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The developers froze before the leap. Perhaps into the abyss.

Russia's developer crisis: after tightening the Family Mortgage Act, new-build sales and project launches are falling, while developers' debt to banks is growing.

Author: Tatyana Rybakova

"I looked at the October sales results for new buildings and came to the conclusion: the next six months will be a real stress test for the project finance system. Either banks will start to pull out, or developers will throw up their hands and say, 'We can't do this anymore, let's do it differently,'" wrote new building market analyst Yuri Kochetkov on social media. And this is probably the most concise and succinct summary of the real estate market situation.

The market has come to a standstill. After the September surge in new home sales before the Family Mortgage parameters were changed, according to According to According to Dom.RF, prices (in rubles) had risen by less than 1% by early November, while the number of mortgages had fallen by 11%—primarily due to a decline in the number of applicants who met the new criteria. Meanwhile, project launches in October plummeted by 32%—developers had gotten it right: the time to stimulate housing construction had passed.

Goodbye, preferential mortgage

"Citizens don't need affordable mortgages; they need affordable housing," said The head of the Central Bank spoke at a plenary session of the State Duma. Subsidized mortgages should remain targeted, she explained, and affordable housing will only become available when inflation is low. Elvira Sakhipzadovna didn't say when inflation would be low. Because, in a situation where 42% of the budget is pouring into the bottomless pit of war, and the Ministry of Finance and the tax service are squeezing ever more money out of ailing civilian businesses and impoverished citizens, inflation can only drop to a point where buying an apartment is out of the question—just living.

However, housing prices across Russia are still rising on average! According to Dom.RF, new buildings have increased by 0,8% in real prices and by 5,9% in nominal prices over the past nine months. "World of Apartments" gives A much larger increase: 10,1% over 10 months, 0,6% in October. The difference may be explained by the fact that Mir Kvartir calculates prices based on listings, while Dom.RF uses documents submitted for mortgage approval. If so, sellers' discounts are more than substantial. And this already suggests that all is not well in the real estate kingdom.

The tightening of the Family Mortgage program on October 1st dealt another blow: the subsidy period was shortened to 15 years, and the rate now depends on the number of children, which has increased for most families. In fact, under the current terms, only families that are unlikely to be able to afford a home at all can take out a mortgage: those with four or more minor children, with the loan repaid either at a subsidized rate of 4-6% over 15 years, or at the market rate after that. While Dom.RF noted a surge in mortgage applications under the old terms in September, since October, new home sales have fallen 23% compared to the previous month, and 28% compared to a year ago. calculated agency. And it predicted that by the end of the year, 4,5–4,7 million square meters of new buildings would be sold (9,6–13,5% less than last year), and 4,4–4,6 million square meters next year. Natalia Zubarevich from the HSE Institute for Social Policy expects three-year decline in housing construction in Russia.

The problem is that many developers and banks may not survive such a long downturn.

Banks, meters, two barrels

One of the most telling is the story of one of the largest, if not the largest, Russian developers—the Samolet Group of Companies. The company, beloved by both investors (its bonds were very popular on the market) and buyers (affordable apartments in good neighborhoods), suddenly failed to pay the next tranche of coupon income on its bonds. And again. And again. Finally, it became clear that the company was essentially on the verge of bankruptcy: despite possessing one of the largest land banks, a huge number of projects, and the support of VTB and Sberbank, the company owed under 800 billion rubles and is now negotiating debt restructuring.

Yes, the banks decided to save Samolet. But now Sberbank will have 274 billion rubles in debt, VTB 86 billion, and Dom.RF about 80 billion rubles in debt, which will definitely not be repaid on time, and it's unclear whether it will be repaid at all or in full.

In addition to the high-profile "landing" of "Samolet," there are also many regional developers who have gone bankrupt or are in the process of going bankrupt. According to the latest According to According to Kontur.Fokus, 8,059 construction companies in Russia filed for bankruptcy in the first nine months of 2026, and from the beginning of the year through October, 1,620 new bankruptcy cases were initiated against them—a 38% increase compared to last year. Considering that all multi-story construction in Russia is conducted through escrow accounts (apartment buyers pay into a special bank account, which then finances the developer), all of their loans are now held by banks. The bank has two options: return the money to the buyers (which would risk social unrest, and the money isn't just sitting idle in the bank) or try to somehow complete the construction: through another developer or restructure the existing loans. More often than not, it's easier and cheaper for a bank to restructure a loan, hoping the developer will eventually pay it off. This, incidentally, allows the bank to maintain its balance sheet in decent shape, as bad loans both damage the bank's reputation and force it to create additional reserves.

Total debt of housing developers to Russian banks by August-September 2026 reached 11,37–11,4 trillion rubles, an increase of 16% over the year. countingAs of September 1, 2026, direct delinquency among developers increased by 8% year-on-year to 160 billion rubles (approximately 4% of their loan portfolio). If related real estate market companies (agencies, rental, and management) are included, the sector's total delinquency reached 592 billion rubles (+43% year-on-year)—an increase of almost 1,5 times. Due to slowing sales and the spread of installment plans, the level of project financing coverage by equity holders in August 2026 fell up to 65,8% (7,48 trillion rubles in escrow with a debt of 11,37 trillion rubles) - this is the minimum since 2020.

That is, the rapid growth of bankruptcies is only the tip of the iceberg; the real situation for developers is much more dire.

According to the Central Bank, the total amount risky restructurings The total debt of Russian businesses reached 4,8 trillion rubles, with the regulator noting that the lion's share of the increase is due to the restructuring of debts in the construction sector. The Central Bank has already deals Emergency measures: for example, the regulator extended its recommendations for banks to restructure loans to companies experiencing temporary difficulties without immediately creating increased reserves throughout 2026 (in October 2026, this measure was extended into the fourth quarter). But how much longer will this rope continue?

Preferential mortgages initially drove up housing prices (and with them, the prices of land, building materials, etc.), but then, as conditions tightened and became more stringent, they began to put pressure on developers like a chamber with sliding walls and ceilings: plots purchased at high prices and expensive construction already underway prevent developers from lowering prices (the average full construction cycle takes four years, meaning that homes are currently being sold on projects started in late 2022, at the height of price growth). Meanwhile, demand is falling—those in need of housing are unable to afford it, and investors in square meters are selling their previously purchased properties themselves—they are keenly aware of the growing crisis.

Rising construction costs plus falling demand are leading to more and more developers postponing project completion dates – fortunately, the government allowed Delays without penalties—53% of projects were late in the first half of 2026. And behind each of these projects is a bank providing financing to the developer. It's clear that large banks, especially those with state participation, will, in the worst case, be recapitalized by the owners. But medium-sized and small banks may not be able to withstand this. And then the bursting of the mortgage bubble could cause a storm in Russia no less dramatic than what happened in the United States in 2008.

We need to build more

The way out of this vicious circle is clear to everyone: we need to build. Build a lot, quickly, and cheaply. Regional price analysis confirms that price increases are slowest in areas with a lot of construction. Research Olga Mikheeva of the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences shows that housing market overheating occurs where one of three factors is present: attractive urban agglomerations and southern regions; certain Far Eastern regions, which found themselves in a state of overheating due to a specific regional preferential mortgage program (the "Far Eastern Mortgage" at 2%); and relatively compact regions (Altai Krai, Astrakhan, and Ryazan Oblasts), where even a small stimulus to increase housing demand was sufficient to create market overheating. However, Moscow, for example, was not included among the overheated markets because the capital has a sufficiently solvent population that is not dependent on preferential mortgages. And Mir Kvartir's monitoring of new building prices clarifies and supplements this research.

For example, for a year, according to this monitoringThe largest increases in apartment prices were in Makhachkala (+30,8%), Grozny (+29,8%), Tver (+23,7%), Bryansk (+22%), and Nizhny Tagil (+20,1%). These are cities where the war has generated significant benefits (payments to military personnel, military contracts for enterprises, etc.), but where mass housing construction is underdeveloped. New building prices fell only in Sevastopol (-5,9%), Cherepovets (-2,1%), and Yakutsk (-1,2%). In the first, this is clearly a result of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' constant attacks on Crimea and constant power and water outages. In the second, housing construction in the city is slowing due to the conflict between Vologda Oblast Governor Georgy Filimonov and Severstal owner Alexei Mordashov, along with the company's declining profits. Yakutsk also appears to be experiencing difficult developments due to difficulties with northern deliveries and Alrosa's declining profits. Meanwhile, Arkhangelsk is among the cities that have seen significant price increases, and this is well illustrated by a study by the Russian Academy of Sciences: in the Arkhangelsk Oblast, a "northern mortgage" is available starting from 2%, but very little new housing is being built, and the existing housing is often of poor quality.

How have new building prices changed over the year?Change in price per square meter, October 2026 to October 2025, %Makhachkala+ 30,8 %formidable+ 29,8 %Tver+ 23,7 %Bryansk+ 22,0 %Nizhny Tagil+ 20,1 %Yakutsk−1,2%Cherepovets−2,1%Sevastopol−5,9%Source: "World of Apartments"

However, the known answer doesn't make the problem any easier. How can we build more, cheaper, and faster?

Let's start with speed. Preparing a feasibility study and obtaining the permits required for construction to begin takes about two years. That's a lot. Construction itself also often takes longer than in many other countries. This includes the low quality of the workforce (migrant workers are still the backbone of construction), interruptions in the supply of materials and equipment, exacerbated by the current fuel crisis, and climate conditions. Ideally, these are solvable problems. Workers can be trained, logistics can be streamlined, and material production can be expanded (queues for cement at the peak of the construction season can sometimes be obtained through bribery). Even the climate isn't a hindrance—there are special solutions for northern conditions. Plus, there are modern construction methods, plus a general improvement in production culture, plus a shift away from skimping on wages and unjustified delays...

It's also possible to get cheaper, though difficult. Beyond reducing inflation, there are also bottlenecks such as infrastructure preparation: ideally, plots should be sold with utilities already connected, but in Russia, connecting to them is a real quest, and quite prone to corruption, by the way. This requires an approved urban development plan (with expert and public input), and the authorities have the funds to create both this plan and the necessary infrastructure. It's not uncommon for an entire new neighborhood to be connected to a dying factory boiler house or a low-power substation.

And more than that, this is government incentives. Developers should be interested in profits from turnover, even at the expense of lower margins, which means they should be confident that administrative barriers won't be imposed at every turn. Even better would be when sales are guaranteed by state and municipal guarantees: both for banks and for the developers themselves, in the form of the city buying back unsold housing, which would use it to create a social housing market, perhaps even through leasing, with tenants gradually buying it out.

Let's be honest—nobody wants to deal with all this yet. Officials see developers as nothing more than cash cows, paying bribes for every piece of paper. Banks see them as crooks, unless they're "one of their own." Developers themselves prefer to take the maximum from a project, and then let the grass grow. And the budget doesn't have the funds to transform the market into a more respectable one.

Under these conditions, the Russian housing market is simply doomed to a constant cycle of ups and downs. When the next crash wipes out the previous market favorites, causing another shortage of construction projects, and this shortage, in turn, causes a new price increase—which will attract new developers who will once again try to skim the cream of the increased demand—the same outcome will follow. And the average citizen looking to acquire a square meter of space can only watch these ebbs and flows, trying, like an experienced surfer, to ride the wave and survive—or be completely buried.

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