What can replace the vertical power structure?
When it comes to the structure of the new Russian state, the question of building a true federation is one of the most controversial. A federation is a union of various state entities, within which there is a federal government and government within each constituent entity. Each level has its own powers. Formally, this is present in today's Russia, but in essence, the state is structured quite differently: everything is subordinated to the center, a vertical power structure that tightly controls all regions.
Is it possible—and even necessary—to build a true federation in Russia? What if some regions want to secede from the future state? How can we ensure regional equality within a federation? This is what people are discussing. Farida Kurbangaleeva, Researcher Harvard University Davis Center Irina Busygina and political scientist Dmitry Oreshkin.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
Let's start with the question that concerns me most. I've heard expert opinions that it's fundamentally impossible to build a federation on the ruins of an empire. And Russia, at its core, is still an empire that's still in existence.
IRINA BUSYGINA
Firstly, history knows of such precedents, and secondly, empires and federations are similar. They differ in the foundations on which a territory's loyalty to the center is built. They may even have similar institutions, but the incentives that compel or push regional elites to join a larger entity and not strive for complete independence are different in empires and federations.
We generally believe that the imperial tradition is extremely bad for building a federation. There is an example GermanyYou, Farida, used the wonderful words "on the ruins." So, on these very ruins, the German Federation was built, a completely functional one, which is considered one of the classic federations. There was the first empire (in German - Reich), there was a second, and eventually a third. It was on their ruins that the federation was built.
The question is how you do it. I want to emphasize that federations can be created in different ways. A very beautiful example is when a federation emerges from below. There were independent states, then they developed a common interest, and they built a federation. This Switzerland with its cantons, Соединенные Штаты Америки, CanadaBut not all federations are formed this way. In short, on the ruins of an empire—or, more accurately, from the ruins of an empire—a federation can be built. It's probably not the most conventional path, but it's possible.
DMITRY ORESHKIN
The United States, including in our beloved homeland, has been accused of imperialism. It's worth considering to what extent the United States can be called an empire. Yes, it's a powerful, large country, with diverse peoples and ethnicities coexisting within it, so by some indications, it's often called an empire, especially by those who dislike the United States. But where's the emperor? Where's the imperial system?
The United States is a federation to a large extent. To the point that the president is elected not by the general population, but by the states. You all know this. mysterious story, when it was possible to get three million more votes in the national vote and still lose the presidential election, because the decisive vote belongs to the states - states that are united in this very federation.
IRINA BUSYGINA
There was one in the USA war with the empire — with the British Empire, it was called the War of Independence, and when the War of Independence ended and 13 states emerged, they united, and all subsequent wars took place when the American Federation already existed.
When we talk about American imperialism, we're talking about foreign policy. This is crucial. This is where the "hairy paws" of imperialism come into play. This means that America is trying to create various forms of dependence both near and far from its borders. And to make it easier for us to discuss them, we call these forms neo-imperial. In reality, there's little behind this. Traditional empires operated somewhat differently.
Internally, America is a federation. There can be no two opinions on this. Moreover, we know perfectly well that most theories of federalism—and federalism is a very well-developed concept in political science—were invented by Americans. Americans are very fond of studying their federalism and, like many others, believe that it is the only true model of federalism. There is a wealth of literature on this subject. It is very useful, including for Russia, although it may not be directly discussed there.
DMITRY ORESHKIN
In our country, I think it might be possible to build a federation on the ruins of an empire. Irina was right to cite the example of Germany. It's a very successful federation, and precisely on the ruins. But I have a hard time imagining how to get through the ruins.
It seems pretty clear to me that Russia is an empire. It even seems to have an emperor. But I've always thought it was an empire in reverse, inside out. Because a normal classical empire sucks resources out of the territories, out of the regions, and draws them into the metropolis. And in the metropolis, by the way, a powerful cultural, political, and other imperial superstructure develops. Everything good we know about Britain, including, for example, Adam Smith, took place in an imperial environment. The remarkable French culture is linked to the French Empire, as is German and Russian culture. You can criticize Pushkin as much as you like for being an imperial poet. Well, indeed, yes, he is imperial. And what else could he be in an empire? And Leningrad, St. Petersburg—imperial cities, capitals. So the situation here is somewhat more complex than political propagandists would like to see.
I can hardly imagine how, for example, Kadyrov's Chechnya—with all due respect to the Chechen people, because the government is one thing, the people another—could join a democratic, law-abiding federation. Simply because, if European laws are valid, then Kadyrov is a common criminal whose people killed him. Natasha Estemirova, Boris Nemtsov, tortured, killed, and raped countless people. How will they accept, for example, the idea of democratization coming from the center? Probably the same way it was during Khrushchev's time, when I traveled through Central Asia and the local party leaders directly tried to convince me: what is this Moscow nonsense? They called all this democratization "Moscow nonsense." Something was emanating from the imperial center that was destroying their worldview. They thought everything was fine: they were in control, sending reports up the chain about the cotton harvest. They were feeling fine, eating pilaf. And then suddenly they were presented with some kind of democratization, elections. What are you guys doing? What's all this for?
And this empire existed inside out due to the fact that the same republics of Soviet Central Asia lived on very serious subsidies. Zhanna Antonovna Zayonchkovskaya I wrote that for every ruble produced in Tajikistan during Soviet times, the budget spent 2,6 rubles. In other words, it was a planned, loss-making economy, supported by subsidies from the center. Meanwhile, the republic's elites sincerely believed, and told the people, that people lived so poorly because they were being exploited. By whom? Moscow. In Uzbekistan, I was told they would have lived much richer if Moscow hadn't forced them to produce cotton.
When this system collapsed, everyone suffered, but those who relied on subsidies suffered the most. The economic recovery in the late 90s—and this, by the way, is something Russians don't like to talk about—was due not only to market reforms and rising oil prices, but also to the fact that Moscow was freed from the burden of empire and no longer had to foot the bill for other republics.
The idea that Russia can be taken and rebuilt on a democratic basis, as proposed Mikhail Sergeevich GorbachevI think this is an oversimplification of the situation. If it falls apart, then some parts, having weighed their interests, might want to reunite. But not all. The seams are too deep and bleeding to hope that they can be pulled back together. Some regions will inevitably break away, and not necessarily along existing borders. Everything depends on how the disintegration process unfolds. And then, in this space of 17 million square kilometers, inhabited by 145 million rather exotic people, something else could emerge.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
Irina, do I understand correctly that you also believe that the collapse of Russia is a necessary condition for building a federal state?
IRINA BUSYGINA
I don't think so; you misunderstand. I absolutely cannot make such irresponsible statements. As for whether an empire is expensive or cheap: when we were taught in school that an empire is when the center sucks up all resources and exploits the periphery, we were taught incorrectly. An empire is the most expensive project. Therefore, I cannot agree with Dmitry when he says that ours is the opposite of an empire. The Russian Empire is, in fact, the most genuine.
The British Empire It was also a very expensive project. And when it was dissolved, partly at the behest of the mother country itself, many in the British Isles breathed a sigh of relief. It's extremely difficult to maintain all the colonies. That's why empires collapse, at least the classical ones—they consume space they can neither organize nor profit from.
Now, Farida, your question. Here we're treading on very thin ice again. One part of me screams: if we fall apart, oh, how wonderful that would be, then you in the Kremlin will understand! But on the other, I understand that all of this could escalate into a global catastrophe, and no one knows how to handle it. In America, for example, they try to avoid discussing this topic altogether, at least in the political mainstream. Because it's incredibly irresponsible; no one understands the consequences. It's hard to listen to this "oh, let's disband now and then get our act together." Considering how much democratic federalism is valued by Russian regional elites, we won't get our act together, that's obvious. And if we do get our act together, it will again be based on some kind of violence, and it will be another colossal failure. It's like building blocks in a child's room, you understand. Let's rearrange this, remake that, paint the blue one red, the red one green. This can't be done; it's dangerous, irresponsible. And it has nothing to do with the implementation of the democratic idea.
DMITRY ORESHKIN
What the vertical is doing is disgusting. But you have a brain, besides emotions. And you understand that what's coming after this vertical, it could be even worse, significantly so.
The state is a collection of institutions. There is no such thing as bare federalism, separate from everything else. For federalism to exist, there must be institutions, starting with a Constitution that must be implemented. This idea simply doesn't exist in Putin's power vertical. Who cares what the Constitution says? Article 31, and some other thing - we'll do it however we want. constitutional Court, the election procedure, political parties that can be formed freely and not from the Kremlin, the parliament - all of this is discredited, and, accordingly, Russian statehood is discredited.
I ask myself: for example, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was carried out feet first in white slippers. In our country it is written in the ConstitutionThat in such a situation, the prime minister, who spends three months preparing for the elections, is performing the duties of the president. Whoever is elected will be president. Everything is written correctly. But what's the reality? All these Patrushevs, Kadyrovs, Rogozins, and numerous generals, Zolotov Some shadowy people like Prigozhin—will they sit up straight, put their knees together, and say: well, since it’s written in our Constitution, let Comrade Mishustin carry out his duties now, and then Ella Alexandrovna Pamfilova Will he honestly count the votes, and whoever is elected will be the one who commands us, and we will obey him? I can't imagine that scenario. But another one does: whoever seizes power now with tanks and cannons, Ella Alexandrovna Pamfilova will project a victorious result in the elections, and they will be given pie, bread and salt, a scepter, and an orb.
So, I would categorically not happily wait for this thing to collapse, for freedom to greet us joyfully at the gate, and for our brothers to hand over their swords. Because what will greet us at the gate will be Comrade Kadyrov and his thugs, or someone like Prigozhin with a criminal record, who have no intention of restraining themselves within any constitutional boundaries. They sincerely believe—Putin taught them—that might makes right. Those who joyfully await, hope, and strive to dismantle this vertical power structure—with full understanding of its harmfulness to our country, not to mention Ukraine, which was simply attacked—must understand that this will be followed by a division of power and, very likely, a fight between these thugs.
The collapse of the vertical will have two extremely unpleasant consequences for neighbors: millions of refugees and the spread of nuclear weapons across the vast expanses of the Motherland. Lukashenko already there are nuclear weaponsWe understand perfectly well what kind of political animal this is. For example, Putin is gone. What does a responsible leader like Alexander Lukashenko do? He takes custody of the nuclear weapons located on his territory. And that's it: we get another nuclear power in the center of Europe, with which we have to negotiate, much like with Kim Jong-un.
When alert readers see these words, they'll say, "Aha! Putin paid him off, so this is his way of saying, 'Guys, let's defend the vertical.'" From what I've said, it doesn't at all follow that I'm a supporter of the vertical. How can I explain this more clearly to people?
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
But still, if we consider the optimal scenario, in which Russia doesn't fall apart—you both admitted, to one degree or another, that such a chance exists—then how can we break down and dismantle Putin's very rigid and stable vertical of power?
IRINA BUSYGINA
This is a very long discussion, but I'll try to answer it. We can't discuss federalism by taking it out of everything else; that's wrong. Federalism is only part of institutional design. It doesn't sustain itself. It requires conditions that are defined by the separation of powers, forgive the banality. They are defined by the functioning of the Constitutional Court, when the regions have someone to appeal to, and this body doesn't work for the center—Moscow or some other city—or for political expediency, as Mr. Zorkin He's not ashamed to admit it, but rather the law. Federalism doesn't work without political parties, and for some reason, this is always forgotten. Moreover, these parties must be structured in a special way. In the case of Russia, my co-author and I Mikhail Filippov We believe that regional parties are needed, and they should form coalitions. This is another major topic.
We need to understand what the institutional design will be and what the overall demand will be for both democracy and federation. Frankly, I don't see much demand at this point. There will probably be demand for decentralization. But will there be demand for federalism? These are two different things. Federalism is enshrined in the constitution. Decentralization is enshrined in other institutions. I suspect that once this blueprint for the future begins to be realized, Russian business may feel a need for decentralization, but it won't feel a need for federalism.
We often talk about a window of opportunity opening and democracy emerging. But there won't be just one democratic project. Different democrats imagine it differently. And they imagine democratic federalism differently, too. There will be non-democratic projects, too. These won't be empty spaces for creativity, but rather a version of consensus, grand compromises, and interim institutional solutions that will eventually evolve into something else. And after this window of opportunity opens, what kind of capacity Moscow will retain will be crucial. Will it manage to maintain legitimacy, and for how long? If it does, that will be one option. If it doesn't, we can assume it will be the 90s. The variable on which the future of federal relations depends lies within Moscow. We may be disgusted by this, but it's a fact.
To what extent do the current governors want the new government? They're perfectly ensconced in the system now, they don't need anything, they understand the rules of the game, the red lines. How much control does Moscow actually have over the regions? Who does it? KirienkoDoes he have a department? There are strategic areas where governors are really under pressure. These include voter turnout, the incumbent president's percentage of votes, and the patriotic agenda. Otherwise, Russia is a highly decentralized country. Otherwise, it would be, firstly, impractical. Secondly, how can we exercise concrete oversight over governors' decisions on a national scale? It's impossible. Or is it possible, or are we missing something?
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
Well, why? The center, for example, very strictly controls national policy in the regions, in particular, Through laws related to the optional study of national languages. This isn't left to local authorities; it's also a very important strategic issue for the central government.
IRINA BUSYGINA
Absolutely right. Farida, I won't argue with you, I'll agree with you. But in a peculiar way. I'll tell you that the national question has nothing to do with federalism. It's a national policy, a strategic priority. It's the same as educational policy. In Germany, for example, it's control the landsOf course, such areas exist. But the region needs to be managed on a daily basis. There are many areas where Moscow lacks practical capabilities. I could be wrong, but I want to say that we must approach the sketch of the future we're discussing with a more or less accurate understanding of the given. If we approach this with simplifications, then the sketch of our future will be distorted, like a distorted mirror image. It will be a poor sketch.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
So you think that the vertical power structure that exists in Russia now is what it should be?
IRINA BUSYGINA
No. I'm not trying to say that the vertical isn't scary. It is, in fact, scary. And precisely because it's more complex than we think. We imagine the vertical as a stick. It's easy to break in one place—and then it's no longer a stick. But the vertical combines centralization with decentralization. It's flexible, and precisely because of that, it's unreformable. And it's the regions, first and foremost, who make it adaptable. I can't imagine what mistake Moscow could make that would make the regions tell it to go to hell. None, you understand. They shield it from everything. An enormous amount is built on patronal relationships, which are poorly documented. We can't measure them, we can't grasp them. Like a weed that has adapted so well that little can be done about it.
What's needed isn't just new people; we need incentives. Politicians in Moscow and the regions need to be willing to act differently. The question is: why should they want to? Not because they're good guys and suddenly became honest at six o'clock on Monday morning. That doesn't work. It's only because, for some reason, it would be advantageous for them to act differently.
A federation, like a collective farm, is a voluntary undertaking. You can construct a false voluntariness that will neither promote development nor the inclusiveness of institutions. Our task is to establish voluntariness on a different basis, to build something long-term that won't fall apart again in ten years, and we'll all be left clucking and saying, "Oh, it didn't work out again." And once again, we'll reduce to utter dust the idea of democracy and federalism, which didn't deserve it. Then we'll be the ones who deserve the blame, those who took it upon themselves and failed again.
DMITRY ORESHKIN
Why do most of our fellow citizens need federalization now? They don't give a damn about it. What they need now is victory, or just talk about it. Show them how we put Ukraine, Western Europe, or anyone else in their place, and they'll applaud and throw ballots, electronic or paper, in the ballot box. Not all, but most. And Putin understands this perfectly well. The horror is that he's quite adequate for this political model. Such systems collapse not because Professor Busygina and Professor Oreshkin recommend something, but because everything has rotted from the inside. And when everything has rotted from the inside, everything collapses. What's left is not something that can be reconstructed, but a desert of dust and fires, in whose place something must be built anew. Which, in fact, is what we did in the 90s. They built it, wiped their hands, and, starting in 2006, in place of the newly constructed state apparatus, that same vertical began to grow, accompanied by thunderous, prolonged applause from the workers and, more importantly, the nomenklatura class.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
Let's imagine an optimistic scenario, where we somehow avoid the period of chaos and turmoil that will accompany the collapse of Putin's vertical power structure. Chechnya has already been mentioned several times. Considering that there are regions with very specific sociocultural characteristics, and all Russian regions are very different, to what extent will they be able to coexist in a future true federation?
IRINA BUSYGINA
It's a difficult question whether all regions are so diverse. Firstly, this diversity has been destroyed for a long time. Secondly, as my teacher said Leonid Viktorovich SmirnyaginRussia doesn't respond well to space. Vertical differences between social groups are much stronger than horizontal differences—those based on territory. If you find yourself in your own environment, it doesn't really matter whether you're playing jazz in St. Petersburg or Vladivostok. You'll understand each other perfectly.
This idea is very difficult to test. If we say that all regions are different, the question immediately arises: what is our reference point, what are we comparing it to? There simply isn't a country the size of Russia. There's no comparative perspective, so we have no criteria. All this often results in mere conversations: I think this, and you think that. We chat and then part ways, usually dissatisfied with each other.
My co-author Mikhail Filippov and I are supporters of a very unpopular idea, for which we are constantly being hammered: Russia is doomed to be asymmetrical federationIt's impossible to build a symmetrical federation in Russia. The literature on ethnic federalism suggests that a federation where ethnic regions have at least nominally more rights—these entities are republics, they have constitutions, while these are not republics, they have charters—is a fragile system.
Any symmetry, all else being equal, is preferable because it's simpler, especially in the socio-political sphere. But Russia has no other choice. Because Russia is built on the ruins of an empire, and any empire is polycentric. And note how strangely our discussion has come full circle. That is, our former imperialism will be reflected in the future design of the federation, even if we successfully overcome all the negative aspects Dmitry described. We won't be able to overcome the colossal interregional disparities. There are rich regions and poor ones. This, too, is insurmountable. Russia's territory is such that you can't do anything there: there's no one to collect taxes from. You won't be able to develop anything there; it's simply impossible.
DMITRY ORESHKIN
I don't think there could be any other federation. It's a commonplace that the regions are very different. But these regions also have very different ambitions, and their regional elites are structured very differently. Of course, Putin has significantly leveled them, curtailed their rights, and turned them into a decorative structure. Council of the FederationFor a truly successful federation to exist, there must at least be an institution that represents the interests of the regions. For example, in Germany, this is Bundesrat — The Chamber of Länder, which is little known in Russia. The Bundesrat has more political clout than the Bundestag, which we constantly hear about due to elections and scandals. And the Bundesrat is filled with seasoned men who represent the interests of specific Länder, with whom the central government is forced to negotiate. Putin doesn't have that. He has the Federation Council standing on its hind legs and looking down its nose at him.
He evened out the regions quite a bit, but they're still asymmetrical. Here, Chechnya receives "Kadyrov explained it was 300 billion rubles. He casually mentioned this figure, without thinking, because in reality he receives less through official channels. But everyone knows that he also receives through unofficial channels and can avoid paying for electricity and gas supplied from the central regions. There was a scandal about this at one time, when Gazprom tried to..." get payment for gas, which is supplied—the empire supplies—to this freedom-loving republic. Of course, in terms of influence and weight, you can't compare Kadyrov's Chechnya to, say, Dagestan, even though Dagestan has a larger population and greater problems. In terms of political weight, because he's close to the leader and for a number of other reasons, Kadyrov is much more influential, perhaps even than Tatarstan, despite the fact that Tatarstan three million voters, and in Chechnya - about 800 thousandThis inequality cannot but persist. And this is the starting point if we are to discuss the beautiful federation of the future.
Russia also can't be a completely unitary country. Here, we would first need to calculate, collect, and rewrite what the center controls and where its sphere of responsibility ends. It's clear that it's interested in recruits, political loyalty, and the performance of certain state functions. For example, if you take the oil and gas-rich northern regions, they could be incredibly rich if they spent all the oil and gas they extract there on themselves. But the government forces them to share with the rest of the country, because, in particular, it controls pipelines and so on. The center takes resources from the rich regions and distributes them to the poor. Not always fairly, but, in particular, based on political expediency. You didn't carry water, you didn't chop wood, so you get so much, but if you, say, Khakassia, you are a free thinker and choose the wrong governor, then you are in trouble.
What else? Language, culture. Specially trained people in the Kremlin administration are vigilantly monitoring the emergence of any alternative regional elite. Neither under the guise of an environmental program, nor, especially, under the guise of a national program.
And so this cart slowly crawls along. Creaking, lagging behind the rest of the developed world, posing a military threat to its neighbors—and not only posing one, but also implementing military expansion. Expecting it to collapse anytime soon seems foolish to me. Yes, the cart is creaking ever more loudly, and there's not enough grease, but this entire system must still hold together for a certain number of years. Against this backdrop, the only thing I think we can do is, to varying degrees, consider possible options. We will need to negotiate and seek a new balance of interests. An asymmetrical political space will always exist, or it simply won't exist as a unified whole. Asymmetrical in the legal sense—that is, who has more rights, who less. In this sense, it's no coincidence that we have five types of political entities within the federation, from republics to autonomous regions.
IRINA BUSYGINA
There are very large objective barriers to the development of many territories. What did, for example, CanadaShe didn't make the territories federal subjects at all; they were simply territories. And in Russia, post-Soviet history has taken such a path that all of them have become federal subjects. This means that once we've achieved the feat of leapfrogging and have leaped over everything we want to leap over, we'll have to make difficult decisions to make it sustainable. Russia can't be sustainable under democracy or a federation, and it can't be sustainable at all under simple decisions.
Firstly, it will most likely be asymmetrical. And secondly, it will be doomed to a major redistribution through Moscow. This means that the federation will be somewhat centralized, at least financially. Most regions will still be recipients. You won't turn them into donors; that's impossible. And telling these regions that democracy will now prevail and they will develop like crazy is wrong. Things will be bad at first, then they will improve, but you will still most likely not become a donor or competitive region. That's how the system works.
Therefore, in addition to the fact that a discussion of federalism should include extraneous conditions to a greater extent than federalism itself, we must understand that only a certain federal model can work in Russia. Not the one we like, but one that is connected to past imperialism and past decisions. In political science, this is called path dependence. That is, the decision you can make today depends on the decisions you made yesterday and the day before. They limit your options. We must understand this. We won't have a menu at a restaurant: I want this, I want that. That's impossible.
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Sketch of the Future – is a joint podcast of the “NotMoscow Speaks” projects, Radio Sakharov и Country and World
