How to Destroy the Propaganda Machine
Propaganda undoubtedly became the basis for the unleashing and waging of a war of conquest in Ukraine. It not only provides informational support for this war; it essentially paved the way for it to become possible.
How can we disrupt its impact on Russian society? Who should do this? How can we prevent such malignant phenomena from occurring in the future? We discuss this. Farida Kurbangaleeva, Ilya Yablokov, historian, media expert, lecturer at the University of Sheffield and author of the book "Russian Conspiracy Culture: Conspiracy Theories in the Post-Soviet Space" и Denis Grekov, a philosopher and political scientist who taught critical thinking at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
Russian propaganda is often compared to Nazi propaganda during the Third Reich, sometimes called Goebbels-style. Is this comparison appropriate? Is Russian propaganda today truly so malignant, and is its contribution to Russian society's approval and, in many ways, support for the war in Ukraine so great?
ILYA YABLOKOV
Of course, it's not journalists or public intellectuals who are shooting and killing people in Ukraine. Their contribution lies elsewhere. They help those who actively support the war find reasons for their actions. A fairly large part of Russian society, so to speak, maintains neutrality. For them, such propaganda also provides certain arguments for maintaining this position. I don't like labels—Third Reich, Goebbels' propaganda. Why not Pol Pot's?
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
Most likely, it's simply because Goebbels's is more widely known. It directly affected residents of the Soviet and post-Soviet space, while Pol pot was somewhere far away along with his regime.
ILYA YABLOKOV
But that doesn't mean that regime was any less bloody. Or, for example, what happened recently in Myanmar. It would be greatly helpful if we avoid labels and instead try to assess a specific phenomenon: Russian state and near-state media, which have adopted a regime of total disinformation of the Russian population. And not just the Russian population—we understand that this propaganda is heard by people throughout the post-Soviet space, and by Russian-speaking audiences in the European Union. Propagandists are offering verbal ammunition, verbal missiles, to attack people's brains. Not always successfully, but it's enough to keep the war going for three years.
DENIS GREKOV
I think it's far more important not to draw external comparisons, but to understand how the process works. Calling propaganda Goebbels-like, Pol Pot-like, or something else doesn't help us understand it any better. This propaganda, of course, isn't Goebbels-like. I'd rather say it's based on post-totalitarian forms of social thinking that have taken root in post-Soviet society and that are probably inherited from Stalin's time. Propaganda—I agree with this—has quite successfully shaped the Russian population's perception of reality, one in which we have enemies and must shoot at them. And this propaganda is structured in a specific way. Let's understand the phenomenon, not draw analogies that, in reality, explain little.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
What's so unique about Russian propaganda? If you're saying it's structured in a particular way, could you please explain how?
DENIS GREKOV
Well, it's based on a collective morality of self-preservation, for example. More precisely, a morality of collective self-preservation, that's the more accurate way to put it. This way of thinking is inherited from totalitarian times. It's a way of thinking in which, first and foremost, the most significant object, or the most significant goal, is the preservation of the community with which a person identifies. Later, this resulted in the cult of Victory. That is, we won, we preserved ourselves, our society survived. And the cost is unimportant. "We will spare no expense." The value of the individual is zero. An individual is assessed based on how they can contribute to the preservation of this total community of "us." Yes, of course, we value life, but the main thing... It's after this "but" that the fun begins. This way of thinking has been broadcast by propaganda for a long time.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
Even Putin's time is usually divided into distinct eras. There's the supposedly vegetarian Putin era, and then there's the time when the screws were already tightened completely. Do you have a certain point of reference where you could say: from that moment on, Russian propaganda no longer held back?
ILYA YABLOKOV
First, let's understand what we're talking about. The Russian media industry's connection to the state—and, in fact, this is propaganda—has been going on since at least the mid-90s. Russian journalism suffers from a profound birth trauma. It never detached itself from the center of power and became independent, autonomous, and self-sustaining. Just like many other communities, like academics. So how can we say when Russian media became propaganda? Since 1996? Or maybe since 1999? We can dig further, all the way back to 1992, 1991. It all depends on how we define "propaganda." Our conversation in this regard may not be very productive, because we're using labels that each of us understands differently. And we need to explain what exactly needs to be fixed. Therefore, Denis's proposal to understand how it works seems more productive to me.
I'm ready to add to what Denis said about the cult of Victory. The cult of Victory is a story about identity and the past. It's also clearly intertwined with the "column" on which this propaganda stands, called "Russia's greatness." This applies to all spheres. This includes the Olympic Games, territory, natural resources. And the cult of Victory is attached to it, but it's a story that has grown into its own column.
Here, within this propaganda, another main pillar is the constant search for internal enemies. We can't do without them. And fourthly, it's an attempt to formulate a future. Sadly, the propagandists also see this same "beautiful Russia of the future," only they paint it from a different perspective. For them, it's anti-gay, "true Russians," built around "traditional values," which everyone, again, interprets differently.
It's crucial to understand that all four of these elements began as initiatives—not always by statists, but often by people connected to the state—and then they all evolved into, for example, a law prohibiting criticism of the Red Army's actions during World War II. Or a law designating LGBT people as a terrorist or extremist organization. This is one element of propaganda.
The second element is precisely the public figures, public intellectuals, let's call them that. People close to the government who generate their ideas. And these are the various structures of what we call propaganda. Added to this is online propaganda, bots, bot farms, Prigozhin's men, trolls, and so on. All of this has layers. How can we understand what we're dealing with today and what we'll be dealing with when the war ends and when the regime ends? This, I think, is what we need to talk about.
DENIS GREKOV
I also look at this from the perspective of how the consciousness of the subject living in all of this is structured. How do their social forms of thinking work, what do they assimilate during socialization. For example, what are citizens assimilating today? First and foremost, the practice of doublethink. Like in Soviet times: how did the educational process begin, back in kindergarten? Probably with the practice of doublethink, when you have to agree with the "right" side of things, but at the same time, not forget your own. This isn't even a fig in your pocket. People weren't opponents of Soviet power; they simply wanted to live, they cared about their basic needs. The practice of doublethink is destructive. Ultimately, it destroys society, horizontal connections, and mutual trust. And without mutual trust, no progress in society is possible. In general, I believe that, above all, we need some kind of psychological rehabilitation on a national scale. We have a society of people deeply traumatized, dating back to totalitarian times, and this trauma is constantly being reproduced. It's now effectively institutionalized at the state level. We, for example, are well aware that there are people in the State Duma with an orientation considered terrorist.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
But they are passing “anti-terrorism” laws, let’s call them that.
DENIS GREKOV
You see, this is evidence of schizophrenic duality, such schizorealism, as it is called Peter SloterdijkThey understand perfectly well who they are, but they accept the laws that need to be accepted.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
So, how can we eradicate the influence of Russian propaganda on the minds and consciousness of Russian citizens? Let's assume we've reached a point where this has become possible. What needs to be done to free people from this delusion?
ILYA YABLOKOV
We need to start with small steps. The curse of Russian journalism is its lack of ethics. That is, the news production ethics of even the best media organizations are built more on certain obvious things to adhere to, rather than on clear rules. From the days of glasnost to the present day, this has often failed Russian journalism. This is where the problems come from. crucified boys, girls kidnapped in Germany and various other made-up stories. You, Farida, worked inside the newsroom and know this very well: there are no written rules.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
No, there are certain rules, but they are not written according to the laws, they are written by the authorities.
ILYA YABLOKOV
We need to start with this at least. Every media outlet, if it's a real media outlet, should have professional standards that operate within the newsroom. Secondly, it will definitely need to be enacted at the legislative level. conduct the process lustrationThe criteria by which this will be done must be discussed. Clearly, this is a very complex issue, because even "people with pleasant faces" could fall under the definition of lustration.
Third, public television in Russia. It certainly shouldn't be an artificial construct, OTR, which in 2012 was granted to Russian citizens after rallies on Bolotnaya SquareWell, this is, of course, a cry. This isn't public media, nor is it television. It's truly publicly funded media, like the BBC, for example, which would never take a position. And there should be a clearly defined framework within which some commission of independent people could make specific decisions regarding the operations of various media organizations. Clearly, in a post-totalitarian society, the big question is who will monitor and, so to speak, control compliance with all these principles. I won't tell you who it should be right now. In fact, I partly believe that this podcast is an opportunity to open this discussion.
This is part of the process of normalizing the Russian media system, part of a larger process that Denis mentioned in passing. It's simply a legislative overhaul. It's naive to think that with the end of the war and the death of the Russian president, all this will go away. It will remain and could degenerate into an even worse story. Because the people who write the scripts for "Vesti Nedeli" today will undoubtedly remain alive, they will undoubtedly be fine, and they will continue to write exactly the same pamphlets against the next internal enemies.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
What should we do with this army of so-called journalists who currently work for propaganda outlets, both state-owned and quasi-state, serving the Russian state, when something truly changes in Russia? Should they be excommunicated or forced to pass some kind of test, demonstrating that they've been re-educated and reformed?
ILYA YABLOKOV
Those directly responsible for producing hate speech should certainly face criminal prosecution. We understand who is doing this within the editorial offices. As for those who, let's say, facilitated this process, their level of culpability is different. Take, for example, Marina Ovsyannikova, who worked in the editorial office at Channel One since 2003. What should be done with her? That's a big question. One could say: you worked, you maintained the machine, you somehow lived with it. I think that the hierarchy within each editorial office will need to conduct appropriate lustrations. I understand that I'm opening Pandora's box with this conversation; naturally, there will be a huge number of people who will say: they understand everything, they are against the war. But this, unfortunately, won't help anyone today. Moreover, it won't help anyone in the future.
Without a doubt, every media outlet, without exception, must operate according to professional standards. If someone's contract is contingent on their adherence to professional principles, they will behave completely differently. And perhaps a specialist should be hired for a period of time to simply observe from the inside how well the media adheres to these principles.
Moreover, external surveillance may be introduced. In Britain, for example, there is Ofcom Ofcom is an agency where people can complain about the broadcasting practices of, say, the BBC or another TV channel, and Ofcom reviews all complaints. It's clear there's a lot of slag there, but there's a certain procedure. If a violation occurs repeatedly, the media outlet loses its license. It's a complex, unpleasant process, but if journalists and content producers don't adhere to these conditions, nothing will be fixed.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
That is, in Russia, some kind of regulator like Ofcom, which at one time banned RT broadcasting within the United Kingdom?
ILYA YABLOKOV
There absolutely must be a regulator, an independent agency that handles this. Moreover, there must be absolute transparency in the appointment of people there, absolute transparency in their work. This, most likely, will not 100% protect against the possibility of shady characters or people with some inappropriate background being appointed. I'm not naive. But the question is how we will build this machine. A lot depends on us.
DENIS GREKOV
Ilya gave a very detailed commentary; he has a better understanding of how the media works. But I'd like to take a little theoretical perspective. French political thinker, historian, and lawyer Alexis de TocquevilleWhen I was researching democracy in America, I wrote that one of the pillars of maintaining that democracy is freedom—not only of association, but also of the media. I agree with Ilya; I have no illusions either: we will never cleanse this field. There will never be absolute transparency, never a complete absence of propaganda in the media space. Especially now, when anyone can open their own Telegram channel or broadcast something on Twitter. This, in principle, cannot be controlled by anyone in any way. It is far more important that the state never have a monopoly on the information space. This is the first thing that needs to be taken away from it.
Secondly, of course, there should be no support for all these public pages, bot farms, and the like: their money should be confiscated immediately. And in general, it's probably time to introduce some kind of protection against these kinds of false markers of public opinion. Because a bot farm is, essentially, a falsification of public opinion.
ILYA YABLOKOV
Well, not only that. It's also a way to disseminate information and suppress alternative views.
DENIS GREKOV
Yes, but precisely under the pretense that the majority thinks so. Essentially, a bot farm organizes a supposed appeal to the majority opinion. Ten thousand comments about the same thing—and a person begins to think that everyone thinks the same way. And we are collective creatures, and this has an effect on us.
ILYA YABLOKOV
There's certainly another important point here: regulating social media at the legislative level. This is something that is slowly being adopted and will be adopted in America, Britain, and Europe. I think the big tech companies will eventually put the squeeze on them. We simply need to implement a policy of properly monitoring disinformation. And I believe this can and should be done in Russia as well. It's a clear and key part of preventing the spread of propaganda.
DENIS GREKOV
I agree. However, the issue of disinformation doesn't solve the problem of the spread of ideology. That's a completely different story. And there's no defense against it, except for one thing: true freedom of opinion. Alexis de Tocqueville, back in the first half of the 19th century, predicted the emergence of totalitarian regimes based on his study of democratic ones. He also identified what prevents democracy from sliding into totalitarianism, as he put it, "an unprecedented despotism": namely, the balance between freedom and equality. It's important that human freedom be inviolable, that people have the ability to say no without facing any consequences.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
Denis, am I correct in understanding that under a democratic system, this process will be regulated automatically? That is, if we have democracy and freedom of speech, the work of those resources that provide information will also improve?
DENIS GREKOV
Of course. We'll get a lot of opinions. It's all here to stay, as Ilya rightly said. People will still talk about greatness and all that, but there won't be a state monopoly, there won't be state funding for all of this, and there will be freedom of the media.
ILYA YABLOKOV
Yes, but just because the state won't finance it doesn't mean someone like Malofeev won't do the same. Let's say the state has no legal right to give a single kopeck. But there are dozens of ways to pay in today's world, not to mention cryptocurrency.
DENIS GREKOV
I should clarify here: I meant that the state should be prohibited from providing funds for what it currently provides. Not in general. Some state-owned media outlets are entirely possible, provided they are transparent and truly subject to public scrutiny.
ILYA YABLOKOV
The state shouldn't have any media at all, except for public ones. The state's job is to perform certain functions that have nothing to do with the media. As soon as a state-funded channel appears, its employees will be forced to serve the state's needs. The state shouldn't have media in its hands. Not regional governors, not mayors, not the government—the official Rossiyskaya Gazeta. You have a communications department, a press service. Please, communicate with the media through them. And the media will ask you questions. That's all. I think there should be no compromise here.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
And in France, for example, isn’t there a state television channel?
ILYA YABLOKOV
Does France have a supervisory board? Is there effective legislation? France hasn't become a dictatorship. It has nurtured its democratic institutions and boasts a very strong civil society for over 200 years. Therefore, any comparisons with European examples simply won't work in Russia. We largely need to reinvent the wheel, given our current circumstances.
DENIS GREKOV
We also need to change the design of society itself, to a certain extent, and change the culture. And this task, it seems to me, goes beyond working with the media alone. For example, it's absolutely essential to reform education. Right now, the Russian, Putin-led state is creating a grassroots propaganda machine out of education. All these reforms, "Conversations on Important Things," pentabases and their other initiatives are aimed at making education work as what Michel Foucault calls "psi-function"That is, it produced an individual with given parameters, naturally, those set by the state. The concept of education, for example, repackages the concept of traditional values in a certain way. What can even be called traditional values? For example, "Thou shalt not kill!", "Thou shalt not steal!" However, if we look at how traditional values are interpreted in this education system, we see that they operate as a set of servile attitudes: prioritizing state goals over personal ones, prioritizing public over personal ones, stripping away individual human dignity, allowing external structures to judge it, and so on. Plus, reproductive slavery for women. This is the set of "traditional values" that Putin's current education system offers.
ILYA YABLOKOV
There's also a lack of understanding of what "Russians" are, the concept of identity. Traditional values—we're Orthodox, then we're multicultural, and so on. Playing with constantly shifting identities is also a way to fill people's heads. But from a practical standpoint, without a doubt, the greatest danger in the long term is propaganda in schools and universities. Because, firstly, they assume, "Well, that's our job," just like journalists do. Secondly, the people who do this—both university professors and school teachers—have few rights, are heavily dependent on their superiors, and are very often hostage to circumstances. Especially if it's a rural area. This could really play a very significant role in the long term; children and students will remember what's being brainwashed now. And they will build their world based on what they were once taught. This is just as serious a crime as the journalists who produce propaganda.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
Besides education, does the state have any other means of propaganda?
DENIS GREKOV
For example, what might be called poverty. In his theory of the structure of power, Foucault described this precisely as being held in poverty. That is, people's opportunities are limited to such an extent that they are forced to take certain steps. This concept is currently being implemented in Russia's regions, where over-indebted people, unable to simply repay these loans at work, go to war for relatively small amounts of money against Ukrainians who have done nothing to them.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
Are you referring to the deliberate maintenance of a low standard of living for the population? Do you consider that part of propaganda, too?
DENIS GREKOV
Yes, that's right. It's not just about standard of living, it's also about level of opportunities.
ILYA YABLOKOV
I agree, this is a class war. My colleague Kirill Kobrin made a very good point here, right at the very beginning of the war: the classes that are the most deprived of any advantages are the ones that are most used as expendable material.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
And how should counter-propaganda be structured in the beautiful Russia of the future? Should there be some other subjects that will completely refute everything said in Putin's "lessons on what's important"? Should there be special programs on television to bring people to their senses, educate them, and open their eyes to the crimes of the Putin regime?
DENIS GREKOV
First of all, we need to change the educational model. Educational models can be roughly divided into two types: explanatory and argumentative. Explanatory models operate on the principle of interpreting truth. That is, a certain true idea is already accepted, and then we need to explain how to correctly accept it. The argumentative model initially questions the idea, problematizes it. And learning consists of people finding the answer to this question or solving this problem themselves. And at the same time, they figure out whether their hypothesis is true or false, or they pose new questions, and so on. Education should fundamentally move away from the explanatory model, with the exception of certain subjects, such as the natural sciences, where this probably makes sense.
Secondly, we shouldn't be giving lessons in counter-propaganda or lessons on what's truly important. We need to develop the ability to think independently. Because the main crime in Putin's Russia today is the persecution of independent thought. It doesn't matter what you think. What matters is that you think for yourself. That's the most undesirable thing for them. And it's precisely this culture of thinking that should be the goal of education, so that people can truly engage in independent thought and understand that it's possible.
ILYA YABLOKOV
A counter-propaganda course is definitely unnecessary. Recognition of the causes of the war and the crimes documented by international observers will be a separate part of the political process. We should probably return to some autonomy for education—both secondary and higher. In the 90s, although financial pressures were severe, horizontal structures were nonetheless formed at both the rectors' and school levels, and interesting and, most importantly, economically stable schools emerged. All these structures were bent over the knee for many years. As a result, all these institutions—academies of sciences, universities, and schools—simply became part of a rigid hierarchy where there is absolutely no room for alternative thinking. Therefore, autonomy should be granted to as many such organizations as possible. And legislation should prohibit the state from interfering in this.
Indeed, we need to develop critical thinking. Another issue is what to talk to whom and in what language. How do we talk to kids who will be starting school in seven years about what began in 2022? And how do we talk to people who are, say, 50 years old, who are now living in Russia and who have their own understanding of what's happening? This is a complex task. And we need to think about this now. Because, unfortunately, we'll likely end up with a situation where the children of those who returned from the war and the children of those who emigrated will go to school together. These will be two completely different Russias. Their parents will tell them about it at home, and then they will come to school. And who will bear the brunt of the situation? The teachers, of course.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
The current generation of Russians and their children are traumatized generations. How many generations must pass before a non-traumatized generation emerges?
DENIS GREKOV
That's a tough question. I'd guess at least two or three generations.
ILYA YABLOKOV
I think that the geopolitical situation will not allow even one generation of Russians to grow up untraumatized.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
But we are talking about the fact that Putin’s regime will collapse sooner or later.
ILYA YABLOKOV
And that in itself will be traumatic. And it will lead to many more complications, even if all this ends peacefully, there is no massacre, and everything somehow fades away. I think we can agree that what is happening now in Russia is the long death of an empire. We are seeing various pieces falling off this elephant that fell in the jungle and is already rotting. The elephant is already dead. But the empire will continue to collapse, collapse, collapse. How it will collapse, we don't really understand. Let's be optimistic, but I think there won't be two or three generations that grow up without trauma. Everyone will have their own trauma.
DENIS GREKOV
I agree. And I'd even point out that Putin's regime is currently reproducing previous Soviet and totalitarian models, drawing on the generation that took to the streets in the 90s. Those same young people who were young then are now actively supporting this regime. Many of them support the war, and many are fighting in it. This generation, judging from polls, is primarily comprised of people in their 40s and 50s.
ILYA YABLOKOV
This is precisely the generation traumatized by the collapse of the Soviet Union. It could be followed by a similarly traumatized generation, the early Putin generation, which, on the one hand, seemed to live in stability, but was traumatized by absolute cynicism and hypocrisy. And it was already raised on tabloid culture and the culture of fakes on social media. And the next generation are the children of "SVO" veterans, the children of people, as Denis said, with doublethink. And these are the children of the immigrants who will arrive. So how will these three different groups talk about February 24, 2022? And most importantly, how will they build their relationships with their peers and with state institutions? The story of February 24, 2022, will remain a moment of profound shame for some, and for others, a moment of great victory or the greatest opportunity. And children and teenagers will go online, search for information about this, read books written by Zakhar Prilepin and others. They'll read this very bad literature and then, most likely, perceive it as a model for their own lives. They'll be recruited by various right-wing radical groups, conservative groups—we'll see this. The political process will then evolve—to what extent will these people be allowed to participate in debates? And if not, what will be the price of their non-participation, the price of their possible retreat into hiding? I'm currently fantasizing about negative scenarios.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
Yes, very pessimistic. But what if, sooner or later, a generation is born that has never lived under Putin's regime? What if it is raised and brought up under a highly competent, balanced education system that fosters critical thinking in children? This begins in kindergarten, in elementary school; and the various institutions, the various stages of this education, are maximally autonomous; we have independent media presenting diverse points of view, free from state monopoly—can we still hope to see a generation unintoxicated by this propaganda, free from its corrupting influence on the minds, hearts, and thoughts of Russians?
ILYA YABLOKOV
Well, if everything works out as perfectly as you described, the chances are higher. But to eliminate any propaganda, you really do need, as Denis said, well-developed critical thinking. And the ability to develop this critical thinking should be present from kindergarten onward. And not just critical thinking, but also respect. Respect for others, respect for yourself, and basic values like kindness, compassion, and so on—these are also necessary. Because what we see today is a cult of force. And we see where it leads.
DENIS GREKOV
Yes, I agree. And, of course, if these ideal conditions—one is tempted to say, a wonderful time that none of us will ever live in—come to fruition, the issue will be resolved to some degree. I would put it this way: we must get rid of the situation in which a person is deprived of their a priori dignity. The entire current regime is based on the fact that people have been robbed of their own a priori dignity and convinced that their dignity can be judged by someone else. Most often, this is some authority that supposedly speaks on behalf of everyone. A person must have their own inherent, internal dignity, which allows them to say no, including to everyone else.
FARIDA KURBANGALEEVA
Do these conditions, which make liberation from the influence of propaganda possible, guarantee that the situation in which Russian society finds itself now will not recur? Or must this work be ongoing?
DENIS GREKOV
Constantly. Society's job is to prevent this. There's no system that can't be hacked. Society itself must ensure that its freedoms aren't taken away, its rights aren't violated, and its independent thinking remains. If people don't do this themselves, sooner or later some force will emerge that will begin changing laws and regulations, and, through slow transformation, as we've seen, will begin to build yet another ghoulish regime. Therefore, society's job is to react sharply to any such attempts at the very beginning. If Russian society doesn't learn to do this as a result of all these events, it will disappear completely.
ILYA YABLOKOV
Well, I think we're all familiar with various dystopias in which dictators come to power even in the most wonderful regimes, like British democracy. And what's more, Donald Trump hasn't hidden the fact that he'll be a dictator for at least one day, as he said. If such well-established democratic regimes regularly develop cracks that citizens and civil society representatives struggle to heal, then what can we say about Russian society, where, in addition to the trauma, there's a complete lack of basic checks and balances that would help prevent a repeat of what's happening today in Ukraine and Russia itself. Let's not forget the enormous number of political prisoners. What I'm missing—I wrote about this a year ago—is a discussion of what this will look like in the future. Will this be another round of reforms, carried out on the fly by people who have no idea why they're even doing this? Unfortunately, a year has passed, and there's still no sign of any significant progress. Therefore, I think there's still a lot of work to be done, and it's time to get started.
Sketch of the Future – is a joint podcast of the “NotMoscow Speaks” projects, Radio Sakharov и Country and World
