There is no light at the end of the tunnel at all.

How the war changed Russia's economy
NeMoskva spoke with economist Evgeny Gontmakher about trends in the Russian economy since the start of the war on February 24, 2023. What price will Russians pay for the war, what might the country's economy look like in 10 years, and whether there's a chance of Russia becoming like North Korea.
— Evgeny Shlemovich, how did the war change the world economy, did it affect it at all?
— Globally, no. There have been some changes, for example, in export and import flows, primarily gas and oil. Europe used to receive mostly Russian gas through pipelines, but now it's almost entirely replaced it with other European sources, North Africa, Algeria, and gas from Azerbaijan and other Middle Eastern countries flows through Turkey. Liquefied natural gas supplies have increased sharply, especially from the US. Oil from Russia has gone to China and India instead of Europe. In terms of structural changes in the global economy, nothing fundamental has happened. There's no recession, which many Russian propagandists would like to see. They thought they'd have a crisis, a decline in production, inflation, but inflation in Europe and the US rose due to the pandemic, when they were handing out money. But all these processes have returned to normal. Of course, they have their own problems, especially the developed countries, but there have been no catastrophes or fundamental changes.
— Yes, in Russia they said that Europe was facing an apocalypse...
"Well, listen, not everyone said that. The propagandists really wanted this, saying the sanctions would hit hard those who imposed them, but I'd say that didn't happen. Yes, there were some unpleasant moments in Europe, for example, the rise in gas prices in the second half of last year, significantly in Germany, the UK, and a number of other countries, but I repeat, it didn't lead to anything radical. We'll see, maybe this will have an impact on some of the elections that will take place, for example, in the US and a number of European countries."
"Most European countries relied on our gas and oil for no more than 30%, and almost all of them abandoned our fuel sources within 12 months. Did the propagandists expect the replacement of gas and oil from Russia to be normalized so quickly—it's only been a year?"
Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, and to a significant extent Poland relied on us for gas by far more than 30%. But truly, no one expected—even the Europeans themselves, much less Russia—that Russian gas would be replaced so quickly by gas from other supplier countries. After all, there had long been talk of phasing out Russian gas, but in Europe they thought it would happen gradually over the course of several years, but it turned out to be much faster. It must be said that the global economy has demonstrated its flexibility; it's not for nothing that we call it a market economy. This isn't a command-and-control economy, where some guy sits in an office and distributes gas and oil flows, but rather a market economy, with prices, logistics, and consumption, which has also proven to be very flexible. The population, especially in winter, has also responded sympathetically to the situation and has begun to significantly conserve energy. The problem for Russia is that if, say, the sanctions are lifted someday and all restrictions are lifted, it will no longer be able to return to these markets, at least not for European gas and oil. This is a huge problem for Russia.
— Is this Russia’s short-sightedness?
"These were the calculations of those making the decisions, and they turned out to be incorrect, misguided, based on the assumption that Europe would give in, that people would supposedly freeze. There were fakes that the Germans were practically rushing to the Kaliningrad region to warm up because gas was cheap and accessible there, while theirs was expensive. The calculation was that Europe would waver and make political concessions, above all, and that would be the end of it all, and everything would return to the original situation."
— How did the war change Russia’s economy?
The Russian economy has certainly transformed; the vestiges of any market freedoms that existed are disappearing before our eyes. Essentially, nationalization is underway; look at the president's latest decrees on Danone and Carlsberg. Any private investment before February 24th has ceased; the economy has truly been restructured. The economy is being restructured for war, because the economic growth recorded by statistics—1.5 to 2 percent of GDP—is, of course, driven by the defense sector. It has grown sharply; as our officials say, they're working two or three shifts; there's a labor shortage. The demand for weapons and everything related to the war is enormous, and it's offsetting the stagnation or decline in all other sectors of the economy. You can see what's happening with export revenues from gas and oil; they're plummeting, and the budget is suffering. Furthermore, social benefits continue to be injected, and statistics show that poverty fell last year. Why did it fall? Because payments related to, among other things, the special military operation began, where people who go to fight receive a decent salary—around 200,000 rubles a month. And those who go to the front mostly come from depressed, weak regions, where salaries of 20,000-30,000 rubles are considered good. But here, a man, while risking his life, receives 200,000 rubles, and if, God forbid, he dies, his family receives several million rubles. That's a colossal amount—compensation for injury is several million rubles.
We're already getting into the presidential campaign; there's less than a year left, if everything goes according to schedule. Additional funding will begin in the form of benefits for families with children and pension indexation, but I repeat, this is happening against a backdrop of stagnation in the non-military sector of the economy.
It’s not for nothing that I talk about investments; they are like the lifeblood of the economy: if there are no investments, especially now in the 21st century, there is no quality of economic growth.
Vladimir Putin has been talking a lot lately about new technologies and new ideas, but these don't just appear out of thin air. They require investment in development and, most importantly, for them to work—buying new equipment and investing in the education of those same people, and the situation is dire.
The state can, of course, allocate some funds from the budget as public investment, but this is a double-edged sword, as Anton Siluanov has repeatedly stated that it's important to avoid a budget deficit, and achieving this in the current environment is a difficult macroeconomic task. Surely they won't cut spending on indexing pensions and benefits? What else can be cut? Specifically, public investment in infrastructure, research and development, and construction—everything will be cut, even if it was planned. The government's big fear is that otherwise, inflation will be high in the country. Last year, according to official figures, it was over 11%, and if this level persists, no private investment will enter the economy.
This is a snake-eating-its-own-tail situation: you're cutting government spending, even at the expense of public investment, and raising the Central Bank's refinancing rate. This increases the cost of borrowing, slowing the non-military economy, but reduces inflation. However, injecting unsecured money into the economy will increase inflation, which hurts economic growth. Therefore, the government is currently opting for budget cuts to prevent high inflation. They're dreaming of 4%, as before, but it will be 5-7%. This is the chosen tactic for now, but it's not the tactic for economic growth.
At the St. Petersburg Forum, both Nabiullina and Shuvalov voiced economic problems, inflation, and falling incomes. Were they allowed to do so?
At that same St. Petersburg forum, Vladimir Putin spoke for over an hour like an avid liberal economist, talking about the importance of free enterprise and the need for investment. If you were to cut out everything after that, it would be a perfectly normal speech, from a European liberal who strives for economic growth, because the foundation of economic growth is free enterprise. That's it. Period. That's all there is to it.
But I would clarify that this is, first and foremost, freedom of enterprise for small and medium-sized businesses. Large businesses will take care of themselves; they have no problems, they have administrative resources, they will survive. And all this has been said since Dmitry Medvedev's presidency. Remember, they've been harassing small businesses. He was right to say that inspections should be abolished, but nothing has happened. Because politics prevails over economics. So when Igor Shuvalov speaks after Putin, Shuvalov and Nabiullina can easily repeat these words. But these are just empty declarations. When we actually get down to business, everything depends on how we structure our foreign and domestic policies.
Even before February 24, the transition from words to action was unlikely. And after February 24 of last year, the transition to any kind of normal economic footing became even more distant. After all, economic growth in Russia ended in the early 2010s.
In 2013, before any sanctions, before Crimea, with oil prices at $110-115 per barrel, our economic growth was 1,3%. Even then, all the more or less normal economists said, "Guys, the model is no good; the economic model we had built up to that point has been exhausted."
After that, we saw stagnation for ten years before the active phase of this entire conflict, with an average annual growth rate of 1%. This was predictable, but now, given the shift toward the military industry, nationalization, and the introduction of the windfall tax, the so-called excess profit tax, what can we even talk about? And none of this will solve the accumulated problems that currently plague the Russian economy.
— Who are the beneficiaries of this war? Besides the defense industry?
"The defense industry benefits everywhere, both in America and Europe, but there, too, arms production is rapidly increasing. They have a private military industry, and the state is practically nonexistent there. Today, they receive tens and hundreds of billions of dollars from the American budget. In Europe, defense spending is increasing; they declared two percent of GDP, and now they're urgently trying to reach that limit. Some countries are exceeding that figure. For example, Poland will spend more than two percent, that's obvious, but in all countries involved in the defense industry, they're making huge profits. But if we're talking about Russia, no one except the defense industry benefits—you know, no one really benefits from continuing this war, absolutely. If you want to run a normal business, without excessive theft and the like, the conditions are getting worse and worse, with the same sanctions, government interference, which prevents you from developing your business properly, and the poor management that currently pervades the economy." It's like shagreen leather, except for the defense sector, it's shrinking and shrinking, which is of no benefit to anyone. I wouldn't say there's someone behind the country's leaders, someone pushing for escalation and making some money. Well, the defense industry, all those state corporations, were doing just fine before the war, receiving those same state contracts, very large ones, and spending them uncontrollably. We all remember the salaries of those top managers at state-owned enterprises. In Russia, the military economy is of little benefit to anyone, and very few to anyone. I'd say it's rather unprofitable.
— Do you think investment will return to us and we will be forgiven for what Russia did?
"No, no, at least the hot phase will end first, then the next process will begin—peace terms, some kind of agreement between Russia and Ukraine. It's a long process. If such an agreement is signed, then the process of lifting sanctions will follow, also a very long one. Trade will be normalized, and I don't think a return to normal investment will be imminent for Russia, but there will be some light at the end of the tunnel."
What we're seeing now is that there's no light at the end of the tunnel, do you understand?! Economics is at the core of everything. Right now, politics prevails and exploits the economy from every angle, but sooner or later, the economy begins to resist, and then politics begins to fray.
Perhaps there's no point in being upset that Europe is gone—there's China, India, and Asia now? Can the rupee and yuan compensate for the loss of energy revenues to the EU?
It's a well-known fact that India buys for rupees. Indians are generally very tough negotiators; they're known worldwide for being incredibly difficult to negotiate with. Their terms are standard and universal; they pay in rupees, not dollars, not euros, not even rubles, but rupees. It turns out that we're accumulating colossal amounts of rupee money in Indian bank accounts, and we have to buy something in India with these rupees, but there's not much to buy there in that amount. In this sense, we're largely subsidizing India. The transition to the yuan, something we're pushing in our relations with China, is also leading nowhere; the yuan's exchange rate is set by decree, while formally the ruble is free-floating. The yuan exchange rate is set by China's central bank. Tomorrow, it could announce that the yuan has been devalued by half, or, conversely, that it has doubled in value. Investing in the yuan poses colossal risks in terms of savings. Moreover, the yuan has been weakening recently. We are dependent on the yuan, simply becoming dependent on the policies of China's central bank. This is relevant to the issue of sovereignty of our economy.
True, recently they have begun to talk about this less, because they realized that it is practically impossible for such a large economy as Russia’s to become sovereign, as some understand it.
Read the recent report by Central Bank experts—it's considered unofficial, but it's published by the Central Bank—and they believe that import substitution hasn't really happened in our country over the past 10 years, as was announced in 2014.
The entire world, the 21st-century economy—a global economy—is an economy where you buy a lot of things, but you also sell a lot of things based on niches that exist in the global market, in value chains. You might produce unique bolts that no one else in the world makes, but you're not making airplanes; you're making bolts for airplanes that are assembled in America or Europe. And that's classic, and it's done by small businesses.
— No need to invent a country that will produce everything for itself?
"That's impossible. Everyone understands that in the 21st century, if we want to maintain even the current technological level, we can't replace everything. We don't have our own computers, we don't have our own iPhones—those are just basic examples. For example, the Japanese want to ban the sale of used Japanese cars in the Far East, but the entire Far East drives these cars, Japanese cars, as they call these right-hand drive vehicles, so what? What will people in Khabarovsk drive? Chinese cars, which are an order of magnitude worse than used Japanese ones? We need some kind of conceptual approach to what the Russian economy should look like in the next decade. There's no such approach. We've been saying that business and entrepreneurship need to be developed—very good words, all right—but there's no concrete action behind it. There's no time for that. There are political challenges that need to be addressed. Right now, the next political challenge is the presidential election in March 2024.
"So, China and India won't replace Europe for us? Well, we used to look West, now we look East..."
"They won't. Logistics doesn't allow it. And China doesn't need as much gas and oil as we've lost in Europe, or in India either. Experts have long since calculated that there won't be a complete replacement of the western route with the eastern one. We don't have the railways, highways, or ports that would allow us to restructure our economy from a western to an eastern direction. They need investments that don't exist—and won't exist.
— And we won’t have the North Korea option either?
"No, we won't get to North Korea. North Korea is a purely physiological artifact. They had a brutal dictatorship for decades, including the Japanese occupation and the rise of the Kims. South Korea, however, is a miracle; it shows that, despite this extremely difficult history, they were able to become a completely European country in just a few decades. And if history follows the GDR and FRG, North Korea has a chance to return to normal sooner or later, although it will take decades."
But Russia's history isn't so harsh. The new generations, those in their 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s, have a slightly different idea of what constitutes a normal life than North Korea. Yes, people may say how much they hate the Ukrainian fascists and that they must fight to the bitter end, but they want to live a simple life, like they do in Europe. They want to have an apartment, a nice car, have everything they need in stores, earn a good salary, and be able to travel—if not abroad, then somewhere in Russia.
This isn't the North Korean scenario; we've moved past that. If the war and the military rhetoric end, and the focus shifts to domestic politics, then the generation 50 and younger will demand a normal life, especially since they remember the 2000s, when everything was European—the internet, travel, no major restrictions. This will be a major problem for the Russian leadership.
— How do war money, high salaries for the military, contract soldiers, mobilized soldiers, combat pay, one-time payments of 195 rubles, compensation for injuries, and funeral payments improve the economy?
This slightly increases consumer demand. If before their breadwinner was earning 30 rubles, and they couldn't buy anything, now they get 190–200 rubles from the breadwinner, and they can go to the store. This increases demand for some goods that we do produce, like food, for example. On the other hand, it raises prices slightly, especially in local markets in small towns. And this certainly improves income and poverty statistics. Although this shouldn't be exaggerated; there are hundreds of thousands, not millions, of soldiers at the front. Russia has over 70 million working-age people, and against this backdrop, it's not that much. Some people now earn very good salaries in the defense industry, and they've significantly increased their salaries compared to pre-war times; there are those who service these military enterprises. But the multiplier effect, overall, is not significant for Russia. About a fifth of those employed in the Russian economy live well. But statistics today must be treated with great caution. They simply must be interpreted correctly, and we must dig deep to truly understand what's going on. We must understand what's still being published, understand the numbers—pieces, kilograms, meters. But, I repeat, our economy in its current state has proven to be very resilient; in the short term, it can continue like this for five to ten years. But when the world transitions to completely new energy-saving technologies, green technologies, when energy sources are replaced, we will find ourselves in a hopeless past.
We won't starve, but we'll live a somewhat archaic life here. If the borders are open, people will leave, and right now they're being pushed out in waves due to mobilization, for example. But if everything becomes stable and conservative, there will be peace, no war, but our people will see how much the gap in quality of life between them and us will widen, just like with Bulgaria and Ukraine. Young, active people will leave through various channels, and our demographics are already poor. We're gradually reaching a dead end, and have been for many years, but very slowly.
— And what could happen at the end of this dead end?
— Much will depend on the state, the political system. Perhaps those who remain in Russia will agree to live like this for 10, 15, or 20 years. This is no longer an economic question. Perhaps we will live here at the expense of our relatives who will live in Europe. Well, what is happening in Moldova, for example, where the largest import item is the inflow of money from Moldovans who work in Europe. The same is happening in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. And the same could happen here in 30-40 years. Well, people live in Tajikistan, right?! In Uzbekistan! I've been there, and yes, compared to Russia, they are very poor countries, but they live, they live, they make do. Perhaps the same will happen with Russia, no one knows for sure. There are too many uncertainties. Will we find forces willing to reverse these trends so that we become more than a third-rate country? We are currently a second-tier country. History is a tricky thing; it's impossible to predict anything. Who knew the Soviet Union would collapse in the early 90s? No one. And then it did. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin wrote from Switzerland to Russia in December 1916 and January 1917: "Dear friends, we old men here in Switzerland are unlikely to live to see the bright future when Russia will become a socialist country." He wrote this two months before the February Revolution! So, who knows?! It's a matter of faith; everyone who thinks about Russia's fate must decide for themselves whether they see it or not. It's impossible to provide any arguments in favor of one point of view or another. There are no such arguments.
What will be the cost of war for the Russian economy and society?
"The price is very high. We were already in a very difficult economic situation, and we were in a recession, and the SVO has further exacerbated and deepened all these systemic problems, delaying their possible resolution. The price of reversing these trends will be much higher than if it had happened before February 24, 2022. We have sharply increased the price we will have to pay for our future."
Irina Krasnova
Photo: Karachun/Wikimedia