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Travel ban in Russia

It will become increasingly difficult to move around the country.

Author: Tatyana Rybakova

Last week, a video of Vladimir Putin, sitting in the cockpit of an MS-21 aircraft, listening to the pilot's panegyrics to sanctions spread across Russian media and many public groups. They say that if it weren't for the sanctions, we wouldn't have our own wonderful aircraft engines, but now everything, literally everything, is import-substituted. Most people have the impression that the Russian aviation industry has reached new heights. Meanwhile, in reality, this is just one frame from a meeting in Zhukovsky on the development of aviation. And this event was dedicated to events that were by no means joyful.

"I don't want the sanctions to end," shared An elderly test pilot is seen with Vladimir Putin, seated in the cockpit of an MS-21 aircraft. Because, he explained, thanks to sanctions, domestic engineers managed to create such a remarkable engine that the pilot has no complaints about it. "Well, there are some minor flaws, of course, but overall, I'm confident in this engine," the pilot says in the video.

I really hope the plane gets a truly good engine. But for now, both the pilot and Putin are sitting in an experimental aircraft. In fact, that's why the test pilot is there—it will only be possible to judge what the engine is like in operating mode several years after the MS-21 begins operating. And this is a problem.

The long road of the aviation industry

The new Russia's plans for its own aircraft didn't go well from the very beginning. Operating the Soviet aircraft fleet proved unprofitable under market conditions: the Soviet aviation industry paid no attention to either operating costs or the fuel-hungry nature of its engines. Therefore, the planes were reliable, but essentially unprofitable. They were also noisy, so they couldn't fly to Europe, which, due to its dense population, has very strict noise regulations for aircraft. That's why the development of promising Soviet models was stopped—it was easier to start from scratch than to try to rework existing designs.

They didn't start from scratch, however, but from a negative point of view: airlines began purchasing foreign aircraft: first used ones, then new ones. Money from oil and gas flowed like a river, so by the 2010s, Russian airlines had become world leaders in terms of fleet newness. However, all of these aircraft were purchased on lease, and in 2022, the sellers demanded their return, as leasing payments became impossible due to sanctions. Thus, Russia has become a completely different leader in terms of the size of its pirate aircraft fleet.

Over the past four years, airlines have made efforts to improve the situation. Some are quietly buying foreign aircraft using intermediaries in third countries. Others are purchasing Russian Superjets. Most often, they combine the first and second, and preserve the “pirate” aircraft. But the problem remains: Russia must either return to the global airliner market or establish mass production of its own aircraft.

As I already Wrote, things aren't going well with domestic mass production. In fact, only the Superjets are in serial production, originally developed through international cooperation but forced to adopt Russian avionics and engines (though not all is well with them yet). Airlines aren't very fond of the aircraft. Not only is it uncomfortable for pilots, but it also has obvious problems, including with the engine, which hasn't yet been successfully imported. Here are just two. accidents, which occurred recently: on June 23 at Sheremetyevo Airport, within the space of approximately half an hour, two Rossiya Airlines Superjet 100s experienced the same malfunction in their right SaM-146 engine—increased vibration was detected in the powerplant, after which the crews decided to shut it down. Flight RA-89101, operating flight SU-6361 from Moscow to Kazan, was the first to experience the problem. 34 minutes later, a similar scenario occurred with another Superjet (RA-89028), operating flight SU-6254 from Nizhny Novgorod to Moscow. After inspecting the powerplant of one of the aircraft, three brackets for mounting the high-pressure turbine clearance control system pipelines were found to be damaged. This is only what was publicly reported—only the Federal Air Transport Agency knows how many similar malfunctions there have been. When identical malfunctions occur on different vessels, it's no longer a coincidence, but either an engineering error, assembly problems, or a lack of proper maintenance. If there were no sanctions, we would have addressed the issue with the manufacturer. Currently, any investigation won't solve the problem: the manufacturer doesn't support either maintenance or engine upgrades.

All is well, beautiful marquise

Of course, these emergencies were not the cause Meeting In Zhukovsky. The problem is that the aircraft manufacturers' upbeat reports that domestically produced aircraft with the most superior characteristics are about to enter service have been falling flat for years now. As a result, Putin, having gathered deputy prime ministers, ministers, and specialists at the M. M. Gromov Flight Research Institute, asked them—if we put aside the official rhetoric about undeniable successes—where is what was promised?

Because the Russian air force is in a worse situation than the governor's. They don't have any decent planes of their own. Imported vehicles, deprived of original parts, software updates, and author's supervision due to sanctions, are gradually turning from a means of transportation into a means of increased danger. It's impossible not to fly in Russia: the distances are too great, there are too few ground routes and ground accessibility in general. Zugzwang.

Of course, government officials, РІС ‹Р№РґСЏ Those who spoke to the press after the meeting were routinely optimistic. The flight program for the import-substituting SJ-100 (the one whose engines malfunctioned at Sheremetyevo) is more than 80% complete and will be completed this year, assured Industry and Trade Minister Anton Alikhanov. For the long-suffering MC-21, just over 40% of the tests have been completed, but the flight program is expected to be completed in the first quarter of 2027, with certification received by the end of that year, assured First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov. However, he cautiously added, "For now, these are the deadlines." It's important to understand that they didn't dare give Putin a firm deadline for when this marvel of domestic engineering would be delivered to airlines. And rightly so: many experts attribute the constant complaints about the SJ-100 to its haste to enter service. And now, according to Alikhanov, the Ministry of Industry and Trade has had to find funds for research and development to replace foreign engines with Russian ones on approximately 140 Superjets currently in service, as otherwise they will begin to fail in the near future. As a reminder, the Russian engine for the Superjet is still not certified. According to Alikhanov, the problem was money, but the long history of Russian engine development (and Russian engines in general) suggests that it's not just a lack of funds that is preventing Russian designers from building a reliable and fuel-efficient engine.

However, it is money – or rather the lack of it – that will serve as an excuse for not fulfilling plans when Putin holds his next meeting. Judge for yourself. According to Alikhanov, the aviation industry development program will be extended until 2035, and the volume of leasing financing will exceed 1,5 trillion rubles. The rate will be preferential – the benchmark is set by the National Welfare Fund, with financing at 1,5%. This does not include special operating subsidies for the first 5-6 years – these will cover the difference in the costs of maintaining airworthiness, bringing it to the level to which leading airlines are accustomed. To put it bluntly, airlines will be paid to test their technology on passengers and their own pilots. In principle, this is a fairly common practice worldwide. However, it typically applies to a small pool of airlines and a very limited range of routes. No one has yet dared to use the entire country for this. And there's a time constraint: according to Alikhanov, building an aircraft takes three years. The Russian aviation industry's capacity cannot replace the entire aircraft fleet in three years. Add to this the period of trial operation, and it turns out that even if all promises are fulfilled, the mass re-equipment of the Russian aircraft fleet will only begin in 2035. And this, mind you, is if the money for all of this is allocated from the budget. Whose income and expenses are already diverging at the speed of light.

There's nothing to fly with. And nothing to drive with.

However, right now, it's not so much that there's nothing to fly on, but rather that there's nothing to fly with. Amid government denials of a fuel crisis, including a shortage of jet fuel, Azimuth Airlines said The airline announced flight reductions due to a lack of jet fuel, calling the fuel situation critical. "Flights are losing all economic viability," the airline said in a statement to the Ministry of Transport.

The fuel crisis is gradually spreading throughout Russia, with supply disruptions already occurring in 70 regions. The most important thing about it is the impossibility of predicting the situation. On the one hand, demand should fall after the end of the holiday season and the harvesting campaign—that is, somewhere around October. On the other hand, it is unknown how many more oil refining and transport capacities will be knocked out by Ukrainian drones, and possibly missiles. On the one hand, most oil refining capacity can be repaired. On the other hand, the companies themselves must provide the funds for repairs, and they rightly believe there's no need to rush: once the repairs are completed, another accident occurs and you have to start all over again. Air defense, which companies themselves are again asked to invest in, as practice has shown, is no guarantee of immunity.

It is clear that in these conditions prices are rising. And air travel. And on the cargo and public transport. And even on railway Transportation (funny enough, the title of the linked article completely contradicts its meaning). Drivers are howling, no longer sure what's better: no fuel or plenty, but at 120 rubles per liter, it's practically a European price.

I assume the authorities will be able to more or less cope with the fuel shortage. Yes, they've now adopted the Soviet-style approach to combating it—from restricting sales to pressuring suppliers and even cracking down on "speculators." But if the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to squeeze out oil refining capacity—and there's no indication that this will stop—prices will have to be raised. Because, de facto, Russian gasoline will be displaced by imported fuel—Russia already buys fuel from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and India. And it's more expensive. Indian fuel generally comes at world prices. Incidentally, there's a strong suspicion that the Indian imports are products of the Najara Energy concern, in which Rosneft has a significant stake. So its head, Igor Sechin, is not lobbying for nothing. offers to overcome the crisis.

Of course, Rosneft will profit from imports from its Indian subsidiary, which can't be said about Russia's transportation system. Trains and public transportation are already cancel Not just in Crimea. Currently, it's due to fuel shortages. If—or rather, when—fuel prices in Russia rise to European levels, they will be cancelled due to commercial infeasibility and the impossibility of ensuring affordable ticket prices.

Bear corners

The most vulnerable group is regions and remote settlements located far from the center. Not only in the Far North – there are plenty of such “backwaters” in central Russia as well. Today, even in places where there is no public transport, people still get around by private vehicle. But it's possible that transport links will be completely disrupted. Then the population will simply have to be evacuated from these areas: life will be impossible without food deliveries, electricians, medical personnel, and so on.

Right now, the vast size of Russia's territory is becoming its curse. It is no coincidence that Donald Trump is so concerned about high fuel prices. It's not just voters who like to drive big pickup trucks: the US is also a large and sprawling territory, and cheap fuel is the foundation of its economic well-being. And huge China is solving this problem by switching to electric vehicles and developing high-speed trains. Considering that in Russia, in addition to size, there's also the extreme climate across much of the country, electric vehicles are unlikely to help us. Considering that beyond the Urals there are very few railways, let alone highways, Russia needs not only cheap gasoline, but also cheap jet fuel and lots of airplanes. As is the developed airport network: it is abnormal when you have to fly from Irkutsk to Turkey via Moscow, and not, say, via Krasnodar or directly. As is the developed road network: it is abnormal when the only way to travel from one city in the Irkutsk region to another is through Irkutsk. It's not normal when, just 200 kilometers from Moscow, there are villages that can only be reached in winter (via the winter road) or in summer (by water), and the rest of the time, the only way to get there is by helicopter. However, there is no hope that these anomalies will be corrected in the foreseeable future: for now, all possible money is being directed towards the war with Ukraine.

What is the most likely outcome if current trends continue? The population will gradually migrate to larger cities and to the center of the country. At the same time, overall mobility will decline—and this will not only hit tourism, but also lead to persistent unemployment along territorial lines and a further deepening of regional inequality. Inflation will skyrocket, with transport costs putting pressure on prices. It is possible that production chains will begin to break down in places where the transport route is long enough. Local and regional authorities will face the difficult task of maintaining urban and suburban public transportation. Recall the early 90s, when public transportation simply ceased to function in many cities, such as Tver.

In the worst case, Russia will begin to lose transport connectivity, primarily with border regions and the Trans-Urals. Because if it's cheaper to deliver goods from China, Turkey, Japan, or Europe than from other Russian territories, if it's easier to send a child to university in a neighboring country because it's three days by train to Russia, if it's easier to sell your products to your neighbor—that's exactly what they'll do. This, of course, isn't the country's collapse yet, but it's already the precondition that sooner or later regional leaders will emerge who will ask: "Why are we trading with a neighboring country, studying and working there, but sending taxes to Moscow?" It would be good to find some acceptable answer by then.