Time to read: 11 minutes(s)

Guessed all the letters, but still couldn't name the word

How the Z-community lives in the fifth year of the war

Two years ago, "NeMoscow" talked I spoke with Ivan Filippov, author of the Telegram channel "All Quiet on the Western Front," about what Z-space is and why it's important to explore it. All this time, Ivan has not only continued to study, as his channel's header puts it, "what the Z-nits are whining about today," but also wrote a book about it, "All Quiet on the Western Front: Putin's Russia vs. Putin," which was just published by Freedom Letters.

Today, we asked Ivan Filippov how the fifth year of the war differs from its beginning, and how today's Zetniks differ from those who enthusiastically rushed to "denazify" Ukrainians back then. What do they think of Putin, mobilization, and victory—do they still believe it will be "ours"? And what did he write about all this in his new book?

"This book is about how Putin's supporters tell us about the structure of Putin's Russia," says Filippov. "What we all think about the Motherland—soya relocators, liberals, and other fools who believe in democracy—that's clear to everyone. But let's look at what people who support Putin and the war think about the Motherland. This is, in fact, the idea behind the book. But this isn't a collection of quotes—it's a summary of experience: what we've learned about society, the structure of the country, the war, the army, and, finally, attitudes toward Putin, from his most devoted supporters."

My book is a kind of chronology of how they consistently recount the endless decay and degradation of the Putin system. They just don't reach the final conclusion that Putin is personally to blame for all of this. My colleagues and I often say about some Zelenskyy that they "guessed all the letters but couldn't spell the word." And I spell out the word for them—in the finale, myself, without quotations, based on everything I learned from them.

— Are all Z-space representatives really such devoted Putin supporters? Reading your channel, I increasingly have doubts…

"We can say with certainty that they were Putin supporters from the start and remained so until about 24. Now, as 2026 draws to a close, we can't be sure of that. But they still don't criticize him publicly. And this is largely due, of course, to the fact that this could land you in jail, guaranteed and very quickly, but not only that. After all, admitting that Putin was wrong, that he's incompetent and uninformed means not only admitting one's own stupidity but also admitting that February 24, 2022, was a fatal mistake for the history of the entire country. And that's extremely difficult for them."

I think those capable—even in private—of calling Putin the way he deserves are still a minority. True, some channels have already emerged that are taking the risk of writing: "Guys, let's stop cowardly writing that the Tsar is good and the boyars are bad—after all, the Tsar personally appointed each of these boyars and is responsible for them; there are no random people there."

According to Ivan Filippov, he systematized his Z-archive, which included nearly 50 messages from 1900 Telegram channels. An analysis of this vast corpus of material, accumulated over many years, forms the basis of the book.

"First, I explain who the people behind the Z-channels are, where they came from, and how a full-fledged media space emerged from the scorched ashes of 2022. Then I explain my methodology: it's not that I blindly trust these sources and quote them mindlessly—no, it was a whole system of working with unreliable sources with constant double-checking, a lengthy investigation of this swamp. Then I take each topic in turn, which we learned about largely thanks to the Z-channels, and tell them in my own words: the cost of a Russian soldier's life, the reset, the war on credit, the story of General Popov... The last story is one of my favorite chapters in the book: after reading it, even someone who knows nothing about Putin or our country can form a very accurate impression of the state of affairs. And finally, the ending is a conclusion to the entire narrative."

— How have the moods in Z-space changed recently?

— 2025 passed for them, vacillating between "everything is good and could be even better" and "everything is bad and could be even worse." Then 2026 came to a turning point: they became sad at the beginning of the year and haven't stopped feeling sad since. The hallmark of 2026 is a persistently depressive state. The reason is a combination of factors related to the war and the front, as well as domestic politics and the situation in the rear. At the end of this winter, a consensus emerged in the Z-community that the war had reached a stalemate. And a second consensus is that mobilization is no longer a magic wand and will not lead to a breakthrough at the front, to a radical change in the nature of the war, because at the front, Ukraine—this is their assessment, not mine—has regained its dominance in the "low sky" [i.e., at extremely low altitudes. — Ed.].

By this point, both the military and civilians realized that Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin had decided to disrupt Telegram. This is the nervous system of not only the army, but the entire volunteer movement, which is fundamentally impossible without Telegram. They've tried, and continue to try, moving their fundraising and coordination to other platforms, but it's not working. And then they started remembering all their other grievances: that the government treats them like serfs, that dialogue with the government is completely impossible, that the government doesn't even consider them interlocutors... Then oil refineries started burning, and what they call a "new fuel reality" emerged. Wildberries and Ozon warehouses started burning. The space became heavily politicized. And now they're calling for elections and urging people to vote against United Russia. They're saying, "Dear government, look at us. We are your most loyal supporters. For you and for your war, which we support with all our might, we sacrifice time, money, energy, health, and risk our lives." "And that's how you treat us. When the revolution starts, we won't protect you. But now, dear government, think about it: if we feel this way, what do ordinary people think of you?"

— Will there be a mobilization this fall? What does the Z community think about this?

"They have no consensus on this issue. And the fact that Russian authorities frequently deny rumors of impending mobilization doesn't inspire confidence that it won't happen—quite the opposite. Rumors are multiplying at an incredible rate: maybe it will, maybe it won't. Will it be overt or creeping? That's also unclear. Some believe Belarus will open another front in the winter—I think that's sheer nonsense, but there are those who believe that. I think you just need to be prepared in advance and have a plan for any scenario."

— How competent are they in their predictions? Can they be trusted?

"If we consider the Z community as a kind of collective mind, they are sometimes competent in matters of war, but not in matters of politics. Maps and arrows, movements on the front—they understand those things. They can be used as an indicator of public sentiment. I'll quote one author who expressed what I believe to be a very valid point this year: Strelkov may be acting like a hysterical squirrel, but his predictions tend to come true, albeit not immediately. But they have neither the expertise nor the resources to predict what the Kremlin or the presidential administration will do."

— A year ago, Roman Alekhine, a prominent Zetnik who regularly slanders foreign agents, was added to this list himself. It seems after that he began to understand something about foreign agents and Russian laws…

"This is a very vivid story, because it's very funny. Alekhine, of course, understood that foreign agency status isn't awarded for working for the enemy, but is used as a tool of political repression. Moreover, he argues with Putin when he says that our foreign agent legislation is copied from the American one. Kneeling on his Telegram channel, he counters him with a well-reasoned argument. He writes pitiful posts, tries to challenge his status in all the courts. And naively believes that truth will ever prevail. Incidentally, I agree with foreign agent Alekhine: truth will indeed prevail. It's just that as long as the regime that Roman Alekhine supports and endlessly glorifies exists, he will only get what he's been getting in the courts.

— And the rest—did they understand anything? Or do they think “a terrible mistake has been made”?

Some of his comrades—for example, Tatyana Montyan, who was added to the list of terrorists and extremists—also, of course, drew their own conclusions. But to say that the entire community reached such a conclusion? No. To say that they understood that a state in which a foreign agency is used for political repression is an authoritarian and totalitarian state? Also no. Generally, understanding is difficult in this space.

For example, there's a Z-rated poetess named Anna Dolgareva—she wrote a very sympathetic piece about Lev Shlosberg. She expressed the following thought: it's a great pity that pacifism is impossible in the country right now. But when there's no room for pacifism in a state, that's one of the hallmarks of fascism, according to Umberto Eco. Does Dolgareva draw this conclusion? No, she doesn't.

— Do you have any “favorites” among the Zetniks?

"Generally, I don't like them. Although I've never dehumanized them and always understood that, while unpleasant, they are also people. And I've never posted mocking videos of Russian military deaths on my channel. As for my favorites... There are the channels "Military Informant" and "Informant"—they're very smart. They're not cannibalistic, not mocking, and they're capable of admitting that a Russian missile hit a residential building in Kyiv, rather than claiming it was the work of Ukrainian air defense. There's the channel "Time to Go Home"—its author and I know each other personally and correspond about once a week. There's Anastasia Kashevarova—she occasionally writes complete nonsense, but at some point, in the heat of the moment, she can write a piece that will, in some sense, go down in history." For example, there's this phenomenon called crippled regiments, which are assembled from the partially recovered wounded: people on crutches are simply yanked out of the hospital and sent back to the front lines. This has been described many times, but before Kashevarova was the first to write about it, no one dared to talk or write about it. And then there's this channel called "Desantnik Diary" (A Paratrooper's Diary)—it's run by a man who could be used as a paragon of stupidity. He sometimes writes such stupid texts—it's so bad, it's almost good.

— Have you had any experience of personal communication with them?

You can watch my conversation with the author of the "Time to Go Home" channel on Tatyana Felgenhauer's YouTube channel. I regularly quoted from this channel. And every time I quote from a channel, my readers come and write comments that the author really doesn't like. And after another attack, the author of "Time to Go Home" wrote: "Damn cowardly netwarist Ivan Filippov, I challenge you to a debate." I responded. We just talked at first, and then we had a public debate. It was a very strange experience: the man would say one thing on camera, and when the camera turned off, his intonation noticeably changed. It's not that he was on the same side of the barricade with me, but... I think that by the end of 2026, many of the "Zetniks" will have a significantly changed worldview. Perhaps 2027 will bring some changes in this environment.

— You're constantly immersed in this environment—are you losing your mind?

— Well, how can I say it's not working? When I started in journalism, I worked in news for four years. That means I had to process a huge amount of traumatic information every day: it was the early 2000s—the second intifada, Beslan, the terrorist attacks in Moscow… When Beslan happened, I only left work four days later—and the whole time we had six TVs on, broadcasting six different channels. There was so much that was difficult, scary, bloody… So the news provides such a protective shield that, by and large, it's hard to shake your composure. It's a very strong protection for many years, but it's also a serious professional deformation. It's unhealthy.