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How scores were settled in the USSR

One hundred years ago, the first Soviet population census took place

At the end of this year, the centenary of the first all-Union population census will be celebrated, which is still called the last honest Soviet census. Why was it the last, and what happened next? It's appropriate to remember and discuss this now, as Rosstat is once again deciding what information can be published and what is best kept under wraps.

Author: Sergey Tashevsky

In May 2025, the "Demographics" section of Rosstat's monthly report "On the Socioeconomic Situation" disappeared. This meant that information on deaths, births, marriages, migration, and even the total population disappeared completely. It seems all of this is now a state secret. Moreover, these statistics were "hidden" gradually: first, back in the COVID-19 year of 2020, they stopped publishing operational data on causes of death, then in March 2022, mortality by age and region "disappeared." In 2024, they "removed" all causes of death that could be used to indirectly estimate losses at the front. And in the spring of 2025, they reached the birth rate, which, naturally, also fell—and became a closely guarded secret.

Demographers in Russia can now obtain these figures "for official use only"—with a personal signature—and it appears they face severe penalties for disclosing them. At least independent demographer Alexey Raksha, who resigned from Rosstat and periodically hints at the reasons for this secrecy, was designated a foreign agent in 2025. In other words, the statistical situation has returned to Soviet times, when the main task of the relevant agency was to conceal the true state of affairs from its fellow citizens.

However, it wasn't always this way. In 1926, the Bolsheviks, while building a system of governance for the gigantic country, genuinely wanted to know how many people there were and how they lived. They wanted it so much that they invited specialists who weren't particularly "class-friendly" to organize the census and allowed them to work honestly. But, of course, this didn't last long.

Zemstvo statistics in the service of the Soviets

The first Soviet statistics were compiled by people who, on the one hand, were "close to the people" and, on the other, were extremely distant from the proletarian revolution. They were liberal intellectuals, participants in the "zemstvo movement." The Central Statistical Office was created in the summer of 1918, and was headed by Pavel Popov—a revolutionary in his youth, imprisoned and exiled to Ufa province, then a zemstvo statistician in Tula. Zemstvo statistics were a world apart: they were created by thousands of people who, for decades, traveled through the districts, censusing households, fields, and cows, believing that numbers were a way to tell the truth about the village. The new government wasn't particularly fond of them, but they couldn't do without them.

Although she tried. Before 1926, under the "Soviets," the country had already experienced two unsuccessful and incomplete censuses. The first, in 1920, took place in the midst of the Civil War and barely covered three-quarters of the population. The next census, in 1923, was only urban (and at that point, less than a quarter of the USSR's citizens lived in cities). So the last complete statistical picture depicted Russia as it was in 1897. In thirty years, the country had experienced two wars, a revolution, famine, and the establishment of new borders, so no one really knew how many people were in it.

The new census was prepared almost exclusively by former zemstvo officials. The methodology was developed by Vasily Mikhailovsky, a scholar of the "old school," one of the leading statisticians in pre-revolutionary Russia. But he died suddenly just before the census (some sources say two months before, others say a few days before). Management was handed over to his colleague and student, Olimpiy Kvitkin, a native of the town of Borzna in the Chernihiv region, also an old-school statistician. Popov himself was removed from his post a year before the census, in January 1926, and transferred to Gosplan—perhaps to his good fortune. At least he joined the party and happily lived to a ripe old age (he died in 1950). Not all former zemstvo officials were so fortunate. But Kvitkin was destined to remain "in charge of statistics," and his leadership of the next census cost him his life. But more on that later.

Meanwhile, in 1926, the upcoming work seemed almost like a holiday. A rather optimistic motto was chosen for the census: "Worker! Peasant! You are building your life. The census will help you with this." Apparently, the census in the USSR didn't intend to find anyone other than workers and peasants. Perhaps this was indeed the case, because the other classes of Soviet society were represented among the census takers themselves. They recruited teachers, students, high school students, and all sorts of other members of the intelligentsia—around two hundred thousand people in all. Moreover, they were recruited for little pay. But when complained that the census takers were paid pennies, Osinsky, the head of the Central Statistical Office, responded: "The census is a civic duty!"

However, the press advertising was so intense (for example, Pravda reported on the census in every issue) that by the end of November, several provinces had even more volunteers than they needed. The newspapers also prepared the population for the census as best they could: articles constantly emphasized that the answers to the personal questionnaire "will not be used for any administrative purposes or for collecting taxes or fees." In other words, personal data, they claimed, was completely safe. But the new Soviet citizen had already become adept at reading between the lines, and rumors immediately began to circulate in the cities that the authorities would "extort taxes and arrears." Moreover, the sheer number of questions on the questionnaire aroused suspicion in many.

"The nationality is indicated incorrectly."

Indeed, the personal form contained as many as fourteen questions: gender, age, native language, place of birth, literacy, occupation, physical disabilities, and even mental health. Why so many? In cities, they also filled out a family card detailing their housing conditions. Incidentally, this was the only Soviet census that honestly asked where and how people lived, and how many were unemployed and homeless. Subsequently, such dirty laundry was kept out of sight.

But perhaps the most interesting part of the 1926 census was the fourth item: "nationality." Not nationality or citizenship. The instructions explicitly demanded an assessment of the "tribal (ethnographic) composition" of the population. People were required to answer by their own self-designation. And they "identified themselves" in such a way that statisticians later had to compile a special dictionary. The final list by the Central Statistical Bureau included 195 nationalities—almost twice as many as the 1897 Russian census had counted, and four times as many as in 1920.

Self-designation, however, wasn't entirely free. The Transcaucasian volume of the census results explicitly stated: one couldn't write religion—"Muslim," "Molokan"—in place of nationality; one couldn't write allegiance or republic. People who for centuries had defined themselves by faith or place suddenly had to remember what "tribe" they belonged to.

And in some places, the self-designation was corrected directly in the instructions. Here's how the Central Statistical Office explained the fate of the Sarts, the sedentary Turkic population of Central Asia, in 1927:

The term Sarts, adopted in previous population censuses […] was excluded in the current census as a matter of instruction: people who called themselves by this name were recorded as Uzbeks.

"Azerbaijanis" also disappeared from the list—they were listed as "Turks." "Great Russians" became "Russians," and "Cheremis" became "Mari." A separate column, "ethnicity not accurately stated," was given to the Kryashens, Teptyars, Tavlins, Oirats, and Khakassians: the state had not yet decided what to do with them. Those who identified themselves by their place of residence—"Pomors," "Caucasians," "Dagestanis"—were left to the statisticians to assign to the correct categories.

American historian Francine Hirsch, a renowned author on Russian and Soviet history, called this a "conceptual conquest": the census first organized clans and tribes into nationalities, and then those nationalities into future republics and regions. A few years later, national districts would be carved out on this basis. But in December 1926, that was still a long way off. First, people had to be found.

The mood is cheerful, he committed suicide

The census began on December 17. It took a week in cities and two in villages. At first glance, the work was literally meager: in the Belarusian Liozno district, a registrar was paid 1,8 kopecks for a rural resident's card and two kopecks for a shtetl resident. The quota was 75 cards per day. However, as the well-known joke goes, "ten old ladies - ten rubles": a census taker could theoretically earn one and a half rubles per day, and even more if they exceeded the quota. In 1926, the Soviet ruble was still quite valuable—it was worth about half a dollar. The average worker's wage in St. Petersburg, however, was about two rubles per day. So, it's not as if the census takers were being severely underpaid. However, they still had plenty of problems.

For example, with transport.

The rural census taker of the St. Petersburg province reported Berlin émigré newspaper "Rul", "all the time" walked from village to village.

"Rul'" turned out to be an interesting witness to the census. Soviet newspapers wrote about heroism and victories, while the émigré newspaper—naturally—"spittled" as best it could. And, as it should, whenever possible, it "added fuel to the fire," so curious details appeared on its pages. On December 21, 1926, for example, its Moscow chronicle reported:

The ongoing all-Russian census is causing great concern. It coincides with a time of heightened tension in tax collection, which is being collected extremely sparingly. […] Under these circumstances, the census is viewed as an attempt to "slap people with new taxes," and is met with extreme hostility.

Indeed, in the very first week of the census, the People's Commissariat of Finance, as if on purpose, proposed raising excise taxes and increasing tax collection. Naturally, in some places, the census takers were treated as tax agents—and doors were not opened for them. And sometimes, dogs were deliberately (or perhaps accidentally) unleashed on them. Incidentally, dogs preventing census takers from entering the yard have been a recurring theme in every census in Russia, from 1897 to the present day. And it's even strange that, given their active role, these animals themselves have never yet been the subject of any nationwide census…

But in places where dogs and entrepreneurs never existed, census takers faced other dangers. After all, they had to survey shelters, train stations, and other "squats" for homeless people, whose number in the USSR exceeded a million. They mostly lived in large cities, but were reluctant to cooperate with census takers. In general, they were as fluid as water.

"Many of them managed to learn about the upcoming census in advance and evade it. Entire groups of homeless children moved south," wrote Rul' on December 22. Only 600 homeless children were found in Moscow, 200 in St. Petersburg, 400 in Kharkov—but in Rostov-on-Don, 2,000. In Odessa, the census had to be postponed: thousands of children, "with a few exceptions, went into hiding."

In Dnepropetrovsk, Rul' recounted the Soviet newspaper Pravda (yes, that newspaper could still be a source of information back then!), street children set up headquarters in the ruins of a huge building in the city center:

Of course, conducting a census at night was out of the question, but even in broad daylight, at three o'clock, when the group of census takers entered the house and began climbing the stairs, they were met with a hail of stones raining down from all sides of the house. Negotiations yielded no results, and the census takers were forced to leave.

Another group lived in coal slag heaps near the power plant. Here, negotiations went more successfully: the fifteen-year-old leader allowed the census takers to come in the evening, "when the punks return from work." Many of the street kids and homeless proudly wrote "thief" under "occupation," while the girls wrote "prostitute." What can you do? It's work.

But family life didn't fit the form either. The enumerators, for example, discovered "new types" of families, where in addition to the registered wife, there was also a "de facto" wife, or even two. Moreover, each one proved to the census taker that she was the real one.

Such situations often occurred in large cities. But not in the East—there, husbands preferred not to present extra wives at all, since polygamy was already prohibited by the relevant article in the Soviet criminal code.

But the further they got from the capitals, the less the census takers' adventures resembled a vaudeville. There were also outright tragedies. For example, on January 22, 1927, "Rul" reported: a commission of census takers was sent from Semipalatinsk in December with forms in Turkmen; they never returned, and there is no news of them. "It is presumed that they perished."

In the Far North, the census was a difficult undertaking, lasting over a year—effectively from the summer of 1926 to the fall of 1927, and in Yakutia, until 1928. In some ways, it resembled the work of pioneers. For example, the Turukhansk expedition—twelve registrars covering over two million square miles—traveled on steamships, birch bark boats, and reindeer sleds. The registrars capsized and nearly drowned in rapids, primarily rescuing census materials from the water. Sometimes they found themselves in rather bleak places, and, for example, in the huts of wintering residents, they found children dying of scurvy next to the bodies of their parents, for whom there was no one to bury them. They could do nothing for them, only count them.

At the same time, the local population often looked at them askance. Without tobacco and tea, expedition leader Adam Kurilovich wrote in his report, the northerners "won't even talk to you, much less correspond." The Nenets were reluctant to reveal the number of their reindeer or the names of their wives, but eagerly accepted the red census badges: "All the gifts were beautiful, all became leaders." But when someone spread the rumor that the badge meant enrollment in the Komsomol, the souvenirs were returned the next day. The northerners also preferred to answer questions evasively. However, the questions themselves seemed a bit insane.

Zoologist L. I. Girshfeld, one of the registrars, mockingly described the "food form" issued from Moscow, which required weighing everything the family ate during the week:

— How much fish did the family eat on Monday?

- Don't know!

- Two pounds?

- Well, two pounds - how can you not eat them!

- So maybe six, eight pounds?

- When you eat ten!

- No, and on Monday, how much fish was there?

- Who knows.

But apparently, the job of a census taker wasn't for the refined, the burdened by a higher education. Not everyone could handle idiocy. The head of the "census" expedition, where Girshfeld worked, sent reports to the district center:

"We're leaving today, greetings, the mood is cheerful." (November 10)

And just five days later:

"Girshfeld Boganide committed suicide and brought his body to Dudinka. Dolgikh." (November 15).

There was no one to replace the deceased zoologist in Dudinka, so the census taker's position was eventually filled by some exiled student, sent there from Crimea under charges of "assisting the world bourgeoisie." This was immediately reported to the newspaper "Soviet Siberia," but the denunciation was ignored at the time. The authorities needed results, even from a "minion of the bourgeoisie."

"Osinsky defended himself timidly"

And the results were in. On January 1, 1927, "Rul" (which apparently had its own sources in the Central Statistical Bureau) published the first figures: Moscow had about two million residents, and St. Petersburg, 1,611,000. The newspaper estimated the country's population at "probably 160 million." In February, preliminary results arrived: 143 million. The final figure, published later, was 147 million.

The émigrés immediately realized the key point. In 1897, the same territory had a population of 104 million, and almost all of the increase occurred in the years before 1914. "The rate of population growth is significantly slower than Soviet statisticians had predicted," wrote Rul' on February 3, 1927:

In the Volga region, for example, a significant population decline has been observed throughout. In Samara Province, the population fell by 18,4%, in Orenburg Province by 17,6%, in the Tatar Republic by 14,4%, and in the Bashkir Republic by 11,9%. This is likely a consequence of the famine of 1921.

Meanwhile, the population of the Luhansk District grew by 41,9%—Donbas was drawing people into the mines. Moscow grew by 30% in three years, and Petrograd by 50%. The countryside was turning to the city even before any industrialization.

The census also recorded something that would later become inconvenient. According to its data, over 900,000 people in Kuban—approximately 60% of the population of the Kuban Okrug—identified themselves as Ukrainians. In Primorye (which was settled in the late 19th century by immigrants from Ukraine), a third of the residents of the Vladivostok Okrug identified themselves as Ukrainians. Six years later, the Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars' decree of December 14, 1932, would curtail Ukrainization in the North Caucasus and deport the village of Poltavskaya to the north. By the 1939 census, the number of Ukrainians in Kuban would be several times smaller.

Meanwhile, the "national question" exploded right at the presentation of the results. In February 1927, the head of the Central Statistical Bureau, Valerian Osinsky, reported on the census at a session of the USSR Central Executive Committee. On February 22, "Rul" described it this way:

During the discussion of Osinsky's report, head of the Central Statistical Administration (CSA), on the results and development of the All-Russian Census, the confrontation took a particularly harsh turn thanks to an exceptionally crude speech by a certain Butsenko, which was met with raucous approval by the congress. Butsenko accused the Council of People's Commissars of arbitrary rule and disregard for the constitution; the census had been organized beneath all criticism, and Osinsky's proposed development of census cards aimed to downplay the significance of the national question. Osinsky defended himself timidly.

The Ukrainian delegate essentially accused Moscow of hiding the nationality question in statistical tables (remember the fourth point—"nationality"—which allowed for the almost arbitrary classification of different groups of people into the same nationality?). And in April, an émigré newspaper drew another, no less seditious, conclusion from the census results: if the RSFSR accounted for almost seventy percent of the USSR's population, and Turkmenistan for less than one percent, then "This extreme unevenness in the distribution of the population between legally equal entities cannot but suggest the need for changes in the political structure of Russia."A hundred years later, this paragraph could have cost its author his status as a foreign agent.

But in those days, journalists, especially foreign ones, were a distant memory, while officials were held accountable for their every word. On April 26, 1927, "Rul" briefly reported: Osinsky-Obolensky (who had defended himself too "timidly") had been sent on a four-month leave, "effectively tantamount to resignation." The newspaper did not confirm whether this was related to the scandal at the Central Election Commission. But for the agency that had just (relatively) honestly recounted the country, this was a wake-up call.

Inconvenient category

Knowing how events would unfold, one might assume that the 1926 census data would prove a valuable tool, for example, for dispossession. Especially since eight years later, all primary demographic records (civil registry offices) in the USSR were transferred to the NKVD. This meant that the agency that ran the Gulag itself was now counting the number of deaths.

But no, apparently, the materials from that census were not used directly for repression. Lists of "kulaks" were often compiled from tax records, lists of disenfranchised, and village council decisions. However, the census gave the Soviet regime something more important than lists: categories.

In the "occupation status" column, the census separated out "owners with hired workers." There were 845 of them. Ten years later, in April 1936, Pravda recalled this figure with a special intonation:

"Owners with hired workers"—that was the occupation column in the 1926 census, and it wasn't left blank. Kulaks in the villages and small and medium-sized capitalists in the city still played a significant role. 845 owners with hired workers—this vast army of kulaks—resisted the socialist offensive. […] "Owners with hired workers" disappeared as a social category.

Of course, it wasn't the category that disappeared. People disappeared. But no one was willing to admit that their rights had been stripped or that they had been physically destroyed. Therefore, the same editorial explained that the new census had no question about class, "and the very term 'class' is absent," because the country was already on the threshold of a classless society.

In some places, however, the census did indeed become the root cause, bringing devastating disasters upon thousands of people. For example, in Taimyr, where it sparked talk of "kulak reindeer herders." In 1933, a new, "national economic" census was conducted there—to finally "clarify" the class status of families that in 1926 had seemed too closely related. The names of wealthy reindeer herders in its results, according to British anthropologist David Anderson, belonged to people who were later arrested. Following this, an armed uprising against collectivization officials broke out in the Avam and Khatanga districts in the early 1930s, which was brutally suppressed. But that's another story...

The whole of Finland

The next census was scheduled for 1933, following the results of the first five-year plan. It was postponed again and again: to 1935, then to 1936. It's not hard to guess why. Collectivization, dispossession, and the famine of 1932–1933 occurred between the two censuses. All of this could clearly have skewed the statistics.

Meanwhile, Stalin already had his own figures. In 1930, at the 16th Congress, he сообщил, that "our annual population growth is over 3 million souls." In 1934, at the 17th Congress, he stated the total number as 168 million (he somehow knew the figure without any census; that's what genius is). And on December 1, 1935, at a meeting of leading combine operators, he explained the pattern:

The death rate has fallen, the birth rate has increased, and the net population growth is incomparably greater. This is, of course, a good thing, and we welcome it. (Merry laughter in the audience.) We now have a net population growth of about three million people each year. This means that each year we experience an increase equivalent to the entire country of Finland. (General laughter.)

They weren't laughing at Stalin, of course, but at pathetic Finland, which could be populated with Soviet citizens in just a year. As we know, four years later, they tried to annex its population to the USSR, but only reduced its own by more than a hundred thousand. However, all that was later...

Meanwhile, another problem was brewing. If Finland's annual population were added to the 147 million in 1926, the figure by 1937 would be at least over 170 million. But would it? Suspecting that the USSR's demographics weren't so rosy, abortions were banned in the summer of 1936—but, of course, six months before the census, this ban couldn't be effective. As the saying goes, they were too late.

The census project for the Central Statistical Administration (TsUNKhU)—as the former Central Statistical Administration (TSSU) was now known—was prepared by the same Olimpiy Kvitkin, based on the 1926 template. But the government commission reworked it. Stalin personally edited the census form: he removed family and housing conditions (really! Who in the USSR would be interested in this petty bourgeois information?), added a question about religion, and condensed the census itself to a single day: January 6, 1937, Christmas Eve. At a meeting of statisticians at the Moscow Regional Executive Committee, the announcement that the census form "was personally written by Comrade Stalin" was greeted with "thunderous applause." But not everyone was so euphoric. Kvitkin's deputy, Lazar Brand, according to his wife, responded gloomily to her question about whether there would be a medal now: "I hope not..."

And he was right on target. The census counted only 162 million. The biggest shortages were in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Volga region. As early as January 10, Ukraine's chief statistics officer wrote to Moscow that the preliminary data "rendered this material top secret." 56,7% of adults identified themselves as religious believers—five years after the declared "godless five-year plan."

Statisticians attempted to explain the shortfall. Mikhail Kurman, head of the population sector, broke it down in a report. Some deaths, he wrote, simply weren't included in the civil registration—these were special settlers and camp prisoners, and "this data obviously belongs in the NKVD Gulag." He attributed about one and a half million deaths to the 1926 census's alleged overestimation of the population. Thus, in their defense, the 1937 statisticians began retroactively tarnishing the reputation of the very census they were so proud of. Modern demographers, incidentally, believe that the 1926 census actually undercounted people by approximately 2%.

But all these excuses, of course, were of no avail (especially since Kurman inappropriately mentioned the Gulag). The conspiracy of "bourgeois statisticians" whose figures failed to match Stalin's expectations was obvious. At the end of March 1937, Kvitkin, Kurman, and Brand were arrested. And on May 16, the head of the Central Statistics Department, Ivan Kraval, made the mistake of uttering a phrase at a meeting that should never be uttered in either a Soviet or Russian statistical agency:

There's a disease called sycophancy, and it exists in statistics, too. In statistics, sycophancy consists of the employee giving an inaccurate figure, rather than an exact one, trying to produce a figure they think management will accept favorably.

Two weeks later he was also arrested.

Kurman, according to his recollections, was interrogated for thirty-six hours straight, until he fainted; he refused to sign the charges. On September 26, Pravda published a decree from the Council of People's Commissars: the census had been conducted "with gross violations of the most elementary principles of statistical science," and its materials were deemed "defective." That same day, Kraval was executed. Two days later, on September 28, 1937, Olimpiy Kvitkin, the man who had overseen both the honest 1926 census and the "saboteur" one of 1937, was executed. Kurman and Brand (the same one who had made such an awkward joke about the "order") received ten years each. The "Agitator's Notebook" reported that Soviet intelligence, led by Yezhov, had "smashed a viper's nest of traitors within the Soviet statistical apparatus." The purge also took place in the provinces: in Kyiv, the demographic institute was closed and its director, Mykhailo Ptukhu, was arrested.

The 1939 census was conducted by people who knew the consequences of striving for precision. That's why they counted 170,6 million—almost exactly what they needed. And at the 18th Congress, Stalin explained why there hadn't been "rapid population growth," "the equivalent of Finland in a year," and who was to blame: "certain old Gosplan employees," who had expected an increase of three to four million per year. "It was fantastic, if not worse."

And a few months later the war with Finland began - but this, of course, is just a stupid coincidence.

There is no room for error

The results of the 1926 census were published in fifty-six volumes. The results of 1937 were not published at all: several generations of Soviet people didn't even know such a census had taken place. The materials were discovered in an archive only in the late 1980s and published in 1990. The next census after 1939 was conducted only twenty years later—in part because they didn't want to reveal how many people the country had lost in the war. From then on, Soviet censuses obediently repeated the "Stalinist" program of 1937, and not a single one anymore asked how people were living. The important thing was to get the "correct" data. And they did.

A hundred years ago, a state that had already imprisoned and executed people still wanted to know something about its citizens. It hadn't yet learned to fear its own numbers. But it learned quickly: it took exactly ten years, from the first honest census to the execution. Since then, the work of statisticians in the USSR and today's Russia has often resembled that of a sapper: there's no room for error. You have to guess which figures the authorities need and hide the rest. And we'll only learn about what really happened in the country decades later. If, of course, we're lucky and someone opens the archives for us.

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