 158 million tons, with a projected increase to 270 million in 10 years. The Norilsk Combine, whose products could be shipped via the Northern Latitudinal Passage and on to Alaska, exports approximately 5 million tons of cargo annually. Even if a rare earth metals deal with the US takes place, even if in 10 years cargo from American-developed deposits is shipped to the US, it will still be simpler and cheaper to ship by sea.

But wait, there's another project: the Northern Sea Route! It also has a very long history, with active plans dating back to the 1920s and 30s, and is now being revived. Within 10 years, they promise to increase its traffic volume to 160 million tons, but for now, it's estimated at 40 million. At one time, Ministry of Transport officials enthusiastically developed projects for International Transport Corridors (ITC) through Russia and excitedly told journalists how Russia would become a transport corridor for trade between North and South and West and East: the Trans-Siberian Railway would become high-speed (from China to Berlin in a week!), container ships would sail along the Northern Sea Route, loading and unloading cargo along the Northern Latitudinal Passage, along which new settlements would flourish…

In fact, the construction of the Northern Sea Route was largely intended to support the Northern Sea Route. Despite the talk of global warming, which is about to melt the ice of the Arctic Ocean, the safe passage of ships currently requires monitoring ice conditions along the entire Northern Sea Route. Even with drone monitoring, as is currently proposed, the drone operators would need to be located nearby. And rescue teams would need to be even closer, as it's unlikely that the captains of container ships that must navigate this route would want to emulate the Chelyuskinites' heroism. However, the Northern Sea Route itself is just as economically unviable as the Northern Sea Route.

"Essentially, one unprofitable project needs to be supported by another unprofitable project," says Nikolai Kulbaka. The Northern Sea Route is quite shallow, and even if global warming melts the ice and container ships can navigate further from the coast, their capacity will still be limited. "The Chinese have now built a container ship, the Istanbul Bridge, specifically for the Arctic, which recently made its maiden voyage to Europe. It can carry cargo weighing 25 tons. This is about 2,5 thousand TEU (a measure of the capacity of one standard 20-foot sea container – Ed.).

"And modern container ships currently sailing through the Suez Canal have a capacity of 25 TEUs—ten times greater! Given such a difference in cargo volumes, the shorter route through the Arctic Ocean is completely irrelevant," the economist explains.

Moreover, as we know, the shortest route isn't always the fastest. The same Chinese container ship almost got stuck in the ice during its voyage: the weather suddenly changed, and the captain didn't want to hire an icebreaker—a linear icebreaker would only work for an hour. begins From 300 rubles, excluding VAT. It's no wonder the Danes previously sailed one vessel through the Northern Sea Route and then ended the experiment. Incidentally, the Istanbul Bridge chose to return to China. the traditional way via Suez. And if we return to the tunnel idea, it's completely unclear what would be involved and, most importantly, how it would get to the mainland US.

Strategic plans

However, both the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Baikal-Amur Mainline, and the circumpolar railway options—like the Northern Sea Route—were initially conceived with military-strategic goals in mind: the transfer of troops and weapons, the "pulling" of missiles closer to the North Pole, from where the flight path (and time) to any potential Western adversary is much shorter than across the continent, and there are fewer opportunities for early interception. Again, the supply of remote garrisons, alternative trade routes in the event of a naval blockade, and so on. How effective is this today, in a situation where Donald Trump, in response to the Burevestnik test flight, melancholically noticedthat the US doesn't need such long-range and long-range missiles because its submarine is located off the coast of Russia?

But perhaps China needs this? Let's assume a conflict breaks out between China and the US – over Taiwan or something else, Nikolai Kulbaka muses. Under these circumstances, China is interested in alternative routes. "Then the question is: where does the route across the Arctic Ocean go? The answer is to Europe. The question is: will this route be in demand? Will Europe refuse to cooperate with the US and actively side with China in this conflict? If not, then what's the point of this route?" he asks.

But let's look at the problem more broadly. Why should Russia develop its remote northern territories at all? Even if we assume they are important from a military-strategic perspective. Even if we plan to exploit oil, rare earth metals, and other mineral deposits on a massive scale. The example of Australia and Canada shows that for such purposes, supporting settlements to accommodate and support shift workers are quite sufficient. Everything else can be left to the indigenous peoples living in these territories, who today suffer Due to the disappearance of pastures and traditional fishing grounds, the money poured into these projects should be used to improve existing cities—for example, to build a bridge in Yakutsk.

Incidentally, the author of these lines unwittingly assisted in the construction of the current BAM branch to Yakutsk (the Amur-Yakutsk Mainline). At one time, the Yakut government was only able to complete the road from Neryungri to Tommot on its own. After that, the regions lost a significant portion of their financial independence and had to turn to the federal government.

As luck would have it, in 2003, a severe drought caused the Lena River to dry up, threatening to disrupt the northern supply line to Yakutia. In September, then-Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Yakovlev visited the republic with a group of journalists. Local authorities requested federal funding to complete the road to Yakutsk, but Yakovlev responded lukewarmly—the government had already spent heavily on saving the northern supply line. He was also unimpressed by a trip to the last stop of the existing railway, Tommota Station. On the way to Aldan, where the Deputy Prime Minister was scheduled to open a children's clinic, the railway director shared a bus with the journalists and continued to extol the importance of the line. "Our children just tried yogurt for the first time—the northern supply line can't bring it!" he exclaimed angrily. "Wait, if the road is built to Yakutsk, will the Northern Delivery Service not be necessary?" I asked. And, having received an affirmative answer, I persuaded the director to speak again, this time focusing on the calculations. We did these calculations on the spot: it turned out that the cost of the road was equal to the cost of ten Northern Delivery Services. Inexpensive. Which is exactly what I told Yakovlev. His reaction was very interested: after all, we were talking about saving the federal budget! A year later, the decision to build the road to Yakutsk was made—the republic agreed to temporarily do without a bridge into the city itself. Temporary—and that remains the case.

This story exemplifies the bureaucratic mindset. Under normal circumstances, they're interested in spending as little budget money as possible in order to get as much for it as possible. Believe me, American and other government officials think in exactly the same way. Therefore, it's unlikely they'll make any significant investments or offer incentives for investment in the tunnel project, container ships for the Northern Sea Route, or other large-scale development projects in the polar regions.

So why does this logic so regularly fail Russian officials? Especially when it comes to northern transport routes? Where the main focus is on building and staking out as much territory as possible, while how people will survive in these areas and the efficiency of established transport routes are of secondary importance? When no one asks how railways will perform in the event of global warming, when permafrost melts, and the earth begins to turn into a swamp many meters deep? When the ice on the Northern Sea Route may become thinner, but will more often take the form of floating ice floes, whose routes are more difficult to track than the edge of stationary ice?

Someday, Russia, too, will embrace the concept of Canada and Australia. The problem is that the people currently in power are driven by the concept of a besieged fortress and territorial expansion: if we don't expand and fill our territory, it will be taken away from us, says Nikolai Kulbaka. Therefore, we need to invest in the development of the Arctic, in the construction of roads and other military-strategic facilities there. "Then the question arises: if these projects have no economic significance, only military-strategic significance, then if you're not going to war, you need all this like a stop sign for a hare," says Nikolai Kulbaka. It seems we're not planning to fight. Or are we?